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Abstract: 
The theory of justice which is an influential school of thought in legal 
theory advocates for the concept of distributive justice and the unequal 
distribution of wealth among the members of society due to their 
unequal standings. The extension of the theory of justice to the arena 
of international relations and to the idea which seeks the reduction of 
the concept of basic structure from the ideal concept of “Global 
Government” has resulted in the development of the concepts of 
“Global Governance” in structure and “International Difference 
Principle” as the strategy to be applied to meet the goals of the 
international justice-centered approach. In this theoretical context, the 
WTO and its trade-based policies have been adopted as the 
international structure and international strategy to address the 
problem of inequality. This research examines the numerous features 
and aspects of the WTO and international trade and with specific 
regard to the theory of justice it studies the paths which the WTO and 
international trade could take in order to better fulfill the requirements 
of the principles of justice. 
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Preamble 
The history of the concept of justice goes back to the time when human beings 
realized that isolation was not a practical option for living and that guidelines 
were needed for the interaction that resulted from a social existence. The ideal of 
equal entitlement and equal standing goes back to the time when human being 
started to live together as part of the first steps towards civilization. The 
requirement to be able to compare one-self with other members of society from an 
economic and social perspectives inspired people to look for a concept or 
framework which met their demands. Justice is a naturally-desirable goal which 
seeks to address the undesirability of injustice. All human beings and all members 
of a society recognize justice as a good and desirable end and acknowledge 
injustice in its conceptual sense, as an undesirable situation. This sense of looking 
for equality in opportunities is one of the most ancient social goals which has 
been targeted by social movements and reformists and it can therefore be claimed 
that no other social target could have taken precedence over the concept of justice. 
 
The most critical and significant issue addressed by justice is inequality. The 
problem of inequality in several aspects of social life has motivated society to 
effect change by the introduction of justice to be part and parcel of their lives 
affected. Despite the fact that inequality can be seen and experienced from several 
different angles including social, political and economic, it is economic 
inequality, which this research concentrates on, that has been studied as the most 
important aspect of inequality or contributor to inequality; the sort of inequality 
which could be highlighted as the facilitator or even creator of different other 
inequalities. The economy is an important factor in determining political position 
and an advanced and developed economy strengthens one’s position in political 
bargaining and decision-making. Therefore, political and social inequality cannot 
be dealt with comprehensively unless economic inequality has been addressed and 
dealt with.   
14 
 
 
Through the progression of the social lives of human beings and the increasing 
complexity of the social relationships, many new issues were raised and differing 
attitudes of acceptance as well as various interpretations were put forward as a 
means of passing judgment on the desirability of certain situations, acts and the 
absence or omission of certain acts. Several social movements and lots of social 
reformists aimed at bringing justice to what they believed was an unjust order. 
The development of societies and complexity of the ensuing social relations made 
passing judgment on whether or not actions were just or unjust difficult and often 
resulted in contradictory judgments pertaining to examples of just and unjust 
actions. The development of other social values such as freedom contributed to 
the complexity of the situation and the conflict of social values based on different 
views towards social issues resulted in different views toward justice. 
 
The problem of inequality on a global level is a global problem which can be 
classified as a root cause for many other global problems. In fact inequality is the 
mother of all problems which involve human suffering and from a liberal 
perspective is a sort of market externality which requires collective action. 
Economic inequality is an issue which requires an urgent response. A report by 
Action Aid has revealed that hunger could be costing poor nations USD 450 
billion a year which is more than ten times the amount needed to halve hunger by 
2015 and meet the Millennium Development Goal.1 The importance of economic 
inequality highlights the urgency with which this problem should be dealt with, as 
the later it is tackled, the greater will be the gap between the rich and poor and the 
more difficult it will be to solve the problem.  
 
As a consequence of the legal and de facto denationalization, due mainly as a 
result of globalization, many new problems have been generated and many 
                                                          
1 Report  Action Aid, "Who's Really Fighting Hunger," available at: 
http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/scorecard.pdf. 
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existing problems have increased.2 The process of globalization has caused global 
problems and today's world is faced with several complex and multi-aspect 
problems which require coordination and cooperation on a global level. These 
global problems are different in nature and exhibit difficult features; some involve 
human suffering around the world, some refer to the problem of the behavior of 
individual states in terms of war and oppressiveness and some others to market 
externalities and mainly environmental issues such as climate change which calls 
out for a collective action plan.3 The problem of inequality is one of the global 
problems which has been exacerbated during the years of globalization.  
 
A considerable number of international solutions have been initiated to deal with 
the global problems in general and specifically the problem of inequality. The 
solutions have been put forward and international arrangements have been set up 
to direct the global efforts for dealing with these problems. However, the 
solutions and proposals should all be dealt with in a theoretical framework. The 
initiatives presented in dealing with the problem of inequality fall short of a 
theoretical perspective and lack coherency or enforceability and mostly focus on 
financial foreign aid and therefore as a result of the lack of comprehensive 
framework of governance to tackle the problem on a global scale and to manage 
the initiatives and proposals, they often act against each other. A theoretical 
framework serves as an input for comparing what could be rationally acceptable 
as just based on people being in equal situations. In this way, we are able to 
develop reasonable parameters for a comparison with what actually occurs and for 
proposing changes in the actual functioning of society and in the principles of 
justice that should govern the system as a whole in which we are socially and 
economically integrated and form a part of.4 
 
                                                          
2 Public Forum 2009 WTO, "Global Problems, Global Solutions: Toward Better Global 
Governance," available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum09_e/public_forum09_e.htm. 
3 Charles R. Beitz, "Cosmpolitanism and Global Justice," The Journal of Ethics 9(2005). p.11 
4 Rafael Rosa Cedro, "John Rawls Justice as Fairness and the Wto," The Law and Development 
Review (2010). p.125 
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Currently the world is witnessing significant inequality in the distribution of 
wealth across the globe. Technological progress and the invention of various 
instruments of communication such as the internet have contributed to the call for 
global initiatives in order to address the global problems. The end of the cold war 
and the rise of new energy being channeled into setting a new structure of 
international relations together with the serious will of nation-states to deal with 
the global problems in a global manner, have accelerated the endorsements and 
development of global governance.5 
 
1.1. The Theoretical Framework 
This research has been done within the paradigm of Realism in international law6 
and the liberalism school which distinguish itself from other theoretical schools 
within the paradigm of Realism by advocating and promoting the absence of state 
intervention in the national economy and fostering the theory of comparative 
advantage and free trade in the international and global economy.7 In liberalism, 
state intervention in the national economy is rejected and it provides a free-based 
framework to remove all barriers to trade and to enable all sectors of the economy 
on national and international levels to compete on an equal basis. The liberal 
school justifies itself not only based on rights-based justifications but also on 
consequential-based arguments by asserting that the theory of comparative 
advantage and free trade will bring about the integration of national economies 
                                                          
5 Tanja Bruhl and Volker Rittberger, "From International to Global Governance: Actors, Collective 
Decision-Making, and the United Nations in the World of the Twenty First Century," Volker 
Rittberger, ed., Global Governance and the United Nations System (Tokyo: United Nations 
University Press) (2002). p.3 
6 For more on other paradigms such as Fiduciary Realism and Legal Nihilism look at The Oxford 
Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, Edited By: Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro, 
Oxford University Press, 2002, New York 
7 The other competitive approaches either support the strategic trade theory or solely criticize 
capitalism for the regression of developed countries. The Nationalism approach, also known as 
Statism, Mercantilism and Economic Nationalism, foster the strategic trade theory by rendering a 
modern variant of an infant industry and by providing the theoretical framework for the 
governments to assist their national firms and industries to capture rents by protecting domestic 
markets with tariffs and non-tariff barriers and also subsidizing their input or output or exports. 
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resulting not only in the maximization of economic welfare but also guaranteeing 
peaceful relations in the political arena.   
 
The relevancy of the liberal school of thinking to our research goes back to the 
relationship between political theory and law and the fact that the theory of justice 
as a theory developed mostly through the links or association of political 
philosophy with international law (and international trade law). Additionally, to 
apply a more practical approach to this theoretical subject and to avoid the 
critique of ethical relativism,8   liberalism, as the theoretical pattern of the 
majority of wealthy states, will be utilized as the political approach of this 
research. 
 
While the well-known approach towards the school of liberalism believes in the 
commitment of liberalism to liberty in a general sense, this research believes in 
the lesser known approach which argues that liberalism as the adopted school in 
western societies is more committed to equality than liberty.9   Equality looks for 
fairness in access to opportunities which determine the level by which one profits 
from liberty. Therefore a duty would be established for developed countries to 
remove inequality as they are committed to liberalism. 
 
However the problem of inequality on an international level has been analyzed in 
the school of liberalism mainly through two different approaches. The first 
approach bases its argument on human rights and several international human 
rights such as right to food and right to shelter which are all acceptable 
international norms and which all have implications for the problem of inequality. 
These implications, though important, have not provided a coherent and 
comprehensive solution for the problem of inequality and they cannot be turned 
from a minimalistic concept of inequality into a comprehensive and binding 
framework. To fill this gap, developing countries and a considerable number of 
                                                          
8 Frank J.  Garcia, "Trade, Inequality, and Justice: Toward a Liberal Theory of Just Trade," 
Transnational Publishers (2003). p.53 
9 Ibid. p.56 
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academics and researchers have developed a new type of human rights namely  
"the right to development" to present a more comprehensive solution for the 
problem of inequality. However, this type of human rights needs to be worked on 
further and the developed countries have not agreed to give more than an ethical 
value to this. 
 
However the liberal school and the equality-oriented concept of this school 
present the theory of justice as a comprehensive and theoretical framework in 
addressing inequality. The justice-centered approach, as the adopted framework in 
this research, addresses the problem of inequality and details the requirements of 
its implementation and lots of theories, dating from Socrates, Plato and Aristotle 
right up until the present day, have been rendered in order to detail several aspects 
of the concept of justice and its requirements in social life, economy and politics. 
 
1.2. The Concept of Justice in International Law 
The Law as a system of rules and regulations which aims at regulating the 
relations among social actors and resolving their conflicts has been based on two 
major premises: order and justice. In certain situations order has been ignored 
while honoring the requirements of justice and in certain other situations, justice 
has been put in second place when it has been in conflict with requirements of 
order. As a result of the development of the human society and the entering by the 
human civilization into more complex environments, different branches and 
subsidiaries of the science of law have been originated and consequently, the 
general sense and definition of justice seemed insufficient to fix the orientation of 
several subjects of law. 
 
The justice school and approach in private law and public law enjoys a 
longstanding and diverse literature. In tort law, the theory of justice rules that 
certain principles and rules are considered as just rules and at the same time 
certain others as unjust provisions. In property law and contract law, few 
implications of the concept of justice are envisaged and it has a deep effect on 
19 
 
subject matters of public law such as tax law. Even in Criminal law, the justice 
approach has been one of the most influential academic schools. 
 
On the other hand, the issue is different in international law. Due to its recent 
establishment, there has not been a real and coherent justice approach and 
international law in political and economic order envisages lots of dilemmas 
between different theoretical schools. Several aspects of the Justice approach have 
been unsuccessful in the international arena and even some well-known theorists 
of justice school have denied the importance, inspiring and the dominance of 
justice principles in international order. The most important theory of justice, 
while admitting the importance of the requirements of justice in all human-
centered relations and transactions, rules out the possibility of the implementation 
of justice principles in international relations due to the absence of a global basic 
structure. 
 
However the rise of global problems and global issues has called for some sort of 
global management to deal with these issues. The establishment of international 
institutions and initiatives in recent decades has made the argument of the absence 
of a global basic structure unacceptable. On the other hand, the current 
international situation highlights more than ever the need for the implementation 
of the concept of justice in international law. This issue becomes more critical 
when one realizes that international law as the basis for regulating the behavior of 
international actors has inherited lots of inequalities and injustice. The dark 
history of colonialism and also the massive and systematic violation of human 
rights in the following era of the industrial revolution have shaped the current 
form of international order in an unjust manner. Moreover, the evolution of 
international institutions after the Second World War, introduced a new scheme of 
international law which to some extent affected the process of wealth distribution 
on an international scale. 
 
On the other hand, some academics who believe in cosmopolitan concept of 
justice even refused to accept the basic structure as the pre-condition for applying 
20 
 
principles of justice and have ruled for the relevance of the concept of justice and 
distributive justice whenever inequality exists in the distribution of goods; these 
goods are considered to be  scarce in an absolute sense and yet the dominant 
schools and approaches such as the efficiency-centered and liberty-oriented 
principles could not result in optimized allocation of these scarce goods.10 
 
The inequalities embedded in international law have motivated the recent scholars 
and academics to resort to the justice theories more than before. Despite the fact 
that individuals are separated by national boundaries, economic relations have 
brought them together and they are able to affect each other's welfare. This 
interaction and its consequential effects together with the major inequality 
resulting from economic globalization have triggered the concept of justice. 
Therefore, the justice approach in international law is now in the process of 
evolution and has moved from its inception and related immaturity to an 
acceptable and more developed position.    
 
Some academics and researchers, mainly Rawls approach to international justice, 
have looked for a clear distinction between international justice and global justice. 
This attempt normally originates from the approach which looks at justice on an 
international scale as a neutral notion governing only the international actors 
which interact with each other. According to this view, international justice is a 
well-known and well-accepted concept on an international scale which sets out to 
explain and provide detailed principles for liberal foreign policy and in contrast, 
global justice is a nebulous conception of justice on an international scale which 
does not have any clear and distinct subject. This approach is rooted in the theory 
surrounding the significance and moral value of international boundaries. 
Therefore, the point of departure would shift from individuals and persons to 
Peoples and nations and international justice would be limited to certain general 
                                                          
10 Friedrich Breyer, "Health Care Rationing and Distributive Justice Author," Rationality, Markets 
and Morals 0(2009). p.394 
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principles in foreign policy as a guide for just relations with other societies rather 
than being a proxy global governance structure.11 
 
This research is based on the unimportance of political boundaries from a moral 
and theoretical point of view. Global justice which puts its emphasis on 
individuals and equality among all human beings is an influential concept; the 
application of which cannot be impeded by political boundaries and neither do the 
political boundaries have the capacity and legitimacy of limiting the application 
of justice principles to international relations. In fact many borders across the 
world are divisions generated during colonial times which in some cases has 
lumped diverse communities and cultures into one state while in other cases it has 
split a single community into more than one state. Even in regions such as Europe 
in which the states generally represent nations with same culture, language or 
history, due to the globalization process the national borders are losing their 
importance.  
 
Therefore, global justice as an influential concept and relevant theory enjoys the 
required legitimacy and justification to be applied globally but political 
boundaries are an existing reality which cannot be ignored in this process. In other 
words, the principles of justice enjoy the legitimacy and necessary justification to 
be applied internationally and globally but the question is, with the existing 
concept of states and political boundaries how can the justice theory find its way 
into the international domain. To answer these questions and meet these 
requirements, the concept of "Global Governance" has been developed to provide, 
in the absence of global government, the justificatory basis for the principles of 
justice and has been presented as the optimal pattern of the justice framework.  
 
                                                          
11 Saladin Melcked-Garcia, "International Justice, Human Rights and Neutrality," Kluwer 
Academic Publishers 10(2004). p.170 
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1.3. WTO and International Trade 
When conducting a review of the current structure of international relations and 
global governance, it becomes apparent that the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) is suitably and appropriately placed to take the global governance role. 
The WTO is one of the most powerful and successful international institutions in 
international relations and international law and in the short period since its 
establishment a considerable record in removing trade barriers and contributing to 
the world's welfare can be attributed to the WTO. The elimination of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to trade brought about the integration of national economies 
leading to the dependency of national economies on each other. This dependency 
influenced international relations significantly and contributed to the stabilization 
of international peace, and this fact highlights the WTO as an organization which 
has commitments to peace and justice.12 In addition, the organization has 
introduced a new model of decision-making and set an efficient dispute settlement 
regime which is widely recognized as a successful initiative. While the WTO is 
not an ideal organization, and cannot be described as the end point in the justice 
approach, it however provides a new framework in which the economic relations 
of the WTO Members can be studied from the justice perspective. 
  
On the other hand, international trade plays an important role in the problem of 
inequality. International trade plays a significant role in exacerbating or 
decreasing the problem of inequality by tackling the issue through the areas of 
comparative advantage and competitiveness. Therefore, the impact of the trade 
forum on other global problems has forced researchers and scholars to seek a 
solution within the international trade and WTO framework; a solution which not 
only preserves the great success of reduced trade barriers and enhanced welfare 
but also addresses the issue of inequality. Therefore, as a first step the theory of 
justice and the two principles of justice will be developed on an international 
scale and for the second step the developed theory will be applied to the WTO as 
the leader of global governance in structure and international trade as the strategy 
for addressing the problem of inequality. 
 
                                                          
12 Cedro, "John Rawls Justice as Fairness and the Wto." p.122 
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I. Liberal Theory of Distributive 
Justice and International Economic 
Order 
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1. Justice on National and International 
Scales 
The requirement for justice and equality developed once mankind found himself 
living in a shared common environment with others. Despite the ideas which look 
at the individual's life as the scope of application for the concept of justice, the 
social side of justice which has been reflected in various theories and schools of 
thought came into discussion as a result of the shared life that mankind has. 
Therefore, the developed ideas, principles and rules all addressed the 
establishment of justice in the society in which people lived and interacted with 
each other; this society being limited to the group of people in the same territory 
and the rules of justice which addressed the distribution of burdens and 
advantages created in that society. Following the industrial revolution, the 
enhancement of telecommunication technologies, the globalization process and 
the creation of nation-states, the theories, principles and provisions developed in 
the limited domestic society were presented in a larger scheme. The establishment 
of international law in its conventional sense provided primary and basic 
principles and rules which contained both advantages and disadvantages and 
raised the question regarding whether or not the justice-oriented outlook was 
relevant and applicable to international relations and mankind on a global scale. 
The presentation of justice theory on an ultra-national scale found supporters and 
opponents and a new division occurred among the justice theorists on a national 
scale. Reviewing justice as the adopted approach of this research requires 
studying the concept on two different levels; the national level and the 
international level. 
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1.1 National Concept of Justice 
The most developed and coherent justice approach refers to the theory of justice 
on a national scale which is applicable to the structures and arrangements within a 
nation-state. Any study of the concept of justice on a global and international 
scale requires the study of justice school on a national level due to the fact that the 
principles set for the national distribution of wealth have been developed in a new 
sense on an international level. However, the national concept of justice has been 
studied in two different categories; a traditional concept of justice which refers 
generally to the schools of thought and approaches before the establishment of 
international law and specifically to the Aristotelian definition of justice, and the 
modern concept of justice which has been developed in recent decades and has 
been shaped and tailored as a result of the interaction of national and international 
approaches to justice.  
 
1.1.1. Traditional Concept: Aristotelian Approach 
Following the presentation of the two concepts of Corrective Justice and 
Distributive Justice by Aristotle, the main legal theories were shaped around the 
role and position of these two sorts of justice in different branches of law. The 
history of these two concepts goes back more than two thousand years and since 
that time many scholars and academics adopted these concepts as the point of 
reference for the development of their own legal theories. Prior to Aristotle, the 
concept of justice had been one of the main subjects of discussion and study 
among the well-known philosophers of that era. Socrates defined justice as the 
organization of both the individual and society whereas the Platonic concept of 
justice accepted only the organization of social life and the relationship of the 
parts to the whole.13  Aristotle developed the Platonic notion of justice and 
developed the approach by extracting two different and distinct concepts of 
justice. While the history of legal philosophy presents four separate descriptive 
approaches to justice; i.e. reciprocal justice, retributive justice (Punishment of 
criminal wrongdoers), distributive justice and corrective justice,14 Aristotle's 
                                                          
13 Garcia, "Trade, Inequality, and Justice: Toward a Liberal Theory of Just Trade.", p.46. 
14 Fen Deng, "Corrective Justice in the Confucian Legal Tradition: A Nonexistent Concept!," 
available at: 
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traditional theory has been shaped on the challenge and interaction of two 
concepts of justice; i.e. distributive justice and corrective justice, each with its 
own special definition and distinct view toward individuals, entitlements and 
equality.15 
 
1.1.1.1. Corrective and Distributive Justice 
According to Aristotle's theory, corrective justice includes a special concept of 
justice which is the equality in behavior and compensation of a victim of 
wrongdoing. Corrective justice means engaging with the different parties of a 
transaction irrespective of the differences between them with the aim of rectifying 
and eliminating any wrongful acts.16 Accordingly the criterion for judgment is 
whether or not a party has violated another party's rights and the other party has 
the right to compensation or not. Distributive justice is the rival notion of 
corrective justice developed first by Aristotle. Unlike corrective justice which 
assesses the belongings of an individual before and after a transaction, distributive 
justice considers the belongings of at least two different individuals and members 
of a society.  
 
Transactions in general and corrective justice as the theoretical background 
support a kind of equality which Aristotle names Arithmetic Proportion17 and 
aims at rectifying the violation which occurred in the transaction by several means 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/international/clarke_program/conferences/upload/DengFeng.
pdf. p.3 
15 In the theoretical domain, three distinct approaches toward distributive and corrective justice 
have been presented; the Aristotelian and Thomas Aquinas' concept of justice, the Hobbes and 
Grotius concept and finally the Kantian and Hegel's notion of justice. Among these different 
approaches to justice, the Aristotelian view of justice has been the dominant approach as well as 
the oldest and the most influential. 
16 Deng, "Corrective Justice in the Confucian Legal Tradition: A Nonexistent Concept!." p.8 
17 The reason for which he names such a comparison an arithmetic proportion is that based on 
this category of justice a simple comparison would take place between the individual's 
belongings before the transaction and his belongings after the transaction. In a case which the 
two amounts of belongings are equal together, it would be judged that the individual has 
arithmetical equality. 
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such as compensation without considering the special characteristics of the parties 
to the transaction in wealth, sex, race etc.18 The realization of justice in corrective 
justice is subject to equality between the belongings of a given individual before 
and after the transaction whereas in distributive justice it should be equality 
among belongings of the compared individuals which would be at least two 
persons. Aristotle's theory of justice is the result of interaction between the 
corrective and the distributive definitions of justice in different branches and 
fields of law. Each of these definitions has its distinct principles and approaches 
to entitlement and individuals and the just approach in this school of thought 
looks for applications of each of these concepts with their respective principles on 
different scopes of law. 
 
1.1.1.1.1. Principles of Corrective and Distributive Justice 
The principles of traditional concepts of corrective and distributive justice differ 
generally in their respective view toward individuals and society. The core aim of 
corrective justice addresses the issue of functionality by looking at rectifying the 
violations of the individual's rights which could happen in the transactions. 
However, the distributive justice primary rules look at the individuals as the 
members of the political society. In other words, while the concept of corrective 
justice depends on individuals' transactions and its scope of application is limited 
to the individuals involved in the transactions, distributive justice is independent 
of the individuals' transactions and includes all members of society as the 
members of the society and all assets and belongings exist in the society.19 
 
In addition, the notion of corrective justice has been viewed as an independent 
and distinct concept from the rights which it supports. In fact, corrective justice 
has been developed in order to guarantee that the rights and entitlements of 
individuals would not be violated in the intentional and unintentional transactions 
they carry out with each other whereas in distributive justice the rights and 
individual's entitlements are determined by the distributional considerations of 
                                                          
18 Peter Benson, "The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice," Iowa 
Law Review 77(1992). p.538 
19 Deng, "Corrective Justice in the Confucian Legal Tradition: A Nonexistent Concept!." p.12 
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distributive justice which look for distribution of society's wealth according to the 
ranking of each individual in distributional classification of the society. However, 
in distributive justice, the Distributors and Distributees are not limited to specific 
parties of society.20 The Distributors, indeed are the members and the elite of 
society and the Distributees are the members and citizens of that society. 
Moreover, the Distribuenda is not limited to the belongings of the involved parties 
and includes utility, wealth, well-Being, happiness, satisfaction and also the losses 
and pains within the society.21 Finally the criteria of corrective justice for having 
just outcome is the absolute moral equality of the individuals and the equality of 
all human beings with each other and the transaction not to be odds with the 
moral equality of the parties whereas in distributive justice there are many 
discussions and disagreements on "How ought the advantages and disadvantages 
of the society be distributed?" and "How can distribute society's wealth?". The 
answers to these questions are known as the "Distribution Formula" which with 
the Distribution Mechanism is on the subjects on which disagreements exist 
among the researchers. 
 
Corrective justice aims at curing the violation of equality among parties to a 
transaction and the claims which go beyond the parties involved in the transaction 
are presented in the distributive justice framework. This is due to the fact that 
corrective and distributive justice claims include different scopes of 
implementation; while corrective justice claims encompass the losses and profits 
originating from a transaction, the distributive justice overview generally includes 
all deficiencies in the damaged party's share in the wealth distribution. The claims 
which originate from violation of corrective justice take place in a bilateral 
situation in which counterclaims and cross claims rise from a transactional-based 
relation. Accordingly, any derogation from the equality of the parties whether in 
terms of non-imposition of liability on a party which should bear the liability or in 
                                                          
20 Distributive justice has five major pillars: First those who distribute the benefits and losses 
among the members of the society (Distributors); second those among whom the losses and 
benefits of the society are distributed (Distributees); third the objects and things which should be 
distributed among the members of the society (Distribuenda); forth the formula of the 
distribution (Distribution Formulae) and finally the system and structure in which the advantages 
and disadvantages are distributed (Distribution Mechanism). 
21 Robert Hockett, "Minding the Gaps: Fairness, Welfare and the Constitutive Structure of 
Distributive Assessment," Cornell Law School Working Paper Series Paper:21(2006). p.8 
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terms of imposing liability on an individual who has not any liability in the 
transactional scheme would be viewed as a violation of corrective justice. In fact, 
the corrective justice notion presents a negative concept for entitlement in which 
the transacting parties, rather than having a positive obligation to respect others' 
rights, are obliged to abstain from depriving other individuals from what they 
have gained till now.22 
 
Therefore, in corrective justice-based claims, there are always two sides; first the 
party whose belongings have been negatively affected as a result of another 
party's behavior which violates absolute moral equality; and second the party who 
has caused the negative effect.23 In contrast, in distributive justice-based claims 
the claims are multilateral and in the absence of a special case, none of the low-
income members could unilaterally claim against any wealthier members of that 
society. In the distributive justice scheme, no poor member has any better rights 
than any other poor members and consequently no rich member has any 
obligations which are more than other rich members. Consequently, accepting 
unilateral claims would result in the preference of one poor person over other 
poor people and discrimination between one rich person and other rich people and 
this preference and discrimination have been refused and rejected in distributive 
justice.24 Generally, poor members of the society are entitled to claim against 
those who are wealthy members of the society but this rule would not legitimize 
the unilateral claim of a specific poor person against a specific rich member and 
the general wealth of the society and relative classification of people in 
comparison with other members of the society would determine their level of 
entitlement in the distributive justice perspective. 
 
                                                          
22 Benson, "The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice." p.539 
23 Ernest J. Weinrib, "The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice," Duke Law Journal 44, no. 2 
(Nov. 1994). p.277 
24 Richard W Wright, "Substantive Corrective Justice," Iowa Law Review 77(1992). p.706 
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1.1.1.2. The Relation of Corrective Justice and Distributive 
Justice 
Along with the traditional concept of justice, the relationship of these two 
important concepts of justice reflects the theory of justice on a national level in its 
traditional sense. The dependency or independence of these concepts and the 
possibility of their coexistence or not constitutes the general approach of the 
theory of distributive justice and the scope of application of these concepts and 
principles. The dominant approach to justice theory looks at corrective justice as a 
part and complementary notion to the distributive justice theory. The argument 
presents the role of corrective justice to keep and preserve the wealth which has 
been distributed justly and to correct and modify the deviations occurred from the 
just allocation and distribution of the societies' wealth. Therefore, the two aspects 
of justice interact together and corrective justice would be dependent on 
distributive justice conceptually and normatively.   
 
However, the view supported by formalists considers the two concepts of justice 
as totally separate and distinct conceptual principles which are applied in different 
normative domains.25 Accordingly, distributive justice relates to social justice 
aiming at general distribution of assets and wealth in society whereas corrective 
justice applies to the personal transactions and personal justice looking to 
establish formalistic justice and to protect  individuals from any damage to their 
assets and wealth irrespective of distributive justice considerations or any 
injustice which has occurred between the transactional parties before the 
transaction or generally among all members of the society.26  The Aristotelian 
view of justice found the principles of distributive and corrective justice as 
complementary principles which justify each other and the possibility of their 
coexistence whereas the formalists view these concepts as alternative and 
interchangeable concepts and advocate the total separation of corrective justice 
and distributive justice. Therefore, the school of formalism looks at the 
impossibility of co-existence of corrective justice and distributive justice within a 
                                                          
25 Hanoch Dagan, "The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice," Michigan Law Review 
9(October 1999). p.138 
26 Ernest J. Weinrib, "The Idea of Private Law," Harvard University Press (1995). 
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single legal structure coherently and the impossibility of application of two sorts 
of justice on one special domain simultaneously.27 
 
Consequently, the Aristotelian and formalism schools arrive at the same practical 
conclusion in which the distributional-oriented principles are more relevant to 
political theory and corrective justice to personal transactions. While the 
enforcement of corrective justice has been accepted and shifted to the judicial 
power's role and is the dominant rule in certain fields of private law such as 
contract law, the application of distributive justice principles has not been 
considered as function of the courts due to their lack of information on society's 
wealth and the classification of its members, and therefore the legislative power is 
the relevant and capable agent of enforcement. The fields and branches of law 
known as public law should be ruled and shaped mainly by the legislature 
according to distributive justice principles even though the courts and judicial 
establishments play important roles in these fields.28 
 
1.1.2. Most Influential Theories of Justice 
The traditional theory of justice presented by Aristotle who considered the 
absolute ethical equality of human beings and freedom and equality as the final 
goal of the law has been further examined by the modern theories of justice. The 
process of socialization and urbanization which made social relations more 
complicated than before required the theory of justice to clarify the formula of 
distribution in a more detailed and practical manner. Many researchers were 
shifted toward the left-wing and non-liberal theories of justice which viewed 
private ownership and consequently capitalism as obstacles towards a more just 
society.29 However, in the liberal paradigm, while some academics believe that 
the benefits and losses of society should be distributed equally without 
considering personal distinction and qualifications, others criticize such a formula 
and develop alternative routes; these are alternatives which target wealth 
                                                          
27 Wright, "Substantive Corrective Justice." p.707 
28 Ibid. p.710 
29 Heikki Patomaki, "Global Justice: A Democratic Perspective," Globalizations 3, no. 2 (June 
2006). p.116 
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maximization or the free market system with a minimal state interventionist 
system. These liberal theories which all put specific objectives as the target of 
legislation are generally presented in three major schools: Utilitarianism, 
Libertarianism and Egalitarianism. 
 
1.1.2.1.  Utilitarianism 
In Utilitarianism, the concept of Utility includes the psychiatric state of pleasure 
as well as providing benefits and satisfying the desires which set the core stone 
principle which is to establish the distribution criterion based on aggregate utility 
and profitableness. Accordingly, instead of maximization of welfare, the wealth 
and assets of society should be distributed in a manner which maximizes the share 
of each member.30 Apart from distinct subsidiary approaches within 
Utilitarianism,31 the general history of utilitarianism presents the development of 
a traditional concept of utilitarianism as well as the modern utilitarian school of 
thought.  
 
The utilitarianism has been developed mainly by Jeremy Bentham.32 In Bentham's 
theory, not only the selfishness of individuals has been included, but also the 
utilitarian formula which includes the interests of other members of the society. 
According to the traditional point of view, anything which improves and increases 
pleasure and enjoyment would be a moral good and whatever decreases this 
                                                          
30 John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, "Utilitarianism and Other Essays," Penguin Books, Alan 
Ryan (Ed.) (1987). 
31 Within the utilitarian school, three distinct approaches exist: Egalitarian Utilitarianism, Average 
Utilitarianism and Classical Utilitarianism. In egalitarian utilitarianism, the criterion is the 
maximum aggregate utility for each person in a manner which is compatible with the similar level 
of other people's utility. In contrast, the average utilitarianism adopts the aggregate of maximum 
utility for the majority and finally the classical utilitarianism generally considers the maximum 
level of utility irrespective of the manner of distribution. 
32 Bentam has been considered as one of the most successful social reformists after Carl Marx. 
Bentam's social movement resulted in fundamental reforms in lots of regulations and laws, 
prisons, trade unions, free education and this movement contributed a lot in the expansion of 
free trade and freedom of expression. Jacob Viner, Bentham and J.S. Mill: The Utilitarian 
Background- Economic Jusice, ed. Edmund S. Phelps (Penguin Education, England, 1973). p.197. 
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pleasure would be labeled a moral bad.33 Therefore, in traditional utilitarianism 
which was the dominant theory till John Rawls, the theory's value is based on 
happiness and utility and the morality of each act is valued based on its 
consequence on aggregate individual utility.34 35  
 
However, the modern utilitarian approach, known as the neo-utilitarianism, has 
been embedded in Law and Economics school of thought.36 The school of law 
economics believes that a reasonable man is one who seeks maximization of his 
wealth and benefits and that legislation in terms of changing laws imposes prices 
on all activities including even the non-market activities.37 Law and economics 
believes if the social actors act efficiently by themselves, there would be no need 
for the intervention of regulation and that legislation in this situation would cause 
additional expenses for the society.38 The law and economics approach, during its 
short period of existence has been presented in distinct schools.39 However the 
most famous neo-utilitarian school is known as the Chicago School or put another 
way, Positive Law and Economics has been presented more by the well-known 
scholar Richard Posner in 1970s.40 Accordingly, the common law regime is the 
                                                          
33 William C Powers, "Structural Aspects of the Impact of Law on Moral Duty within Utilitarianism 
and Social Contract Theory," UCLA Law Review 26(1979). p.1270 
34 For the aggregate individual utility, two models have been discussed; first the act-utilitarianism 
and second the rule-utilitarianism.  
35 Garcia, "Trade, Inequality, and Justice: Toward a Liberal Theory of Just Trade.", p.57 
36 One of the reasons why the law and economics school succeeded in expanding itself in law was 
the investment of several countries on this issue and the motivation the scholars and academics 
had to view different branches of law from this perspective. Norman Girvan, "Some Lessons of 
the Cariforum-Eu Epa," Trade Negotiations Insights 8(8)(October 2009). p.3 
37 Richard A. Posner, "The Law and Economics Movement," The American Economic Review 77, 
no. 2 (1987). p.8 
38 Richard McAdams and Eric B. Rasmussen, "Norms in Law and Economics," Handbook of Law 
and Economics. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, editors 1-2(2007). p.2 
39 The approach of law and economics, during its short period of existence has produced three 
distinct approaches related to three schools: Chicago School, Yale School and Virginia School. The 
Yale school of law and economics considers law and regulation as the means of providing 
efficiency for the system and dealing with market failures and the Virginia school which is the 
most recent approach in law and economics has included components of both Yale and Chicago 
schools. Francesco Parisi, "Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and Economics," 
European Journal of Law and Economics 18(2004). p.11 
40 Ibid. p.8 
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most efficient mechanism of law which not only follows the Pareto-efficiency but 
also the Kaldor-Hicks pattern in allocating society's resources.41 
 
1.1.2.2.  Libertarianism 
Historically the libertarian approach was developed in response to the Egalitarian 
theory of Rawls, putting the focus more on the liberty in liberalism and 
developing the primacy of liberty as an alternative approach to Rawlsian justice 
theory. Developed mainly by Robert Nozick, they hold as fundamental the 
primary issue of an individual's right to property and consequently refused the 
distributional nature of justice in a positive way.42 Known as radical libertarians,43 
they believe in the freedom of individuals in their transactional relations and the 
idea that the members of the society have a moral right for concluding any 
contract and doing any transaction for transferring their titles of ownership unless 
they violate a third parties' rights. Accordingly, any obligatory transfer of wealth 
irrespective of its title or name and the application of any pattern of justice would 
be considered as intervention in the private life of individuals and therefore a 
form of theft.  
 
The libertarians reject any legislature's intervention whether this is done in the 
name of a paternalistic and welfare-centered motivation or is done as a result of 
the distributional motives which look at changing the share of individuals based 
                                                          
41 The kaldor-Hicks notion of efficiency has provided the concept of efficient breach in contract 
law in which the obligations of the parties should be respected as far as they are efficient for 
both parties and as soon as the agreement turns inefficient, the damaged party could breach the 
agreement and compensate the other party. 
42 Jonathan Wolff, Robert Nozick: Property, Justice, and the Minimal State  (Stanford University 
Press, 1991). p.3. 
43 Within libertarian school there are two different views: Radical Libertarianism and Moderate 
Libertarianism. The radical libertarians are essentially and basically opposed to the concept of 
distributive justice. This school of which Robert Nozick is its most famous leader  believes that 
the only requirement of justice is to protect people's rights to ownership and freedom against 
violation by other people and that the distribution of wealth is acceptable if it aims at the 
rectification of a violation which occurred in past. 
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on the wealth of the society.44 On the contrary, they adopt a sort of distributive 
justice concept in negative terms and recommend a minimal state which if 
extended, would violate the individual’s rights.45 Therefore, justice in a libertarian 
sense means justice in original acquisition of holdings and justice in transfer of 
holdings and any consideration of further requirements would lead to the violation 
of this basic concept and primary principle of libertarianism; i.e. individual 
liberty. 
 
1.1.2.3.  Egalitarianism and Rawlsian School 
Rawls theory of justice was originally developed in a liberal context and was in 
response to the Utilitarian school which defines the principles of equality as the 
underlying principles of his theory; Justice as Fairness.46 His theory is based on 
the egalitarian nature of justice which developed a concept of justice based on the 
notion of fairness, and he was the first one who incorporated the concept of 
distributive justice to a broad framework of legal theory. Rawls theory is made up 
of two principles, known as the first and second principles of justice. According 
to the Egalitarian Theory, due to the uneven distribution of benefits and burdens 
which left certain members of society in a disadvantaged position, the members of 
society agreed to accept the implementation of principles of justice. However, in 
Rawlsian framework, the implementation of principles of justice required the 
existence of a structural arrangement known as a basic structure.  
 
1.1.2.3.1. Rawlsian Principles of Justice 
The first principle of justice requires that each member of society has an equal 
right to equal and adequate basic liberties and consequently the rules defining the 
                                                          
44 Duncan Kennedy, "Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special 
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power," Maryland Law Review 
41(1982). p.571 
45 Charles Jones, "Institutions with Global Scope: Moral Cosmopolitanism and Political Practice," 
Global Institutions Edited by Daniel Weinstock, The Canadian Journal of Philosophy 
Supplementary Volume 31(2005). p.3 
46 Joseph Heat, "Rawls on Global Distributive Justice: A Defence," ibid. p.212 
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basic liberties apply to everyone equally. The basic liberty cannot be restrained 
only if it conjuncts with basic liberties of another member of the society and 
hence rejects any argument of limiting the equality of having basic liberties 
because of greater general economic benefits (utilitarianism) or in favor of 
preferential moral values.47 However, in the second principle of justice, Rawls 
rules for justification of differences in treatment and distribution. The second 
principle named as the Difference Principle provides that the unequal 
distribution of society's primary goods is legitimate to the extent that they benefit 
the least advantaged members. Accordingly, uneven distribution of benefits and 
burdens, leave some members of society in a disadvantaged position and due to 
this fact, members of society have agreed to accept the principles of justice. 
 
1.1.2.3.2. Original Position and Basic Structure 
Arguing in favor of his theory of justice, Rawls developed a new concept called 
Original Position. He believes that members in original position are behind a 
"veil of ignorance" which precludes them from knowing which social class they 
represent and what would be the effect of their decisions on their life. Therefore, 
behind this veil of ignorance which prevents them from knowing their position in 
future, they would adopt the two principles of justice.48 The principles of justice 
would be applied in the future without distinction whether in a poverty situation 
or not and would not favor anyone because of social or economic situation or 
even as a result of luck. The Rawlsian Original Position is an argument which has 
never happened and would not happen, which looks at what the parties should or 
would agree in a primary fair situation and not what has really been agreed in the 
past. Hence it provides a rational basis against the self-interest decision-making 
process and an ideal justification of defining the need for justice and the 
principles to be adopted by all members of the society; i.e. the principles of 
justice.49 Following the adoption of principles of justice, the people choose the 
structural principles of justice and the legislature tries to materialize the different 
                                                          
47 Cedro, "John Rawls Justice as Fairness and the Wto." p.124 
48 John Rawls, "Theory of Justice," Oxford University Press, T. M. Scanlon (Ed.) (2005). p.15. 
49 Cedro, "John Rawls Justice as Fairness and the Wto." p.123 
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aspects of justice in laws and regulations which at the final stage should be 
implemented by the members of society.50 
 
In Rawlsian theory, the invisible hand and the general direction of market acts 
against the direction of justice requirements and for application of principles of 
justice in such condition, existence of a political society is a necessary condition. 
Hence, to establish the justice framework in society, there should be institutions 
which constitute the background conditions of justice, named the Basic 
Structure.51 The Basic Structure generally governs the political society as a 
Scheme of Corporation which is organized for the mutual benefit of its citizens 
who participate in the scheme as free and equal persons.52 In Rawls perspective, 
basic structure is normally constituted from the main political and social 
institutions in a society which form the mechanism of social cooperation and the 
way of distribution of rights and basic duties.53 The two principles of justice apply 
to the basic structure as well as to primary goods; these goods being those which 
individuals generally ask for irrespective of their final end and are normally 
referred to the wealth, rights, income, liberties, self-respect and opportunities.54 
 
The need for the existence of political and social institutions has caused the Rawls 
theory to be limited to the liberal societies. Rawls believe that as the basic 
structure forms the subject of the justice theory, the absence of such subject in 
non-liberal and non-democratic societies results in considering justice as the 
function of basic structure in democratic societies.55 Moreover, the Rawls theory 
only addresses the just distribution of benefits and burdens among the citizens of 
the society and does not involve itself with the issue of scarcity of resources and 
maximization of wealth. Therefore, the egalitarian school of justice would be 
                                                          
50 Volker H. Schmidt, "Procedural Aspects of Distributive Justice," Darmouth, England (1997). 
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52 John Rawls, "Justice as Fairness," The Philosophical Review 67, no. 2 (Apr 1958). p.4 
53 "Theory of Justice." p.61 
54 Ibid. p.332 
55 Brodi Kemp, "International Distributive Justice: Evaluating Cosmopolitan Challenges to the Law 
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viewed as a theory in which the basic structure and primary goods are the subject 
of its framework and justice would be viewed as principles that citizens and 
individuals who are the source of values of the theory must agree upon.  
 
1.1.2.3.3. Inequalities and Just Outcomes 
The Rawlsian perspective provides different individual starting points within the 
basic structure of society influenced by natural, social and economic situations or 
even by luck, creating significant fundamental inequalities in the individuals' life. 
However, the inequality in this sense would not be intrinsically unjust. 
Accordingly, the way which the basic structure, i.e. the institutions, address the 
existing inequality constitutes the notion of just and unjust and the concept of 
justice in this sense refers to the fact of whether or not the basic structure respect 
the two principles of justice in distributing burdens and benefits.56 Rawls justice 
theory looks at quasi-pure procedural justice57 in assessing outcomes as just 
outcomes. In quasi-pure procedural justice, and likewise the pure procedural 
justice, the just outcome is deemed the result of the application of procedures and 
rules. However, while in pure procedural justice no external criterion is being 
considered for judging on the procedural justice, in quasi-pure procedural justice, 
apart from the application of rules and principles, the result should also be just to 
a certain level.58 Therefore, the quasi-pure procedural justice looks for defining 
the limits of freedom and the framework in which the results would be considered 
as just results. Consequently, once a regulation or law has been passed and 
approved, it would be deemed as a just regulation unless it is proved that the 
result, according to quasi-pure procedural justice, is not a just outcome.59 
 
While utilitarianism looks for the satisfaction of the maximum preferences and 
libertarianism looks for the protection of individual rights as the just outcome, the 
                                                          
56 Benson, "The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice." p.605 
57 Procedural justice could be applied in four ways; Perfect Procedural Justice which applies the 
justice in a manner which guarantees the just outcome and Imperfect Procedural Justice which 
the possibility of unjust outcome exists. 
58 Axel Tschenter, The Function of Procedural Justice in Theories of Justice- Procedural Justice, ed. 
Edit by Klaus F. Rohl and Stefan Machura (Darmouth, England, 1997). p.105 
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egalitarian version of just outcome has been materialized in the second principle 
of justice which seeks a difference in distributing resources in favor of the weaker 
and poorer members of the society. In the utilitarian approach, the issue of 
standing and those whose utility counts does not provide a comprehensive 
response to the problem of inequality. Therefore in addressing the problem of 
inequality, the definition of just outcome in each different school of the modern 
concept of justice presents significant reasoning in adopting the egalitarian 
version of the concept of justice. 
 
1.1.2.4.  Why Egalitarian School? 
The egalitarian school has been classified as a deontological ethical theory which 
instead of focusing on the theory of good or act consequences adopts the right-
based approach.60 In the right-based deontological school of thought, the 
individuals are treated as ends in themselves and not as instruments to fulfill other 
goods. The egalitarian school is a deontological ethical theory, putting its point of 
departure on the most important social values; i.e. equality.61  However, the 
utilitarian school cannot be viewed as a comprehensive ethical school. 
Utilitarianism which looks at happiness and utility as the final end falls short of 
being a comprehensive framework for addressing the problem of inequality. 
Recent utilitarian experts have gradually approached wealth maximization and 
utility as goods which by themselves are not final-ends unless they expedite and 
facilitate other social goods. Consequently, the new utilitarian theorists have 
tended to justify utility and wealth maximization not as the final-ends, but as 
means of moving toward the ideal just principles.62 
 
                                                          
60 Ethical theories generally are studied in two categories: first the schools which are based on 
theory of good and second the schools which have adopted their point of departure on theory of 
right. These sort of ethical theories focus on the act rather than the good and end. The main 
branch of the right-based theories is the deontological approaches which form their argument on 
the nature of the act. 
61 Garcia, "Trade, Inequality, and Justice: Toward a Liberal Theory of Just Trade." p.76 
62 Guido Calabresi, "About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin," Hofstra Law Review 
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In addition, the liberal approach of justice looks at the obligatory mechanism for 
redistribution of wealth and society's resources among the members of the society 
whereas the libertarians refuse any intervention into the market's function in the 
name of justice and view these deviations as theft. While the liberal approach is 
distinct from the libertarian approach by introducing wealth maximization via 
market mechanism as well as wealth redistribution by different instruments such 
as equality-oriented tax regimes, the egalitarian school within the liberal context 
favors the priority of equality over liberty.63 The egalitarian school believes in the 
greater commitment of liberalism to equality than liberty. Therefore, equality 
would find priority over liberty and the problem of inequality becomes the most 
significant agenda of the liberal school.64   The egalitarian school criticizes the 
liberty-centered arguments on the basis that in an unequal standing of the parties 
to a transaction in which inequality exist in their bargaining power and also the 
cumulative effect of prior distributions of natural asset, sticking to the libertarian 
self-ownership principle would only be regarded as a purely formal equality 
which would weaken the possibility of substantive justice.65 
 
The egalitarian approach has been also criticized in several different ways. In 
Rawls theory, the fact that there is no distinction between those who become poor 
unintentionally and by chance of life and those who chose to be poor by their own 
decision, has been the subject of criticism.66 Moreover, Dworkin's criticism 
highlights the lack of ambition in the justice theory of Rawls and calls for 
consideration of the role of ambition and ambition-sensitive theory.67 However, 
the egalitarian school despite all the criticism has been viewed as the most 
competent theory in addressing the problem of inequality in a comprehensive and 
coherent manner. 
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1.2. International Distributive Justice (IDJ) 
The creation of nation-states and the establishment of international law elevated 
the theory of justice to a new level. Prior to that, the theory of justice and its 
principles were only discussed on a national scale and within the boundaries of 
society. Following the introduction of the new arrangements on an international 
level, international organizations were established and the decisions made in these 
arrangements started to affect the national decision-makers' decisions and to 
impact the distribution of burdens and benefits. The call for justice on an 
international level was not only inspired by the significance of the role of 
international players in channelizing and impacting wealth creation and wealth 
distribution but it also found a remarkable position in addressing the problem of 
inequality due to historical events. The colonial abuses delegitimized justice in 
acquisition68 and consequently put in question the current international holdings 
not only from a distributive perspective of justice, but also from the corrective 
nature of justice. The call for justice in structuring the relationship of individuals 
in an international and globalized world requires that the possibility of having an 
international version of justice be studied and the theory of justice be developed 
in order to be applicable to the trans-boundary relations. 
 
The necessity of justice on an international level has been realized and studied 
more seriously in recent years. The process of globalization and international 
integration of national economies and national politics have further highlighted 
the fact that the destiny of all nations is becoming more and more dependent on 
each other than before. The increase in integration and dependence, the evolution 
in international means of communication and the integration of the global 
economy which are current and non-stop processes have caused the destiny of 
human beings who were more or less detached from each other prior to that, to be 
more associated together in the coming years and decades. The problem of 
inequality and call for equality from one side and the interdependence of the 
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nations and their affection on the well-being of each other through international 
relations have motivated the action of calling for principles of justice in 
structuring international arrangements. Consequently, the call for just 
international relations and the application of principles of justice on an 
international level have put forward a new concept of justice suitable for the 
international arena. The extension of the second principle of justice to 
international relations has developed the concept of International Distributive 
Justice as the applicable principle in addressing the problem of inequality on an 
international scale. 
 
1.2.1.  Philosophical Foundation of IDJ 
One of the first and the most important aspect of justice in international relations 
is the philosophical account of the concept of international distributive justice. 
The priority of this account is based on the fact that the theoretical study of 
current order and the application of the theory of justice to international relations 
requires a firm and reasonable philosophical justification and argument on the 
issue of trans-boundary application of justice principles and for addressing this 
question it should answer whether individuals of different societies have an 
obligation to one another due to accepting the benefits of membership in global 
institutions.69 
 
Regarding the philosophical routes and targets of international distributive justice, 
disagreement exists among the justice theorists. The definition of a just situation 
has been at the center of the controversies and debates of international justice. The 
end-oriented approach rules that a just situation exists as long as equal outcomes 
exist whereas the act-oriented outlook to justice does not consider a role of 
guaranteeing the equal outcomes among the individuals in a world-wide scale and 
looks towards establishing a just mechanism in which all members of the 
international community enjoy equality in opportunities. Another fundamental 
disagreement addresses the scope of the international concept of justice and the 
                                                          
69 Kemp, "International Distributive Justice: Evaluating Cosmopolitan Challenges to the Law of 
Peoples." p.21 
43 
 
limits of the application of these principles. This disagreement itself is evident 
when considering the reduction of inequality as the primary and most important 
mission of international distributive justice or limiting its role in the international 
arena by providing the basic minimum.70 Consequently, the disagreement in the 
fundamental issues of target and scope cause disagreement in the criterion, rules, 
structures and strategies which have been elaborated in several philosophical 
approaches to the international definition of theory of justice and especially the 
concept of international distributive justice.  
 
1.2.1.1. The Traditional Theory of Justice 
The traditional theory of justice in international relations believes in the 
inapplicability and irrelevancy of the justice principles to international relations. 
The inapplicability of the principles have been justified and argued by resorting to 
several reasons in the theoretical schools. The absence of basic structure, the right 
of self-determination, the neutral approach and minimalist view towards human 
rights and the absence of agents for taking responsibility for the implementation 
of justice principles have been put forward, discussed and reasoned in order to 
develop a limited and neutral role for the justice theory in the international arena. 
These arguments all address the basis on which the inapplicability of justice on an 
international scale has been argued. The most important theorist of the modern 
justice concept on a national scale, John Rawls steps back from his 
comprehensive distributive scheme in international relations and limits the 
applicability of justice principles and especially the second principle of justice to 
the individuals who interact with each other; these interactions which irrespective 
of their condition and situation raise the duty of justice in a general sense.  
 
1.2.1.1.1. Rawlsian Approach: Neutralism and Self-Determination 
The Rawlsian approach to justice in the international domain presents a different 
overview of the definition of individuals and based on its special definition of 
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political boundaries, it considers a new role of distributive justice in international 
relations. The core stone and fundamental concept of the Rawlsian theory, 
whether on a national or international scale, is the notion of basic structure. 
Rawls' theory of justice looks at the existence of basic structure as the prerequisite 
for the application of the principles of justice and from this point of view there 
would be no difference in his theory between the national and international scales. 
The existence of a basic structure justifies the relevancy of justice principles and 
as far as an equivalent structure in international relations could be found or set up 
which represents the people of the international society and distributes the 
burdens and benefits on an international scale, he would apply the same principles 
of justice in international relations. However, in the absence of the basic structure 
on the international arena the result would be the inapplicability of justice 
principles on this stage. Therefore, in Rawls view "there is no global structure 
mainly because there is no "world-state" and "since there is no world-state, there 
is no interdependent global property system to apply a principle of distributive 
justice to, such as the difference principle."71 
 
Rawls international theory originates from his special opinion regarding political 
borders. In accordance with this theory political borders are contingent and 
morally significant which leads to a limited role for the international version of 
principles of justice. The Rawls international theory looks at a way in between the 
mere modus vivendi, determined by the balance of powers and the ideal situation 
of enforced justice principles. His middle way focuses on the states' system and 
establishes the states as the point of departure in developing his international 
theory; i.e. The Law of Peoples.72 Rawls' Law of People generally accepts 
flexibilities and differences in approaching human rights and looks towards 
resolving the tension between a western definition of human rights and different 
liberal and non-liberal political constitutions and societies. Therefore, a neutral 
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approach would be developed which seeks to accommodate the other non-liberal 
but decent societies.73 
 
However, the decent society in Rawlsian terms presents a distinction between 
acceptable and non-acceptable societies with regard to respecting the minimal set 
of human rights. This minimalist approach to human rights which originates from 
Rawls' neutralism in international relations contains only the most basic human 
rights related to the right to life (to the means of subsistence and security); to 
liberty (to freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a 
sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and 
thought); to property (personal property); and to formal equality as expressed by 
the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases be treated similarly).74 The 
neutral and minimalist approach to human rights in international affairs results 
from John Rawls belief that no common, authoritative body; i.e. basic structure, 
which would be capable of distributing burdens and benefits and imposing rights 
and duties does exist. Rawls presents the basic notion of human rights as the 
guide for foreign policy and further develops the idea that this existence of human 
rights could be a legitimacy threshold for all the states which by respecting them 
would block any justification for interfering into other states' affairs.75 
 
Apart from moral reasons and arguments spelling out the neutralist approach of 
John Rawls in international relations76 the political significance of self-
determination justifies the Rawls shift from the person in his theory of justice on a 
national scale to people in the international version of his justice theory. He views 
the people as moralized political groups which due to being represented by their 
internal institutions, are presupposed to be off limits where interference in their 
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affairs is concerned.77 Accordingly any interference in their internal affairs in 
cases other than serious abuses would be a violation of self-determination and the 
non-interference approach and also against the Rawlsian international theory.78 
 
1.2.1.1.2. Other Traditional Approaches 
In addition to the Rawlsian international approach to the role of justice, other 
philosophical and political theories have been presented denying any international 
role for justice or admitting only a limited definition of the concept of justice. The 
theoretical school known as constructivism looks at the agent which the principles 
of justice should govern. Constructivism puts its emphasis more on the operation 
and implementation of the theory and principles rather than focusing on moral 
obligations and theoretical principles.79 The Rawlsian theory could be viewed as  
a constructivist theory in the sense that the basic structure is the responsible agent 
and mechanism of implementation of justice principles and the absence of the 
basic structure on an international and global scale results in the rejection of any 
enforcement of justice principles at any ultra-national level.80 In addition, other 
conservative schools such as the Cosmopolitan Principle of Global Equality of 
Opportunity81 or the Complex Equality82 present a way between sufficientarin 
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approach and egalitarianism which are viewed as conservative approaches to the 
role of justice in international relations. 
 
1.2.1.2.  Transformative Accounts: Cosmopolitan and Non-
Neutralist Approaches 
The second and significant aspect relating to the global version of justice are the 
transformative accounts which look at justice as a global concept that could and 
should be defined and applied not only in international relations but also globally 
without the need to take on board boundaries imposed by political considerations. 
The transformative accounts of justice known as the post-Rawlsian debate have 
endorsed a global concept of justice on ideas such as moral cosmopolitanism, 
universalism, relativism, etc. The transformative approach to international justice 
rejects the Rawlsian theory of international relations and criticizes the theory 
based on the traditional concept of states which constitutes the main pillar of 
Rawls theory. Despite Rawls claim that a global basic structure or a world-state 
does not exist to make the justice principles applicable to international relations, 
such sovereign states that were the basis of Rawls' theory in both domestic and 
international societies do not exist anymore and the theory should consider the 
changes that have occurred in the definition and concept of states.83 There has 
also been criticism of Rawls in the face of the growth of supranational 
organizations with the associated power of imposing binding rules. Although 
international organizations fall short of being a real global state, the general trend 
in international relations within which the discretion of national states has been 
gradually decreased while the influence of international organizations has 
increased through the production of rules and regulations which are coercive and 
binding, means that the role of these organizations cannot be ignored and the 
stated absence of a global basic structure would not be correct anymore.84 
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Certain transformative theories have attempted to apply the transformative 
approach toward the international application of justice principles by focusing on 
the internal principles and rules of society. The theories such as Take Distribution 
Seriously85 and Structural Fairness86 emphasis the internal structures of social 
welfare and the rules distributing the advantages and disadvantages between 
different classes within society, nationally and internationally. However, the 
general philosophical transformative account of international and global justice 
has been reflected and detailed in the cosmopolitan and non-neutralist approaches. 
Several academics and researchers have contributed to the literature and tried to 
develop a transformative concept of justice on a global scale. To detail and 
develop the principles of distributive justice in international relations and also on 
a global scale, different frameworks have been presented. These frameworks, 
although they share similar major principles, each has separate and distinct rules 
in applying the theoretical principles to the real world and should be studied in 
order to develop the ideal and practical IDJ. 
 
1.2.1.2.1. Cosmopolitanism 
The cosmopolitan school is the most significant branch of the transformative 
accounts of justice on international level. Cosmopolitans have criticized Rawls 
principles and outcomes on global and international levels. Rawls refusal to apply 
the difference principle internationally, while presenting a minimalist set of 
human rights as the guide for international relations and the neutralist and 
tolerance have been rejected by the cosmopolitan experts. They believe that in 
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Rawls political liberalism, the basic units which are of moral concern are 
individuals and any shift from individuals to any other criterion would have no 
reasonable justifications.87 The states do not enjoy a moral value, nor are starting 
point in developing the principles of cosmopolitanism. The cosmopolitans put 
their point of departure on individuals on global scale and reject any moral 
significance of the political boundaries in developing their principles and rules.88   
 
In addressing the inequality in international relations, Rawls presents the 8th 
principle of the Law of Peoples89 in order to attenuate the unequal nature of his 
libertarian approach in international relations. However, his solution and 
argument contradicts with his argument in the domestic case which presented the 
free bargaining among the members of society causing the moral powerful 
members to shape the transactions in their own favor enabling them to take more 
advantage of the international transactions.90 Therefore, the arbitrary inequalities 
between the members of society distort equality in access to opportunities and 
resources of society and results in domination of certain members of society over 
other members, and cosmopolitanism extends the same argument to international 
relations and international institutions by looking at the arbitrary inequalities 
between the members of these international institutions, i.e. the nations, as a 
significant element which results in domination of powerful and high-income 
members over the weaker and low-income states.91  
 
They reject constructivism by adopting individuals as the proper agents for global 
justice and criticize Rawls for ignoring individuals on an international level and 
limiting the application of the justice principles only to domestic rules without 
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any admissible justification. Addressing the moral injustice of the current 
worldwide inequalities in personal well-being and freedom and supporting the 
concept of international moral obligation, the cosmopolitans believe in the 
irrelevancy of territorial boundaries and the fundamental contradiction between 
sovereignty and justice by holding states as significant obstacles to global 
justice.92 In cosmopolitanism the adopted global scheme as the ideal agent should 
be deemed legitimate as if they are representatives of their individuals and not the 
states (peoples). Therefore, they reject the intervention of international 
organizations as the representatives of peoples and nations. They believe in the 
significance of individuals on a global level and present the idea of forming a sort 
of authoritative global power in a so-called global public law to which the same 
rules of public law on the national level would be applied irrespective of national 
boundaries.  
 
The cosmopolitan account of justice is of a non-relational and non-interactional 
nature. They believe that despite the separation of individuals by national 
boundaries, economic relations have united individuals and have provided the 
basis for claiming moral equality among individuals. Thomas Pogge proposes a 
new justification for cosmopolitanism by presenting the notion of shared 
responsibility in aiding the victims and attempting to reform the unjust relations.93 
Accordingly, even if one accepts that the duties of aiding and rejecting the unjust 
scheme relates to individuals of the relations which affect each other, the concept 
of Vertical Dispersal believes that people's level of membership is not limited to 
states and includes local and international memberships. He claims the failure to 
understand the reason for limiting the application of the domestic justice 
principles to global relations and presents an inconsistency between liberal moral 
theory and actual liberal practice.94 Pogge believes in fair background conditions 
on a global level and in international relations. The fair background in Pogge's 
theory is a fair initial distribution of societies' resources and a set of just 
principles, rules and procedures which apply to the members' interaction 
afterward; the principles which implement the difference principle on a global 
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scale and provide outcomes which are influenced more by the freedom of 
members in exercising choice than initial arbitrary endowments.95 
 
Therefore, the cosmopolitans try to fill the gap of the global basic structure by 
proposing a multi-layered authority for resolution of disputes either through the 
prerogative of voluntary state relations, or through some higher authority, 
meaning global government. They reject inequality and discrimination among 
individuals and present the enjoyment of certain economic and political rights as 
the criterion for judging different political regimes.96 Apart from general theories 
of cosmopolitanism developed by Thomas Pogge and certain other academics,97 
different sorts of the subsidiary schools of thought have been developed by the 
cosmopolitans. Cosmopolitan Democracy98 and Cosmopolitan Republicanism99 
have presented a need for a multi-layered democratic and enforceable system in a 
new domain of global public law; the former through accepting the concept of 
self-determination as the main pillar of democracy and the latter through rejecting 
such an idea.100  
  
1.2.1.2.2. Non-Neutralism and Reasonableness 
The second major transformative approach to international justice criticizes 
widely the neutralism in international human rights which led to the minimalistic 
approach of international human rights. They view the Rawls approach to 
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international relations in defining the decency of non-liberal states and setting a 
minimal list for human rights as the principal reason for accommodating the wide 
range of liberal and non-liberal states. In fact, the criticism looks at the reason for 
Rawls reluctance in applying the principles of justice to international relations and 
argues for the non-neutralism approach in international relations in order to 
respect the separation of individuals. They reject the Rawls argument for 
developing the Law of People and his neutralist view by questioning how the 
plurality of states and peoples on the international scale results in the neutralism 
in international relations and foreign policy.101 Accordingly, instead of developing 
a neutralist approach to include the non-liberal states, the criteria of 
reasonableness should be presented to justify the international application of 
justice principles. Reasonableness as the proposed rule acts as the degree for 
tolerance in international order. Therefore, the same role of reasonableness in 
national and domestic application of the justice principles would be developed 
and extended to the international relations resulting in different but 
comprehensive moral views.102   
 
1.2.2. Possibility, Desirability and Legitimacy of IDJ 
Implementation 
1.2.2.1.  Possibility of IDJ Implementation 
The possibility of implementing the concept of justice on a global scale results in 
different arguments and ideas apart from its philosophical foundations. While the 
transformative accounts have argued in favor of having a global and international 
notion of justice, certain requirements have been set as the necessary conditions 
for applying the principles and moving toward the materialization of these rules in 
international relations. In fact the question of possibility perspective of the 
international distributive justice looks at the required prerequisites for making the 
enforcement of global justice possible. The subjects considered as the prerequisite 
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for the implementation of IDJ range from the basic structure to having global 
people and global democracy. 
 
Apart from the notion of the global basic structure which has been studied in the 
Rawlsian international conservative account, having global people in the sense 
that they have common culture and identity has been stated as the prerequisite for 
IDJ. Egalitarian justice believes in the relevancy of this condition and argues that 
as there are no common identical and cultural features of the states and societies, 
distributive justice gives it place to the minimum set of human rights and weak 
duty of assistance on international scale. Moreover, the condition set for the need 
for self-governing people with equal political rights for all members of society 
requires that a democracy be in place on a global scale before appealing to justice 
on a global scale.103  
 
However, the growth in the multiculturalism of populations and improvements in 
telecommunication technologies have brought people around the world closer 
together and changed the definition and features of the nation-states. In 
responding to the conservative accounts of global justice which present the 
diversity in cultures and mechanism of governance as the main elements of 
restricting the claim for global justice to certain basic international human rights, 
the cosmopolitans believe in integration of the world both from above by 
establishment of international institutions and from below in terms of integration 
of national economies, the integration on global scale and cultural 
homogenization.104 The traditional approach of justice could not ignore the 
process of nation-building and could not suspend the need for equality on a global 
scale for the establishment of a global people with the same features of people in 
nation-states. Similarly, the need for equality in global relations is a matter of the 
moral duties and rights of individuals in reference to one another and not about 
the pre-existence of a pure democracy on a global scale. Therefore, the mere 
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mutual acceptance of individuals living in the same justificatory community 
would be sufficient in ruling in favor of IDJ and the cosmopolitan and the global 
governance approaches have shifted the basis of their approaches from peoples 
with the same culture to individuals on global level.105 
 
1.2.2.2.  Desirability and Legitimacy of IDJ Implementation 
The second important aspect targets the desirability of implementation of 
international distributive justice. This desirability does not address the 
philosophical and theoretical accounts and even accept the international approach 
of distributive justice but puts in question whether or not to address the problem 
of inequality on an international level and if the international implementation of 
principles of justice is desirable. To address the problem of inequality in 
international relations in economy and politics, some solutions and approaches 
have been developed. These alternative approaches of justice all study the unjust 
structure of international arrangements from their specific point of view. First and 
the most important are the human rights approach and the development of a new 
category of human rights; i.e. right to development. Additionally, other 
approaches become distinct based on their point of departure; one by legitimacy 
and the other by democracy.  
 
The primary subject in studying the necessity for having an international 
framework for the justice principles is the ethical significance or non-significance 
of boundaries. According to the humanitarian and justice-centered point of view, 
the right to have equal opportunities should be for all regardless of their 
nationalities. Based on this approach, the question arises whether or not in order 
to address inequalities in a manner to provide equal opportunities or just 
outcomes, it is necessary to develop the international distributive justice concept. 
Some proposals have been made as some sort of peripheral to the distributive 
justice concept and for removing the necessity for developing IDJ and putting in 
question the desirability of having distributive justice on an international level. 
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The restorative concept and transgressed legitimate entitlements has presented the 
possibility of accepting reparation for colonial and other abuse cases without the 
need to resort to the development of IDJ.106  
 
On the trade side of the debate, initiatives such as the necessity for having fair 
trade to ensure that the poor do not suffer from monopolies or the cooperative 
concept of trade by proposing equal distribution of the benefits of cooperation 
have put in question the necessity for international arrangements for justice. Apart 
from controversial ideas such as worldwide equal rights to natural resources and 
sharing them or the humanitarian duty to rescue other human beings, the Rawls 
approach does not endorse the international concept of justice and refers only to 
meeting basic needs on a global scale while ensuring a duty of assistance to the 
weak. In addition to Rawls minimum economic security, Miller put forward the 
minimally adequate life and right to subsistence as the acceptable concept in the 
international arena addressing the problem of inequality and Sen follows the route 
of securing everyone's basic capabilities.107  
 
Among all these alternative concepts and peripheral routes to the problem of 
inequality, the question is "what is the lack and shortage which necessitate the 
development of IDJ"? The reason refers to the fact that all these proposals and 
ideas fall short of tracking entitlements. They accept the existing and current 
entitlements as the correct and just entitlements and put their starting point as the 
status quo. The reparative concept put in question the legitimacy of entitlements, 
but falls short of going further and has limited scope and only deals with 
correcting the wrongdoings of the past. Other considerations regarding the right to 
subsistence are not only vague in the meanings of basic needs and minimum basic 
rights, but also limited in the sense that they do not go further than basic needs 
and do not care about inequality in a broader sense other than providing basic 
needs. The reason which necessitates the development of a justice-centered 
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concept is that the international notion of justice studies international 
arrangements and the problem of inequality in a general, comprehensive and 
coherent manner; general in the sense it does not care only for past unjust actions 
and entitlements; comprehensive which does not limit its scope of application to 
providing basic needs and primary human rights and coherent in the sense that it 
will not prescribe the application of the principles of justice to one issue, e.g. 
distribution of natural resources, and applying other non-justice rules and 
principles for other areas. 
 
While addressing the issues from philosophical foundations of IDJ to its 
possibility and desirability, still the most important issue which exists is the agent 
of IDJ and whether or not international organizations have the legitimacy to go 
after the transformative account of justice. The issue of legitimacy does not 
interfere with the philosophical account of distributive justice or the desirability 
of its implementation. Rather, it accepts the rightness of its philosophical account 
and admits the desirability of its implementation but puts into question the proper 
agent for its implementation and whether or not international organizations are the 
legitimate agents to go after distributive justice. While some believe that 
international organizations must only uphold the basic socio-economic rights and 
should not follow any transformative distributive pattern, other approach accepts 
the role of the enforcement of distributive justice for international organizations 
but make a distinction between the basic socio-economic rights and a global 
equality of opportunities. Accordingly, international institutions should take 
immediate action to uphold socio-economic rights while for a comprehensive 
egalitarian approach and for providing global equality of opportunity, they should 
develop a political project to justify the intervention of international 
organizations.108 However the question of legitimacy is addressed in a broader 
view of the global governance approach. This approach provides reasonable 
grounds for the international application of justice theory and sets the duties of the 
international organizations as the part of global governance. 
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1.2.3. Global Governance Approach 
Rawls theory of international justice is based on certain facts and conditions 
which constitute the pillars of the argument in favor of the Law of Peoples and the 
minimalistic approach to international human rights as a guide for foreign policy. 
These facts and presupposed conditions generally refer to the notion of states as 
separate and totally independent entities without the possibility of affecting each 
other and the absence of the global basic structure which in his literature is 
synonymous to the global government; an authoritative body which is the 
exclusive responsible body for distributing the advantages and burdens of the 
global society on a global scale. In fact, Rawls international theory, which is a 
non-ideal theory and does not prescribe any significant change in international 
relations, is a political theory developed according to certain existing types of 
political and economic relations and any change in these facts and relations would 
result in the irrelevancy and non-applicability of this theory. 
 
However, the cosmopolitan approach has been criticized by different theories and 
schools,109 and it mainly suffers from ignoring the existing facts and limitations. 
Alternatively, the global governance approach adopts the existing national 
boundaries and states as the present facts and stresses that ignoring them in 
developing the global justice is impossible. This view while it rejects the 
approach of looking at the national boundaries as a significant element in limiting 
the application of the principles of justice on an international level, looks at the 
national boundaries as the existing fact which should be taken into account in 
developing the global interpretation of the concept of justice. In fact, global 
governance is a broad conception of management which includes multilevel 
governance ranging from the subnational, local and regional to the national and 
international levels.110 This broad concept recognizes the national boundaries as a 
real fact and accepts a major role for the states as the most complete form of 
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authoritative body. However, all forms of governance from local to the national 
levels enjoy a clear mandate and distinct structure. The global governance 
approach addresses mainly the supranational level which is the global governance 
at its international level in order to complete the chain of global governance. 
Moreover, cosmopolitanism suffers from the problem of agency in its practical 
sense. Despite the cosmopolitans’ view in presenting international moral 
obligations and the significance of individuals as the agents of global justice, their 
theory suffers from the lack of any practical roadmap for moving toward 
materialization of the justice principles. Pogge's theory, which aims at solving the 
problem of the basic structure on a global scale by presenting a multi-layered 
authority in international relations, lacks the authoritative body for decision-
making and for dispute settlement in order to dominate the traditional concept of 
state voluntarism. 
 
1.2.3.1.  Creation of Burdens and Benefits 
As a consequence of these criticisms, the extension of the Rawlsian principles of 
justice to global interactions was undertaken by Charles Beitz who claimed the 
absence of reason that why Rawls' two basic principles of justice should be 
changed in transposing them to a global framework. Beitz asserted that Rawls had 
to demonstrate why he had changed his position in the international domain and 
why he had changed from persons in the analysis of domestic society to peoples 
in the analysis of international society.111 Beitz maintained that national 
boundaries had no moral significance so there would be no difference between the 
principles applicable in domestic societies and the principles applicable in a 
global arena. Beitz argues that as Rawls had not rendered a plausible reason for 
this shift, we ought to extend the domestic principles to the international domain 
and in response to Rawls' theory which considers the existence of cooperation and 
interaction as a necessary factor, Beitz believes that although existing global 
interaction is sufficient to ground duties of distributive justice between the states, 
justice is required to be applied across the borders even in the absence of 
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interaction and cooperation.112 Furthermore, in selecting the criteria for applying 
requirements of justice, Beitz looks at the production of burdens and benefits as 
the primary criterion for applying the principles of distributive justice. Therefore, 
he argues that if any social activity produces benefits or burdens the problem of 
justice would arise whether or not the activity takes place on a domestic or 
international level.113  
 
The application of Rawlsian justice principles is dependent on the existence of a 
coercive legal system. The most significant feature of a coercive mechanism 
which is a prerequisite for the international and global concept of justice is its 
capability of introducing and imposing all duties and rights to all respective 
members and parts of society. The Rawlsian point of view focuses on the 
members' obligation rather than natural duties and considers society as a social 
contract within which parties to the contract are obliged by their voluntary acts.114 
Therefore in searching for the agent of global justice to apply the theory of justice 
to the global basic structure, Rawls presents the Global Government as the 
authoritative body required to rule in the context of the application of justice.115 
 
However, in the current international order, the only body which acts in an 
authoritative manner is the state and international arrangements are based more or 
less on state-consent. Consequently in the Rawlsian perspective, justice with all 
its principles and rules is applicable only to domestic societies which enjoy a self-
sufficient scheme of cooperation. On the contrary, Charles Beitz presents a new 
perspective to global justice and rules for the sufficiency of production of benefits 
and burdens. He considers the mere existence of the global scheme of cooperation 
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and applicability of justice anytime from which benefits and burdens are 
produced; e.g. the international and global relations.116 Therefore he rules for the 
existence of the global basic structure despite the absence of the global 
government and argues for the relevancy of the justice principles in the situation 
where the complex system of border-crossing rules has made the fate of people 
across the world dependent on each other.117 
 
1.2.3.2.  Global Governance as the Global Basic Structure 
While the Cosmopolitan and the Rawlsian approaches both agree that a global 
basic structure does not exist, the cosmopolitans do not see this as a reason for 
ignoring requirements of justice. The cosmopolitans view the international moral 
obligation as triggering global justice for which individuals are considered as the 
agent. However, the history of justice theories presents the notion of progression 
from global government to global governance. This progress criticized the 
definition of state in Rawls theory by advocating the fact that former states no 
longer exist while there are a growing number of international organizations; 
these international organizations although falling short of global state definition, 
produce coercive rules and affect the mechanism of distribution of benefits and 
duties. As a consequence, the pattern would change from a global state that 
distributes burdens and benefits to a multidimensional concept of networks and 
multilateral legal and political processes which do not substitute the existing 
nation-states but rather broaden the scope of international relations and act in 
accordance with the principles of justice. Thus, individuals of different societies 
would be seen as those who have obligations to one another due to accepting 
benefits of membership in global institutions and consequently international 
institutions would undertake a prominent role in the global governance structure 
and would be studied as the starting point.118 
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Much recent works done in the context of global justice and international law 
have dismissed Rawls' refusal to extend his domestic theory of justice to the 
international arena. According to these views, the fact that international economic 
organizations make decisions which involve allocation of social goods makes 
their structure, activities and decisions subject to justice theory. Therefore, we 
have international distributive justice which results in the second principle of 
justice on an international scale, i.e., "International Difference Principle". 
International Difference Principle's task is to furnish the principles that first, 
would serve as a standard for evaluating the social response to natural inequalities 
and second, would act as a guide to social institutions for making distributive 
allocations.119 
 
The question of considering real facts presents itself in the issue of political 
boundaries. While there is no doubt of the existence of political boundaries, the 
controversy exists on the issue of whether or not it should be considered and be 
the basis for the ideal theory. Rawls approach considers the practical possibility 
and the importance of achievability and developing a realistic utopia, while 
cosmopolitans reject any relevancy of national boundaries in developing their 
theory and the global governance approach developed mainly by Beitz adopts a 
way in between. The Hybrid Institutional Arrangement proposed by the socio-
politic Jürgen Habermas, though classified as a cosmopolitan school, is more a 
global governance approach that presents a scheme of global justice in which the 
democratic components of the system are materialized only in international 
institutions; transnational institutions which regulates the interactions on regional 
level and the supranational institutions responsible for peace, security and human 
rights on the global level.120 
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While the Rawlsian approach believes in a clear distinction between moral natural 
duty and distributive justice in the sense that they have different sources, not 
every moral claim would be a distributive justice claim and equal moral worth 
would not suffice to explain the duties of distributive justice. However, Beitz 
seems less interested to link particular claimants with particular persons and put 
forward a new concept of justice; "Global Governance" which is a result of 
looking realistically to ideal theories and has resulted from the interaction 
between the desirability of applying the justice principles and the reality of the 
absence of the global state.121 Therefore, even with the undisputable fact of the 
global state's absence, due to the existence of a kind of global governance, we 
should move toward a more just situation and this should be the dominant trend in 
studying international structure. 
 
1.2.3.3.  What is the Global Governance? 
In modeling the global governance, different models and patterns have been 
considered and studied. Apart from the idea which looks for hegemonic power 
and argues for world state or global government as the necessary element for 
effectiveness and legitimacy of global justice, the controversy exists in the 
sufficiency of a non-hierarchical governance with horizontal self-coordination as 
the appropriate model of global governance.122 The advocates of the social and 
self-coordinated pattern believe in non-legal forms of international regulations 
beyond the state-voluntarism territory providing for "private" or "hybrid" regimes 
in areas such as dispute settlement, e-commerce and international human rights as 
the constituent elements of global governance.123 From a broader perspective, for 
some experts the modern multinational companies (MNCs) have the potential of 
taking roles in global governance. Accordingly, due to the openness of investment 
markets and technological progress, these companies have a significant role in 
Global Public Policy Networks (GPPN) which in relation to these companies is an 
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emerging mechanism which has the potential of being the agent of global 
justice.124 
 
The idea of distinguishing the social and non-state centered initiatives in 
international and global order and developing a concept of global civil society has 
been criticized in terms of lacking a sanctioning and enforcement mechanism as 
the primary element of the concept of governance. The core stone principle of 
every governance regime has been viewed as the ability to impose norms and 
rules with an enforcement regime for guaranteeing compliance.125 Therefore, in 
defining the "global governance" term, there has been considered a significant 
distinction between the "governance in global" which refers to the consideration 
of the social relations and interactions on all levels beyond the national 
boundaries, and the "governance that is global" which presents a purposive 
mechanism of the principles and norms to which the actors bind themselves to 
respect the established obligations.126 Moreover, in designing the respective body 
as the responsible agent for global justice, the primary role of states could not be 
dismissed or ignored. Despite the important evolutions, in the definition and 
function of the states as a consequence of the globalization process, the states play 
a major role in international relations and the national boundaries and national 
sovereignty of the nation-states remains as a currently existing fact.127 
 
Consequently, apart from major market forces (e.g. the MCNs) and civil society 
actors (e.g. the alternative dispute settlement mechanisms), the role of states and 
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the intergovernmental organizations as the symbol of the states’ cooperation 
should be taken into account and put in a salient position of regulating the 
behavior of states. The major role of states and consequently the international 
organizations as the expression of the states’ initiatives and cooperation for 
managing the global problems has been so significant that some academics 
believe that the "global governance" as an analytical approach does not only act as 
an alternative to the global government but also has been developed in order to 
highlight the role of international organizations.128 Therefore, the global 
governance as the desirable global basic structure shifts more toward the 
institutions which enjoy a semi-authoritative mechanism in introducing provisions 
and rules and establishing the necessary arrangements to ensure compliance. 
These institutions have progressed one step more from the social norms toward 
legal initiatives supported by the nation-states which have been conferred the 
authority to set obligatory rules and make binding decisions affecting the 
distribution of burdens and benefits on the global scale. 
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2. Distributive Justice in International 
Economic Order 
There is no doubt that without a mechanism for distributing wealth, the process of 
globalization and integration of national economies would not be sustainable. 
Without considering the concept of justice and its principles as the prerequisite for 
sustainable globalization, the enormous pressure and claims from parties suffering 
from this process would strengthen the alternative and opposing views of 
nationalism or socialism. However, the question arises regarding how to extend 
the normative desirability of justice principles to the positive reality of 
international economic relations. With the existing controversy regarding the 
desirability, possibility or legitimacy of obtaining distributive justice principles 
between different political communities, the unjust character of international 
relations in the real world necessitates an appropriate response with rectification 
as the aim. This response, while using distributive justice as the ideal theory, 
should be developed and tailored in a manner which fits the current situation of 
international law. Any ideal theories which do not have the capability of 
implementation would be viewed as impractical theories which do not take into 
consideration real-life scenarios and which therefore would be incapable of 
bringing about any change to the lives of people affected. Therefore, to develop 
an ideal theory which is practical and capable of making a person's life better, the 
process of theory-making should be close to existing facts and the theory should 
develop with regards to the capability of making positive changes to the lives of 
people. Hence, in order to shape the ideal theory of distributive justice in 
international law to ensure applicability to current reality, the history of 
globalization and problem of inequality should be studied briefly. 
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2.1. History of International Economic Order 
The history of international economic relations presents decades of attempts to 
put the issue of inequality as an important agenda item in the international arena. 
The current inequality embedded in today's international relations was mainly 
established and created as a result of decades of colonialism. Tracing back the 
roots of existing inequality in international relations, it is apparent that the 
existence of colonialism for decades created enormous wealth and advantages for 
certain countries, while keeping back a considerable number of countries and a 
huge number of people and nations which were deprived of the opportunity to use 
their own elements of production for the improvement and growth of their own 
country.129 This pure and clear process of exploitation by foreigners has changed 
and expired by the independence of mainly African countries and the entry into 
force of a new international scheme. However, this unequal standing of 
international players affects the global economic relations of nation-states by 
providing more opportunities for developed countries to be better-off while 
placing poor countries in a stagnant and even negative and deteriorative trend.130 
 
2.1.1. Pre-Globalization Period and US Hegemony 
Following the post-World War II era and the independence of colonial countries, 
international economic relations experienced three different phases in which an 
economic element unified the different nation-states across the world. The first 
period, known as Bretton Woods, resulted in a politically controlled system 
established since 1945 in which monetary issues unified the states. The World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund were established and a new regime of 
economic cooperation on an international scale was introduced. The second 
period of international economic order covers the time period between 1971 to 
1989 in which international trade acted as an element through which the nation-
states which were politically independent, attempted to get close to each other in 
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economic terms by motivating the free flow of goods across their boundaries.131 
The failed initiative of establishing the International Trade Organization (ITO) 
encouraged industrialized countries to form an agreement in which they 
committed to reduce the tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in a gradual manner 
and in different rounds of negotiation in order to fulfill the increase in global 
trade.  
However all the international efforts in terms of economic relations in the post-
colonial and post-World War II period resulted in making the United States (US) 
the most important power in economic relations. The establishment of the new 
international monetary system resulted in the introduction of the US Dollar as the 
global reserve currency and the US as the major owner of world gold stock.132 
The US economy became the major player in international trade and formed more 
than half of total world investment in 1970s. The changes in economic relations in 
these periods led to the economic and also military dominance of the United 
States, making it the only superpower of the post-Cold War era.133 The economic 
and consequently the military hegemony of the United States coincided with 
programs such as the Marshall Plan while the termination of the struggle between 
the East and West Blocs in the Cold War resulted in the dominance of US values 
and the liberal pro-business and anti-government approach in Europe.134 This 
economic, military and cultural hegemony in the pre-globalization period formed 
the necessary elements of US superiority in international economic and political 
relations contributing to a situation where the US Government has been reluctant 
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to sign or ratify certain notable treaties135 or even refusing to sign or ratify several 
important treaties which have become more or less a global norm.136 
 
2.1.2. Globalization Era 
During the post-1989 period, the world witnessed the addition of a new economic 
element of the unification of national economies. The monetary and free trade 
establishment provided the basis for capital to move easily across international 
boundaries and foreign investment played a major role in shaping international 
economic relations. The share of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in total 
liabilities rose in a tremendous way especially in the emerging markets.137 The 
World Trade Organization (WTO), a more powerful and comprehensive substitute 
for regulating all trade and trade-related issues, provided  a good basis for moving 
capital  and delivering the world economy into a new period of global competition 
based on comparative advantage in the global market. World trade has grown five 
times in real terms since 1980, and its share of world GDP has risen from 36 
percent to 55 percent over this period.138 
 
The process of global integration has been accelerated by the independence of the 
former Eastern bloc countries and the high motivation of these countries together 
with Asian countries to be more active in international economic relations and 
show themselves as key players of the WTO. The integration of the world 
economy through the globalization of trade and finance started mainly in the 
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1980s and accelerated in the 1990s to a position today where it has reached 
unprecedented levels of integrity. The economic elements of investment and 
finance led by free trade have proven to be a key element in improving the overall 
worldwide wealth.139 The per capita income, GDP on a global scale and people 
enjoying "medium human development" have increased drastically in the past few 
decades. The improvement in economic prosperity coupled with the political 
stability that originated from the removal of trade barriers, investment limitations 
and capital regulations led to the success of the whole globalization process in 
improving overall global wealth.140 Financial liberalization has also accelerated 
considerably in the past two decades. While the developed economies have 
previously experienced financial security, the developing countries increased their 
cross-border financial assets and the financial assets have more than doubled in 
this period.141   
 
2.1.2.1.  Globalization and Inequality 
The new wave of globalization which has significant implications for the 
economic well-being of individuals in all countries and regions and among all 
income groups has brought lots of hopes together with concerns. The hopes are 
related to the claims and advice which presents the globalization process as an 
open door to new opportunities and advantages which mostly relates to better 
access to the global economy in terms of financial facilities and expanded markets 
for developing nations in terms of improving their trade comparative advantages. 
On the other side, the concerns reflect the danger of entering into a new phase 
where the speed of events and availability of opportunities together with free 
competition among unequal competitors can easily cause the widening of the gap 
between rich and poor thus further exacerbating the problem of inequality. 
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Despite the fact that this process of global liberalization brought certain positive 
outcomes in some parts of the world especially in some countries of Eastern Asia, 
the overall outcome has been viewed as a significant element in widening the gap 
between rich and poor and exacerbating inequality. In contrast to the tremendous 
results of free trade in increasing global wealth, the gap between the rich and poor 
on a global scale has been deepening and the increased wealth has not been justly 
distributed. The reports of international organizations show that the speed of 
difference between the incomes of the rich and poor has increased from 30 to 1 in 
1960 to 74 to 1 in 1997.142 The statistics indicate that 13 percent of people in the 
world live in societies with a GDP per capita of more than USD 30,000 while the 
remaining 87 percent live in poor societies with an average per capita GDP of 
USD 1200.143 The income gap between the fifth living in rich and fifth living in 
poor countries had increased from 30 to 1 in 1960 to 74 to 1 in 1997 which led to 
the belief that the western countries did not only fail to honor their negative duties 
of justice but also contributed to the creation of global poverty in an extreme 
sense.144 
 
The distributional impacts of the process of globalization have also been 
examined from both optimistic and non-optimistic points of view. The optimistic 
approach while recognizing the deepening of inequalities and the rise of 
inequalities following the globalization process, asserts that at the final stage the 
inequality would decline as the countries move forward towards industrialization. 
This approach which had been developed even before the start of the new era of 
globalization and which has been followed and supported by a considerable 
number of researchers and academics, believes that despite the fact that 
globalization will widen the gap between low-income and high-income countries 
in the primary stages, finally the low-income groups will come out as winners 
from globalization in absolute terms and overall the globalization process will 
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automatically act as a reducing-inequality element.145 However, the opposite 
approach rebuts the optimistic view arguing that although globalization would 
increase the overall incomes on a global scale, the advantages and wealth created 
as a result of this process are not shared equally among the individuals in different 
countries and the mere globalization of economies, unless balanced by a new 
element would not result automatically in optimum results.146 
 
 The globalization process moved the members of the new globalized world into a 
new stage of competition which could speed up the development of wealthy and 
high-income countries while lowering the speed of development of low-income 
countries leading to a greater gap and more unjust outcomes than before. This 
income disparity and the widening gap between poor and riches not only results in 
social externalities but also limits the growth capacities of low income countries 
due to the fact that the opportunities created by globalization may not be fully 
exploited.147 The unjust positions of the players of international economy not only 
reduce the development speed of the disadvantaged countries but also cost them 
more to the extent that their development becomes impossible. A report by 
ActionAid has revealed that hunger could be costing poor nations up to USD 450 
billion a year which is more than ten times the amount needed to halve hunger by 
2015 and meet Millennium Development Goal One.148 
 
This cost has hampered the economic performance of low-income countries 
keeping them at the lowest levels of life standards. The outcome has been the 
creation of a certain major class of countries named Least Developed Countries. 
These countries which have been also called low-income countries or the Bottom 
Billion by some researchers,149 are the members of the international community 
                                                          
145 Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," American Economic Review 
45(March 1955). 
146 Justin Forsyth, "Growth and Poor, Letters to the Editor," The Economist June 10-17(2000). p.6 
147 World Bank, "World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development," World Bank 
(Washington) (2006). 
148 Action Aid, "Who's Really Fighting Hunger." 
149 Paul Collier, "The Bottom Billion (Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing & What Can Be Done 
About It)," Oxford University Press (2007). 
72 
 
which have been isolated from global economic development and international 
markets. The more the global economy improves, the less they gain and at the 
same time their growth is impacted negatively. This income gap results in a 
stronger bargaining position for the rich and powerful members of international 
society and a superiority which has enabled them to impose their wills and shape 
the international economic regime in favor of themselves through tailoring their 
own economic and trade relations in a mercantilist approach. 
 
Even though it has had positive outcomes in certain countries and regions in the 
world, the globalization process in general is viewed as a factor of influence 
which has contributed to lowering the speed of growth in low-income countries. 
Moreover, it resulted in the removal from the development process of more than a 
billion people of the world population putting them in a situation in which 
survival has become impossible without foreign aid. Therefore, the globalization 
process, in order to be sustainable needs to maintain broad support of the people 
around the world. Rising inequality would prevent globalization from going ahead 
and it would encourage nationalistic and protectionist approaches. While 
globalization has deepened the inequality in current international relations, it has 
also brought several opportunities and possibilities for the weaker members of the 
international society. Therefore a new element, i.e. the principle of justice, is 
required to shift the stream of international economic relations toward a more just 
distribution of wealth and shared advantages of the global economy. 
 
2.1.2.2.  Inequality and Distributive Justice 
While globalization has deepened certain inequalities within current international 
relations, it has also resulted in several opportunities and possibilities to facilitate 
the development of some low-income countries. These opportunities all relate to 
how globalization can be viewed and how the principles of justice can be applied 
to this process of denationalization in order to increase the low-income countries 
portion and share of global economic development. In fact the justice principle 
acts as a key element in shifting the current path of wealth distribution to a more 
just and acceptable situation.  
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The history of economic relations on an international scale presents pre-existing 
inequalities and also deepened inequalities as result of the colonial period and the 
globalization process. In other words, the roots of current inequalities in 
international relations provide the necessary basis for requiring both corrective 
justice and distributive justice. The removal of inequality which should take place 
by the redistribution of wealth has also been investigated by the theories of 
corrective justice. The corrective justice framework puts into question the 
rightness and justice of acquisition by certain countries during the time when they 
profit from exploitation of several other countries mainly in Africa. This sort of 
theories normally look at the misdistribution of wealth among the international 
players during the period of colonialism and look to the principles of corrective 
justice as the guide principle and theory to rectify the inequalities established 
since the colonialism era.150 
 
This approach while a useful and practical approach in addressing the problem of 
inequality embedded in international relations has been perceived as a fact-
specific theory which limits its role only to those facts within which the violation 
of justice in acquisition has occurred. The corrective justice approach solely 
addresses the issue of reparation of a specific committed wrongdoing and falls 
short of developing a general duty for the international community irrespective of 
what has happened, while the distributive justice requirements provide a broader 
umbrella to address all sorts of inequalities in the current international order. 
Therefore in order to address inequality in a comprehensive manner while 
presenting the justice requirements as a general duty for all international actors 
and members, and at the same time enhance the position of weaker members in 
the international society and vindicate the goal of wealth redistribution on 
international level, an international and global concept of distributive justice 
should be developed.  
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The international version of the concept of distributive justice aims at the proper 
redistribution of wealth on an international scale as a solution to the problem of 
inequality. Hence, in order to reduce inequality, the redistribution of wealth is 
proposed and to accommodate and justify the process of wealth redistribution, the 
international sense and the concept of justice principles is resorted to. While it 
could be claimed that the international application of justice principles has caused 
researchers and writers to think about wealth distribution and removing 
inequality, it seems that the inequality embedded in the substance and procedure 
of international arrangements shift the scholars to think and study the problem in 
a descriptive and normative manner and the redistribution of wealth has been 
developed to implement the theory of justice in addressing the problem of 
inequality.  
 
2.1.2.3.  International Distributive Justice in Structure and 
Strategy 
The global concept of justice or the transformative sense of international justice 
has two sides of implementation and application which should be considered as a 
whole. A comprehensive and coherent implementation of justice requires 
application in substance as well as the form and procedure of the respective 
relations. Implementation of justice-centred strategies in a structure which has 
been founded and shaped based on rules and principles other than justice would 
not end in a just outcome and at the same time having a mere just structure which 
provides the framework without implementation of any justice-based strategy 
would not help in improving the problem of inequality. Therefore, a 
comprehensive justice approach in international law questions and studies the 
requirements of justice theories not only as the strategy of the international 
community in addressing the problem of inequality but also as the structure and 
framework within which the developed and adopted strategies should take place 
and be implemented. Hence, the international concept of justice and global-scale 
approach to the problem of inequality and redistribution of wealth should perceive 
these principles both in the strategies as well as the structure within which the 
strategies should be implemented. 
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2.2. International Distributive Justice and 
Structure 
The structure of international relations mainly refers to the framework in which 
the international players act; the framework which provides the hard-ware of 
justice based on which the justice-based strategies, as the soft-ware of the concept 
of justice find their way to be implemented in the international arena. In fact the 
implementation of international distributive justice requires that the structure and 
agent which should bear the responsibility of distribution on an international and 
global level be aligned with the requirements of justice and a global governance 
approach capable of fostering the justice-based strategies. Therefore the structure 
and relevant agent should enjoy at least a just procedure capable of handling the 
distribution-centred policies and compatible with facilitating the process of 
application of redistribution and justice principles on a global scale. 
 
The international distributive justice debate in this structural context is faced with 
some difficulties on a philosophical account. These difficulties mainly relate to 
defining the point of departure in the theoretical framework and the individual-
states as the international players in international relations. While the Rawls 
theory of justice on national level is based principally on the individuals as the 
members of society, the extension of principles of justice to international relations 
has been done by other researchers where some have kept the same criterion but 
in a global and cosmopolitan view, and others by substituting individuals with the 
nation-states on an international level.151 
 
However, the basis on which the justice principles should be built up is still 
individuals and the structural examination of international distributive justice 
requires the justification of extension of justice principles to international 
relations by keeping individuals as the counting unit of international distributive 
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justice and the political boundaries and the nation-states are the existing realities 
which should be taken into account in the implementation of justice theories 
within philosophical and theoretical domains. Ignoring the realities of 
international relations would result in the facing of significant problems of 
national self-determination and independent nation-states making the theory 
impractical and impossible to implement. Therefore while the concept of justice 
should still be the pure global justice which considers all individuals around the 
world as the principals in the application of justice, the realities of international 
relations should be considered in implementing global justice and the ideal theory 
of justice should be tailored based on the current international relations and 
considering the existing political boundaries in developing the process of wealth 
distribution. 
 
2.2.1. Different approaches to IDJ Structure 
2.2.1.1.  Global Government as the Agent of IDJ 
The concept of global government has not only been set as the condition for 
relevancy of justice principles to an ultra-national level but also has been 
presented as the relevant and exclusive agent of wealth distribution in a structural 
scheme of international distributive justice. The body responsible for distributing 
all burdens and advantages on a global scale whether named as a global 
government, or using similar concepts such as the world government, global state 
or super state has been one of the most controversial subjects of justice theory. 
The development of such a concept has been inspired more by the constructivist 
approach which considers the issue of agency as the most important and core 
stone of each theory resulting in the development of global government as the 
relevant agent of global justice.152 The Rawlsian approach and its strict condition 
of implementation of justice principles meets constructivism at the crossroads in 
the sense that it considers the existence of basic structure as the prerequisite of the 
implementation of justice principles' leading to the necessity for having a global 
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basic structure, i.e. a global government, to rule the application of justice 
principles on a global order. 
 
However the desirability of having a global government as the agent of 
international distributive justice has been questioned. Some writers have disputed 
the desirability of having such an economic structure in international relations and 
have ruled on the undesirability of global government in a sense that it would be a 
coercive institution which mandates all redistributive issues in the international 
economic order.153 According to those who advocate the necessity of global 
government as the IDJ agent, to date no such international body has enjoyed the 
features of global government and as all the international organizations are based 
on state-consent and completely horizontal, they could not take the agent role for 
international justice.154 Consequently in the absence of global government, the 
distribution of wealth would become impossible making remedying the low-
income countries difficult. The question that arises is that in the absence of 
international coercive institutions to mandate distributive obligation, what would 
happen to the principles of justice and what theoretical pattern should be adopted 
internationally.155 The question is would the international community and 
international players be satisfied with the current situation and wait till the 
formation of a global government or should they do as much as they can to reduce 
the inequalities and injustice even without the existence of a global government 
and adopt a more similar existing body to global government as the IDJ agent.156   
 
2.2.1.2.  States as the Agent of IDJ 
An alternative approach to the international distributive justice and global 
government idea is the Rawlsian approach in international relations which 
proposes that instead of developing principles which govern all relations on a 
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global scale, principles should be developed that govern the current international 
order, i.e. the foreign policy of sovereign states as defined in Rawlsian 
approach.157 This approach while denying the international role of sovereign 
states views the absence of global government as a basis for refusing the 
implementation of justice principles and proposes certain soft and general 
principles to rule or govern the existing international relations especially the 
foreign policy of states. As a result, principles should be developed which govern 
only the foreign policy of liberal states in a very general sense.158 
 
The Rawlsian theory in international relations has been developed based on the 
traditional theory of justice in international relations, however the second 
approach to the international justice structure considers the transformative 
concept of justice by adopting the current states as the agents for the 
implementation of global justice. This approach is based on the model which 
looks at the states not only as the agents of their nations but also, based on the 
necessity for political morality in the states' activities and the states' 
responsibilities, as the agents of the individuals to uphold moral obligations and 
the transboundary actions originated and shaped by the moral obligations.159   
This approach generally views liberal societies as the proper and primary agent of 
global justice and perceives that liberal states should be powerful enough to take 
trans boundary actions in a way that international peace and security are not 
violated.160 
 
Therefore despite the Rawls theory which as a result of the absence of a global 
government, considers the existing point of departure as states and not individuals 
or members of the nation-states, the second approach of international distributive 
justice adopts states as the agent of global justice and considers it a duty for them 
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to engage in international actions to implement cross-state distributive principles. 
However this approach to the structure and agent of international distributive 
justice has been criticized widely based on the fundamental feature of self-
governance of political societies and their equal standing in international 
relations.161 This approach which is based on the possibility and power of liberal 
states to take international actions is contingent and also unsustainable. It also 
puts at risk the existing mutual peace and security leading to the denial of 
international cooperation. Moreover, the issue that liberal states are proper agents 
for global justice does not take into consideration the fact that in a world which 
lacks a common set of authoritative institutions, permitting liberal states to 
implement global justice through restructuring the non-liberal societies, will not 
only threaten peace and security but also deny the significance of political 
independence of sovereign states and act against the equal standing of nation-
states.162 
 
2.2.1.3.  Between Status quo and Global Government: Global 
Governance 
The notion of Global Government has been developed from a new academic 
review of the ideal concept of Global Government and it was first developed in 
the justice theories and was considered as an ideal perspective. The notion of 
"Global Government" shows its role through the question of the possibility of its 
implementation and presents itself as an answer to the question of whether the 
existence of global government provides a prerequisite for applying the global 
justice principles.163 Nonetheless, emerging global problems following the 
globalization process and the difficulty of having the prerequisites to rule for the 
application of justice principles have motivated and encouraged academics and 
scholars to review once again the ideal notion of a global state and the ways in 
which it needs to be addressed in today's real world.  
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The liberals generally do not accept the idea of global government as the guide 
rule for an international structure, nor do they accept the states being the agents of 
global justice. Rather, they look for a solution in between; i.e. a solution between 
a global government and states quo.164 This option in between two extreme 
positions looks at the existing international institutions and the process of 
distribution of burdens and benefits which form a sort of global governance, 
addressing the transformation and progression from the notion of global 
government to the notion of global governance. This approach which is well-
presented in Rawls-Beitz debate regarding international basic structure while 
rejecting the role of the states as the proper agents for global justice admits the 
necessity for having a basic structure therefore presenting the existing 
international arrangements as the necessary international basic structure which 
triggers the principles of global justice. 
 
2.2.2. The Global Governance Approach 
The structural study of justice theory in international relations represents the 
conflict of a self-help approach and institutionalism in considering the competent 
agent for carrying out the requirements of principles of justice. While the self-
help approach looks at nation-states as the major players of the international 
community which follow their own interests irrespective of the consequences, the 
institutionalism approach puts the focus on international institutions as the 
significant players who follow a collective pattern of optimal outcomes.165 This 
conflict in studying the eligible IDJ agent considers two distinctly different 
approaches to the notion of international justice based on the agent of justice and 
the coordinating role which has been reflected in a new dilemma of state-action 
and ultra-state action. 
 
Similar to the self-help approach but one step further, the state-action approach 
while accepting the implementation of justice principles on international order, 
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puts the burden of implementation on states' actions and admits no ultra-state 
authority to function as the justice agent. This approach in fact denies any 
authoritative role for international institutions and ignores any contribution of 
international institutions to the process of distribution of burdens and advantages. 
In contrast, the super-state action approach, while accepting the importance of 
states' actions in the process of implementation of justice principles, extends the 
responsibility and role of enforcement of justice to the super-state authorities. The 
realities of international relations and the limitations of the self-help approach 
advocate the special framework of global justice on the super-state premises. 
However the same realities of the current international order reject the idea of the 
necessity for global government as the only prerequisite for ruling in favor of 
justice principles and accept the current international arrangement as holding the 
minimum requirements, transiting from a global government approach to global 
governance within the paradigm of institutionalism. 
 
The idea of global governance mainly addresses the principle that wherever there 
is creation or distribution of burdens and benefits, the principle of justice becomes 
relevant to be applied. The existing international institutions are generally 
involved in establishing international rules and regulations, imposing on 
sovereign states and affecting the process of distribution. Generally speaking, the 
ideas which support the justice-based theories in international arrangements are 
based on the principles which current international institutions have entered in, 
which could impose legally and politically binding rules and form a kind of global 
basic structure or global governance to be served as the necessary structure for 
implementation of justice theories. While the global governance approach has 
been widely accepted in theory, in practice and within the implementation phase, 
several patterns have been presented as the proper pattern. Some researchers have 
fostered an idea for handling the global problem within the paradigm of global 
governance through a multiple-organization arrangement which would be 
acceptable and proper whereas others look at the necessity of having at least one 
organization as the final body responsible for the global management. 
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2.2.2.1.  Multiple-Organization Solutions 
Certain writers believe in the international management of global problems by 
existing international institutions without giving any priority to any international 
institution to act as the leader. According to this view, due to the absence of an 
organization which can handle all global issues and problems simultaneously and 
comprehensively, there is a need to have separate, strong specialized 
organizations involved which can keep each other in check and balance each 
other's power.166 This view insists on the necessity for the involvement of all 
relevant agencies' as well as a clear definition of what each institution should be 
responsible and its specialized task; for instance, WTO for trade, ILO for labour, 
World Health Organization (WHO) for health issues, etc.167 In fact, those who 
support an inter-agency cooperation between international economic institutions 
in the current international economic order are promoting the multiple-
organization model.168 They call for strengthened cooperation between 
international specialized institutions to prevent conflicts and to improve global 
governance in order to address global problems and the problem of inequality on 
a global scale.169 Other researchers advocating the multiple-organization pattern 
argue in favor of this pattern by resorting to the current situation and the 
incapacity of any of the existing international institutions to handle all global 
problems. They argue that the WTO, for example, cannot incorporate non-trade 
issues and therefore it should develop a solution by including multiple and 
separate organizations in the international scheme.170 
 
The difference between the multiple-organization pattern and one-organization 
scheme does not relate to acceptance or denial of the necessity for having inter-
organizational cooperation. However it refers to the primacy of such cooperation. 
Those who advocate this kind of cooperation as the primary and main role in 
                                                          
166 James Patrick  Kelly, "The Wto and Global Governance: The Case for Contractual Treaty 
Regimes," Widener Law Symposium Journal 7(2001). p. 129 
167 Kofi Addo, "The Correlation between Labour Standards and International Trade: Which Way 
Forward?," Journal of World Trade 36(2)(2002). p.302 
168 Dukgeun AHN, "Linkage between International Financial and Trade Institutions; Imf, World 
Bank and Wto," ibid.34(4)(2000). 
169 Christian Tietje, "Global Governance and Inter-Agency Co-Operation in International 
Economic Law," ibid.36(3)(2002)., p.508 
170 Gabrielle Marceau, "Wto Dispute Settlement and Human Rights," EJIL 13(2002). p.756f 
83 
 
global governance and the key element of global governance are categorized as 
proponents of multiple-organizations solutions. For instance, they believe that 
instead of developing the idea of including a social clause in GATT, Article XX 
to improve the WTO to be the leader in a one-organization scheme of 
international structure, it would be better to encourage international cooperation 
between the WTO and the ILO and allow the implementation of labour standards 
to be followed within the ILO advocated framework.171  
 
The advocators of this pattern criticize the one-organization pattern as well as 
those who present the WTO as a capable body for global governance, by arguing 
that putting non-trade problems on the WTO agenda would lead to overloading 
the WTO which as a result of an overload on both trade and non-trade issues 
would not be an effective solution.172 Supporters of the multiple-organization 
pattern observe this international arrangement and international cooperation as a 
part of the overall shift from the law of international coordination to the law of 
international cooperation and this has been adopted by multiple-organization 
supporters as the central element of global governance.  
 
However, the multiple-organization approach has been criticized as being 
incapable of solving and managing the global problems. It's critics mainly address 
the fact that in a multi-agency cooperation scheme within the current international 
environment, there would be no guarantee that all nation-states would join and 
become members of these organizations especially due to the fact that some of the 
organizations such as labour organizations would impose on them more burdens 
than benefits. Moreover, even if the problem of membership is solved there is no 
guarantee that these organizations which would have roles and positions in this 
inter-agency cooperation will possess adequate powers to check others and 
advance their agenda. In fact comparing the multiple-organization approach to the 
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WTO pattern as an example of one-organization model, even if the universal 
membership of those organizations is formed, the second issue of accountability 
among these international organizations would weaken their capability thus 
making them not as powerful as the WTO in addressing global problems.173 
Finally, by obtaining full universal membership and solving the problem of 
weakness by having really powerful institutions, there would be no guarantee that 
such an arrangement would lead to a desirable balance. Due to all these 
ambiguities and problems, the proposed solutions have not enjoyed adequate 
support to be the adopted pattern for the international distributive justice structure. 
 
2.2.2.2.  One Organization Solutions 
Certain solutions have been presented based upon the idea of a central organ 
which could manage global problems in a cohesive manner. These sorts of 
solutions, named as the One-Organization approach have many similarities with 
the ideal global government approach which has been presented in legal theory 
and the theoretical framework. However, it differs in its answer to the question of 
whether or not other institutions should have a role in this management or not. 
Despite the ideal global government approach which sets out that only one 
institution would be responsible for the distribution of burdens and benefits and 
for managing global problems, in the one-organization model, one international 
institution would be selected as the leader-organization, however the role and 
influence of other organizations would not disappear entirely and would still be 
present in this scheme. In the other words, one organization would be adopted as 
the one which has the leading role and the roles of the other organizations would 
be defined in conjunction with the leader organization.  
 
The advocators of a one-organization solution do not rule out the need for having 
cooperation and coordination at an international level among the international 
organizations. The increase in the complexity of trade and in financial and 
economic issues have necessitated the requirement for to cooperate together to 
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avoid any parallel working and waste of energy.174 Therefore while this approach 
does not deny the importance of inter-agency cooperation, it places it in the 
context of one-leading organization. The high cost of withdrawal and exit has 
made the one-organization solution more effective. Within multiple-organization 
solutions, states can easily violate their obligations or exit whenever burdens of 
participation outweigh benefits.175 However in a one-organization model violating 
an obligation within the umbrella of the leading organization would provide the 
possibility of a broad range of countermeasures, making the violation difficult to 
sustain. The same applies to exiting the organization which includes diverse 
issues and both burdens and benefits. Therefore the cost and difficulty of violating 
an obligation or exiting the coordinator organization which covers several topics 
have made the one-regime pattern effective and practical.          
 
Adopting the one-organization approach, the debate transfers to the optimal way 
on how to choose the leading organization. The first approach could be to 
consider the establishment of a new organization as the leading organization and 
take the responsibility for coordinating and managing global problems especially 
the problem of inequality. This new organization although falling short of the 
concept of ideal global government should enjoy all features and have at its 
disposal the required (human, capital and technical) resources in order to achieve 
the redistribution of world wealth or at least distribute the burdens and benefits on 
a just and fair basis on an international scale.  
 
However, establishing a new institution to be the responsible institution for global 
problems has encountered significant obstacles and difficulties. Despite the fact 
that establishment of a new organization with all the ideal features for carrying 
out the role of international distributive justice and acting as the IDJ agent for 
distributing burdens and benefits could be considered, realistically this would not 
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be an efficient act. The cost of a new establishment with all the risks of having 
universal membership, having enough power to enforce its worldwide objectives 
and finally producing a desirable outcome which does not destabilize the current 
situation,  have together resulted in recognizing the efficiency of using an existing 
body and institution in international structure. Using the existing structure in 
developing the desired institution not only is not considered as an ideal or 
unrealistic solution, but also would provide a broader view of the limitations 
under which the institution should function. Furthermore, adopting an existing 
body would enable the researchers to select an efficient institution with closer 
features to the leader organization, study its duties and responsibilities, deal with 
its limitations and ameliorate its current deficiencies in order to achieve the goal 
at lesser cost.  
 
Studying existing international institutions highlights a number of international 
organizations which have the minimum required global stature and enjoy the 
necessary jurisdiction or scope of action in order to be the subject of studies to 
address global problems. These organizations which either have nominated 
themselves as the relevant institutions required to address global problems or 
which have not claimed to have such a huge objective but have been observed and 
studied by writers and scholars as being the capable and proper institutions on this 
subject are as follows: United Nations, G20/7, Bretton Woods institutions, i.e. 
International Monetary Fund and world Bank, and World Trade Organization. 
 
2.2.2.2.1. United Nations Framework 
The most important inter-state and international institution which is an 
international organization and more than a mere governmental forum is the 
United Nations (UN). By saying United Nations, it includes the UN itself, 
General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, UN 
specialized agencies and UN programs forming a significant pillar of existing 
global governance. The UN was established by looking at security and peace and 
it serves as a forum in which all nation-states can have a voice and vote. The UN 
model was proposed in the aftermath of World War II in order to provide a forum 
for the peaceful settlement of disputes. However it has gradually become a 
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complex political institution which the complexity of the scope of jurisdiction and 
responsibility of all respective bodies of UN has made it difficult for it to operate 
effectively and almost impossible for responsibility to be attributed to it. 
Moreover it lacks the element of abidingness and only the Security Council's 
resolutions are legally binding while all its other regulations and decisions lack 
the important element of applicability.176 The UN whose aim is to secure peaceful 
relationships among nation-states was founded based on the recognition of the 
voluntary nature of state relationships, therefore it is a voluntary organization by 
nature and its international measures and regulations do not impose any positive 
obligations on non-members.177 Due to the lack of abidingness, the UN and its 
subsidiaries fall short of developing a binding process of wealth distribution. 
Moreover, it has not changed alongside the changes in the in its operating 
environment and a consensus exists on the necessity of its reform.178 
  
2.2.2.2.2. G20 
The creation of the G7/8 (group of nations) which has now been extended to the 
G20 was a kind of effort to fill the gaps and deficiencies of the UN in its role in 
addressing global problems. Accordingly, in the absence of ideal world 
government, the major governmental forums could fill the gap and play the role 
and the only powerful and respectable governmental forum is the G20.179 
Therefore, as it appears in its objectives, the G20 could be a proper institution 
taking responsibility for addressing global problems. The former G7/8 and today's 
"G20" forum consists of 85 percent of global gross national product and 80 
percent of world trade. In fact the G20 forum has been presented as a capable 
institution or forum which could take on the role of managing global problems. 
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The Gs forum, although it has shown a decisive face to address the world's 
problems and the participation of high level heads of states shows a powerful 
political view to solve the issues, still suffers from exclusivity and this exclusive 
nature, precludes it to render itself as a real global forum.180 It's a kind of club 
which apart from the criticism of the selection of its members, has ignored a great 
majority of the world's population and economic power and not reflected the poor 
countries' voices. The G20 is not a legitimate institution for the leading 
organization of global governance as it suffers from the agency problem and does 
not represent all individuals or in other words all citizens of the world. An 
international institution should have the votes of the members of the global 
society and represent them on an international scale and therefore the lack of such 
votes does not provide the necessary legitimacy to take a leading role in global 
governance.181 
 
2.2.2.2.3. World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
The third group of organizations which is known as the "New Bretton Woods" 
regime are the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank which are 
at the center of the third category of specialized organizations constituting third 
pillars of current global governance. These organizations are leading 
organizations in their specific fields and perform distinct and specific roles and 
tasks; the IMF in currency stabilization and the World Bank in financing 
development projects. These institutions have good records and have proved to be 
more effective, global and powerful than parallel bodies in the UN such as 
UNCTAD and UNDP.182 
 
Studying the history of the IMF highlights that the IMF was first designed to 
promote international monetary cooperation and stabilize foreign exchange but 
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then it shifted to acting more as an international financial institution.183 The IMF's 
structure of governance is not consistent with its purposes and it cannot function 
as a real global forum. The decision-making is not consistent with the minimum 
requirements of procedural justice and the G7 countries have 45 percent of votes 
at the IMF whereas 40 African countries enjoy less than 5 percent of the votes. 
While the ordinary decisions could be taken by a simple majority, special 
decisions need 85 percent of votes which has resulted in a situation where the 
United States, which has 17 percent of the votes, is able to unilaterally block 
certain decisions irrespective of the discipline and rules advocated by the IMF, 
resulting in the breakdown of the credibility of the Bretton Wood's regime.184 
These are all happening in a situation which United States is not subject to IMF 
disciplines and rules benefiting from domination of Dollar in huge deficit in 
balance of payments. Moreover, the record of its policy advice shows that it 
follows an ideology that is not responsive to all the challenges resulting from 
globalization and that it does not have the capabilities of being the leader 
organization for a one-organization model.185 
 
The same applies to the World Bank which although has had considerable success 
in many ways, it suffers from the same problems as the IMF. The function of the 
World Bank which was lending money to credit-worthy countries in the 
framework of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
shifted toward more of wealth transfer to low-income countries. Most of the 
World Bank and IMF tasks are carried out by loans to the developing countries 
and not grants; an approach which has been criticized by some researchers.186  
However apart from distributive policies and justice strategies adopted by these 
institutions, the IMF and the World Bank have fallen short of being the leader 
organization and have been viewed as inappropriate and irrelevant for being the 
coordinator of global governance in today's circumstances. The division of power 
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in these institutions exists in a manner which procedural justice in decision-
makings is not respected and the structure is not conducive to hearing the 
grievances or opinions of weaker members.187 
   
2.2.2.2.4. World Trade Organization 
The WTO was established as a result of nine rounds of negotiations which took 
place under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
GATT the former forum which managed international trade before the WTO, was 
more of an agreement than an organization which was formed as a result of an 
initiative by developed countries to circumvent the International Trade 
Organization (ITO); an organization which was established after the Bretton 
Woods arrangement and was mainly dominated by developing countries and low-
income nations. Signed by small number of countries, General Agreement on 
Tariff and Trade (GATT) was initiated by the developed countries to move 
toward the free movement of goods across their boundaries. Its content 
represented only what should have been just one of the chapters of the ITO and 
several aspects relating to development and to the needs of underdeveloped 
countries were kept out.188 It did not consider the existing economic inequality 
among the nation-states in the world and hence did not materialize welfare-
increase by itself.189 
 
Failure of other trade forums in reducing the trade barriers encouraged the 
developing and least-developed countries to join GATT and push for 
consideration of their economic situation in decision-making. The negotiation 
rounds started and the negotiation agenda shifted from some institutional issues in 
the first four rounds to the codification of legal behavior in the Kennedy Round 
and the Tokyo Round. Huge success came in the Uruguay Round and after years 
of negotiations resulted in the establishment of the WTO. The developing 
countries succeeded in integrating agricultural goods and textiles into the general 
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regime of international trade and an efficient and powerful mechanism for settling 
disputes arising from violation of WTO covered agreements was established. On 
the other side, developed countries succeeded in integrating services as the second 
pillar of WTO regulations, incorporating Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) as the third pillar of the WTO regime and also in 
introducing some general practices such as the anti-dumping practices forbidden 
by WTO regulations. Therefore, the Uruguay Round resulted in full 
representation of trade concerns in the international system, bringing developing 
countries into an international trade regime and it was a step toward a rule-based 
system instead of a power-based arrangement which therefore increased the 
security of small and middle-sized countries.190 As a result of the Uruguay Round 
conclusion, the WTO was established in 1995 and until now has been the 
responsible agent for international trade. 
 
The WTO has presented a good pattern of cooperation and regulation through 
justice principles. Instead of having a powerful executive branch and governing 
body which acts under the influence of powerful actors and developed countries, 
it is a member-driven organization in which the decisions are taken based on 
consensus. In addition, it has an effective dispute settlement mechanism which 
enables all its members regardless of their economic size and power to complain 
against each other and follow their claims via this process. While international 
organizations lack effective tools to induce their members to fulfill their 
obligations and moral pressure and public attention are the only tools which they 
hold that are voluntary in nature and lack real structural power, the WTO's 
effective mechanism of implementation has put the organization in a salient 
position.191 Although economic power together with legal and political capacities 
have greatly influenced the process of decision-making and dispute settlement in 
which for example most of WTO dispute settlement cases have been among major 
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actors of WTO, this inequality is a matter of substantial justice.192 As far as 
structure is concerned, we are engaged with providing relative procedural justice 
and the WTO's achievement is something that does not have any precedent in the 
history of international relations. 
 
The “single undertaking” feature of the WTO and integrated economies has made 
WTO a single package of rules, principles, commitments and concessions, thus 
making exiting the WTO nearly impossible and it has had real success in 
incorporating at least one non-trade subject to the trade forum.193 In a one-
organization model of global governance, the WTO enjoys the capabilities and 
potential to be presented as the leader organization and to be the major body 
responsible for dealing with global problems. Many believe the WTO, due to its 
extensive areas of global business operations, the effective and powerful sanctions 
mechanism, its great role and the high compliance and good record in opening 
markets, could be viewed as the most appropriate and proper organization to be in 
effective inter-institutional cooperation with other international institution in order 
to address global issues and play the leading role.194 In the current situation, the 
WTO (including its former structure) is the only international body which has 
proved that it is generally improving its structure and agenda significantly in 
accordance with the distributional concerns. However, the WTO needs 
fundamental and basic reforms both in its structure according to the requirements 
of procedural justice and in its agenda and strategy to fulfill the requirements of 
substantial justice. Therefore, the WTO should be strengthened and empowered 
and a strong and effective WTO would be in interest of not only economic 
development but also in the interest of social sustainable development.195  
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2.3. International Distributive Justice and Strategy 
The demand for application of justice principles and justice in international 
economic relations first appeared as part of the need for formal equality in the 
structure of international relations named as procedural justice. Formal equality or 
procedural justice provides the framework in which a just decision could be made 
and a just outcome could be the end result. However the problem is that a pure 
formal equality in procedure is not a sufficient factor for reaching a just outcome 
and the procedural justice and equality in the decision-making process, dispute 
settlement mechanism and the whole structure of the WTO, does not address the 
establishment of substantive equality among international players and nation-
states. Therefore, the second stage of the implementation of justice theory on 
international relations aims at the implementation of substantive justice in a 
manner which not only puts the decisions taken in a just structure according to 
justice requirements but also asks for the substance of decisions and the outcomes 
to be in accordance with justice principles. 
 
These decisions should provide a set of rules and principles to be applied to the 
global economy that design an ideal theoretical perspective in which the present 
semi-mercantilism approach in the international economy can be replaced by new 
rules and standards; rules and standards which break up the existing cartels, make 
open the global market in the same manner for all individuals, in a manner 
through which the authoritative body responsible for rectifying the violations will 
be able to monitor the trade and economic behavior and intervene whenever it 
finds deviations from rules and principles.196 These principles, rules and 
provisions which are the substance of the decisions taken within the adopted 
structure for international distributive justice constitute the strategy part of the 
international concept of justice. The international justice approach to the 
substance of decisions and to the strategy of international institutions aims at a 
kind of patterned redistribution of wealth among the individuals across the state 
boundaries.197 This strategy named as the second principle of justice in Rawls 
theory develops a framework in which the unequal distribution of wealth takes 
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place but in favor of less advantaged members of the society. The Rawlsian 
theory which has been extended to the global governance on international level 
provides the general principle of international difference principle as the guideline 
in international strategy.  
 
Following the Second World War and the establishment of the UN, the problem 
of inequality has become the center of the demands of the developing countries 
and as the priority on their agenda. Initiatives were proposed in order to address 
the problem of inequality and reduce the gap between the rich and poor. These 
initiatives focused on the substantive inequality among the international 
community and different classes of countries contributing to the development of 
the international difference principle. In the Post-World War II period and after 
decades of war, a new era in international relations started based on the nation-
states as the central elements and main international actors and players. Following 
the independence movement mainly in Africa and post-colonialism era, a class of 
low-income countries was formed and established which were not only in a 
disadvantaged position due to colonialism and unjust acquisition by some 
developed countries, but also they were and are still suffering from the unjust 
nature of international relations. These unjust relations inspired the developing 
and low-income countries to present several initiatives to change the existing 
international arrangements and shift it to a more fair and equitable position.  
 
Inspired by Marxist ideology in the 1970s, a group of developing countries 
presented a new economic order to enhance the standing of developing countries 
within the established order in international economic relations. This initiative, 
named New International Economic Order (NIEO) aimed at a more equitable 
relationship among the international actors and nation-states through the increase 
in the development assistance and decrease in the tariffs of the developed 
countries thus responding to the requirements of justice.198   However, the NIEO 
attempt of the low-income countries failed and this was effectively due to the 
reason that it lacked the necessary factual basis. Its failure was due to its political 
roots and the economic impact of its implementation, which would have resulted 
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in some unacceptable implications for primary goods and the creation of high 
barriers for manufactured goods from low-income countries. By the end of the 
domination of Marxist ideology, the developing and least-developed countries had 
no other way than finding solutions and initiatives within the liberal concept of 
justice and equality. Initiatives were proposed in order to address the problem of 
inequality and reduce the gap between the rich and poor. These initiatives focused 
on the substantive inequality among the international community and the different 
classes of countries which contributed to the development of the international 
difference principle and should be studied and examined in accordance with the 
principles of justice in addressing the problem of inequality. 
 
2.3.1. Justice-Oriented Strategy in the Current Facts 
The process of globalization has accelerated the speed of denationalization by 
removing economic barriers and facilitating the movement of goods, capital and 
the work force. The high speed with which globalization took place coincided 
with the existing inequality among countries and therefore resulted in deepening 
the gap between the low-income and high-income countries. The exacerbation of 
the inequality caused by the high speed of the globalization process caused some 
researchers to favour the idea of stopping or slowing down the expansion of 
international cooperation, leading to the reduction of the influence of international 
organizations particularly the World Trade Organization.199 
 
However, the current evolution in today's international relations proves that ideas 
which prefer to eliminate the causes rather than to solve the problems are 
incompatible with the reality of the international order. Stopping the daily 
increasing wave of international cooperation in today's globalized world with the 
integrated economies is as much unrealistic as ideal global government with full 
discretion of distributing burdens and benefits. Despite the fact that the 
globalization process has caused global problems, the appropriate solution is not 
                                                          
199 Robert Howse and Makau Mutua, "Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy. Challenges 
for the World Trade Organization," Human Rights in Development Yearbook 1999/2000: The 
Millennium Edition, Hugo Stokke, Anne Tostensen, eds., Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
2010-008 (2001 ). p.81 
96 
 
to step back from globalization. Therefore the study of the policies and strategies 
which address the problem of inequality based on the principles of justice should 
only consider the policies which realize the current facts and existing limitations; 
the policies which are developed based on the understanding that the globalization 
process is part of today's international relations and the paradigm which favors an 
increasing level of cooperation. Therefore in order to address the global problems 
efficiently, international cooperation and global management is a necessary 
element.200 
 
The global governance approach, while it considers the individuals as the focal 
point of justice principles on global scale, also take into account the real facts and 
international limitations as the necessary elements of an ideal theory to be 
practical and implementable. The global governance approach tailors and shapes 
the ideal cosmopolitan theory by realizing the existing nation-states and political 
boundaries, as a significant obstacle to global justice by presenting a two-stage 
process as a new model for the redistribution of wealth. This two-stage process 
provides that in the first stage the existing players of international society, i.e. 
sovereign states, should strengthen to be powerful enough to receive a more than 
proportionate portion of wealth in international relations and arrangements. The 
existing nation-states in fact put a kind of precondition and restriction on the 
distribution of wealth in the current international order through which the 
distribution of wealth should be channelized in a manner in which first the current 
sovereign states enjoy a more equal and proportionate share of the world wealth; 
the stage which is known as the stage of development.  
 
However the wealth created on the international level is not the final stage and the 
wealth created for the low-income countries as a result of the development 
process should be distributed on a national scale among the citizens and members 
of each society to improve the current well-being of individuals in less developed 
countries. While the first stage of the redistribution mechanism is referred and 
limited only to the less-developed countries with the aim of making this class of 
countries capable for the following distributional step, the second stage includes 
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not only the least-developed and less-advanced economies but also the developed 
and advanced countries which suffer from a gap between the high-income and 
low-income citizens of their society.  
 
In other words, the second wealth redistribution stage addresses the inequality 
resulting from either the pre-globalization inequalities or from the unjust character 
of the international relations, which affects not only the low-income citizens but 
also the citizens and members of the middle and high-income countries. 
Therefore, the redistribution process on a global scale based on the current 
consideration of existing facts should take place in two stages: first the wealth 
creation in the international order for low-income and least developed countries 
and second the wealth distribution on a national level in order to ameliorate the 
individuals and citizens' standard of living in these countries.   
 
2.3.2. DJ and Wealth Distribution in International 
Order: Wealth Creation 
The existing poverty due to current international circumstances and the lack of 
economic growth and absence of positive forecasts of economic well-being in the 
least-developed and low-income countries are evidence of the importance and 
significance of wealth distribution in the international order. In order to move 
toward global justice within the current existing international mechanism, the first 
stage of implementation of justice principles on the international policies and 
strategies require the supporting and strengthening of the low-income countries; 
the support which is the subject and target of the first stage of wealth distribution 
in international order, should result in wealth creation for the weaker members of 
the society. However, the first distributional stage has been developed and 
approached by researchers using two different classes of policies; the direct 
system of financial aid and the indirect policies of development. 
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2.3.2.1.  Direct Financial Aid System 
The major focus of the international community in reducing poverty and 
addressing the problem of inequality has been on the provision of financial aid to 
poor countries which is categorized as direct financial intervention of rich 
countries into the less-advanced economies. Attempts to implement the foreign 
aid approach which has been viewed as a short-term and fast solution in 
addressing the problem of inequality, has been done through initiatives such as 
"Millennium Development Goals" (MDG). The MDG was developed to increase 
social equity and enhance life standards by improving economic and social 
conditions in the weaker members and poorest countries of the world.201 The 
MDG still exists on the agenda of the United Nations and its objectives are as 
targets for international institutions.202 Other direct financial aid initiatives 
the G8 countries' promises of foreign aid to the low-income and weak countries.  
 
Two opposite views on the direct financial-aid system each put foreign aid in a 
special context which results either in positive or negative outcomes. While the 
left-wing approach led by some researchers203 considers a significant and 
important role for foreign aid, the right-wing scholars204 mock the delusion of the 
aid lobby and accuse the aid-approach supporters of neglecting other policies.205 
The left-wing approach in this debate which has been vested in the desirability or 
undesirability of foreign aid as an instrument and solution believes in foreign aid 
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as an important component of international economic order and seeks for an 
equilibrium point between aid and other strategies.206  
 
However, the rival view puts in question the efficiency and desirability of foreign 
aid considering aid as not part of any potential solution but rather part of the 
problem which has exacerbated the underdevelopment of low-income 
countries.207 The proponents of this approach argue that current foreign aid is not 
only heavily conditional but also puts several restrictions and limitations on the 
recipient countries in the utilization of aid and the control mechanisms for 
achieving the goals. They also argue that it has brought significant consequences 
and externalities such as corruption among the governors and authorities of the 
recipient countries and additionally encouraged rival groups leading to the 
expansion of disharmony and in extreme cases civil wars within the recipient 
countries.208 
 
The existing foreign aid mechanism and direct financial intervention system has 
been criticized widely. Initiatives such as MDG, while successful in shifting the 
agenda from inputs to outcomes, have fallen short of putting forward an ideal 
scheme which defines the development goals for the entire world. The G8 
promises have been unfulfilled and the new promises are nothing but the 
repackaging of old aid promises in to new aid promises.209 Its efficiency has been 
put into question and its desirability in being a solution for the development of the 
less-developed countries is also in doubt. The foreign aid and direct financial 
intervention approach has been criticized as not being a realistic and exclusive 
option and solution for the development of the developing world as it sacrifices 
mid-term and long-term developmental goals for some short-term and fast 
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solution.210 It distorts the development process of recipient countries and removes 
the motivations of the less developed countries to look for sustainable solutions 
and mechanisms for developing and fostering their economies.211 
 
The justice-approach looks like more than a charity-mechanism for reducing the 
poverty.212   In fact, the justice school addresses the issue of obtaining a 
sustainable and long-standing approach of removing inequality which result in 
sustainable growth in the least developed and developing countries rather than a 
temporary and fast solution and instrument of reducing poverty. The justice-
centered theories look at a solution which avoids the adverse side-effects of 
foreign aid and the developing and less-developed countries have shown in 
several initiatives proposed by them that they want a hand up instead of handouts. 
They are seeking more opportunities to expedite their growth and development 
process rather than receiving annual, heavily conditional amounts of aid which 
fall short of providing any sustainable solution.213 Therefore the solutions and 
policies which aim at the removal of inequality by wealth distribution on the 
international level and wealth creation on the national level should consider other 
initiatives rather than the direct financial intervention and foreign aid of 
developed and rich countries. 
 
2.3.2.2.  Indirect system: Non-Aid system 
The only alternative to the mechanism of direct financial intervention and foreign 
aid is an indirect, non-aid approach which addresses the unjust nature and 
discriminatory consequences of some international economic relations. The direct 
financial aid approach has not been successful in shifting the low-income 
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countries toward a more just situation and does not present a good outcome even 
in the area of poverty reduction in terms of halving hunger. A report by Action 
Aid reveals that 20 out of 28 poor nations are off track in the race to half hunger 
by 2015 and 12 of these are going backwards.214 The indirect solutions reject the 
issue of monetary contributions in a direct manner into the targeted economies 
and present solutions and approaches in which the common points are the increase 
in the capability of the poorer and low-income countries in accelerating their 
development process leading to wealth creation for these countries.  
 
The indirect policies include a wide range of solutions from some institutional 
solutions such as the establishment of certain public funds or the improvement of 
regional or multilateral development banks to other strategic and policy 
mechanisms such as policy reforms, introduction of an international tax regime or 
the development of an efficient foreign direct investment system. These policies 
and solutions have been criticized in different ways; some have been contested as 
being inefficient, others are efficient but unworkable and unpractical, certain 
others are efficient and applicable but with limited and micro impacts and finally 
other solutions while being desirable and efficient, have been viewed as difficult 
to implement politically. 
 
Public funds and regional or multilateral development banks which have been 
proposed for addressing the inequality and poverty, even though viewed as a step 
forward, have a limited scope of influence and are prepared to deal only with a 
limited category of problems. The World Bank experience as the most powerful 
and well-organized institution in this regard shows a limited scope of influence 
and major difficulties in implementing strategies which these institutions 
encounter.215 Other approaches in international taxation, proposed as a desirable 
approach which could lead to explicit redistribution, have been developed in two 
ways; first taxation on transactions on an international scale such as currency 
transactions and second, as a step further, taxation on international revenue and 
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global resources. The taxation-centred solutions, even though it was envisaged 
would be more efficient than any other indirect approaches, have encountered 
many difficulties and problems in implementation. The taxation solutions have 
been criticized due to neglecting the existing limitations in terms of national 
boundaries by proposing an ultra-national mechanism of world taxation and hence 
have been viewed more as an ideal proposition than a real practical approach to 
implement.216 
 
The policy reform solution, proposed mostly by International Monetary Fund's 
prescriptions refers to market-friendly policies that were generally advised and 
implemented and economic reforms that were prescribed for developing 
countries. Known mainly as the Washington Consensus, the IMF policy reforms 
ask for reduction of government deficits, deregulation of international trade and 
economic opening regarding international trade and cross-border investment, and 
pursuing export-led growth and the expansion of market forces in the national 
economies. The policy reform in a general sense does not refer only to the IMF 
prescriptions and its general definition includes all policies ranging from the 
distribution of natural resources to political and monetary policies and is a major 
pillar of the justice-approach in international strategies. These prescriptions which 
address the obstacles or the delay factors in the development process of 
developing countries have been proposed by some researchers to be reflected in 
principles known as charters for natural resources, democracy, budget 
transparency, post conflict situation and investment.217  
 
However these charters and principles do not go further than being prescriptions 
for all countries especially the developing countries and the real policy reforms 
materialized in the IMF package have proved to be ineffective and are currently 
unpopular due to the negative outcomes in several developing countries as a result 
of shock-therapies proposed by these prescriptions. The few examples of 
                                                          
216 Garcia, "Trade, Inequality, and Justice: Toward a Liberal Theory of Just Trade." p.209 
217 Paul Collier, "Opportunities and Challenges for the Inclusion of the ‘Bottom Billion’," Session 
3, Keynote Lectures: “Economic Development for Global Inclusion”, Our Common Future, 
Hannover (November 3, 2010). p.3 
103 
 
successful implementation of the IMF policies have been criticized as their 
success can be attributed to other economic elements and there have been claims 
of discrepancies between what has been claimed in the Washington Consensus 
policies and what has been actually implemented by the responsible institutions. 
These prescriptions mainly advocate a unified prescription for each country which 
has to date resulted in huge losses and the failure of major developing countries 
has therefore been widely criticized in regard to the need for policy diversity and 
local specific paths for development.218 
 
2.3.2.2.1. Trade-based Policies 
The trade-based policies for development have been studied as the most important 
set of policies for moving toward wealth distribution on an international level and 
wealth creation for weak economies. This can be traced back to the trade 
pessimism approach and the argument which stated that in order to develop the 
industrial and manufacturing capacity of the developing countries as well as to 
diversify the production of these countries, the import-substitution policy to 
protect their infant industries had to be prescribed.219 The failure of such approach 
retained no other alternatives for the low-income and middle-class countries other 
than shifting toward the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). GATT 
which was an agreement developed in liberal paradigm to propose rules and 
regulations for international trade liberalization was well-known as a club of rich 
and developed countries. Its regulations and rules were written by the developed 
countries and the nature of its provisions resulted in the marginalization of the 
low-income countries, thereby encouraging the developing countries to reduce the 
influence of the GATT arrangement through the Havana Charter which however 
enjoyed little success. The failure of Havana Charter initiative and the character 
of the GATT regulation which was viewed as the rules of competition among 
equal but powerful members resulted in the decision by developing countries to 
minimize their involvement in GATT in the 1960s and 1970s. This decision at 
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that time resulted in the transfer to the only existing alternative which was the 
United Nations framework.220 
 
The dominant paradigm of the United Nations at that time was a totally different 
approach, proposing import substitution in regional and international trade as the 
adopted approach for the development of the less-developed countries instead of 
the pareto-efficiency school and the comparative advantage approach of GATT 
which looked at liberalization of international trade and removal of all tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to trade.221 The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) was established within the UN structure as the result of 
the developing countries inclination to the UN framework. The UNCTAD 
initiatives brought for the first time the general concept of differential treatment 
for the least-developed and developing countries as the marginalized actors of 
international trade and economics providing a new scope of competition with 
specific rules and regulations presenting new opportunities and chances for 
development.  
 
The Haberler report in 1958 indicated that the domestic policies of the high-
income countries resulted in the reduction of the export capacity of the low-
income countries. The fact that the low-income countries were not suppliers of 
many goods which were the focus of GATT negotiations coupled with their 
limited leverage in negotiations due to the smallness of their domestic markets led 
to the increase in the belief among the low-income countries, who are generally 
the primary goods producers, that the terms of trade in GATT are in favor of the 
high-income countries. This dissatisfaction led to the call for the development of 
flexibilities in GATT in order to encourage the developing and low-income 
countries to remain within the trade forum.222  The concept of differential 
treatment was therefore developed in UNCTAD and justified the generalized 
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system of trade preferences (GSP) and resulted in two initiatives for the first time 
in GATT; GATT Waiver 1971 and Enabling Clause 1979.223 
 
Despite bringing certain success in several aspects, the UNCTAD was viewed 
overall as an ineffective structure thereby encouraging the developing and least-
developed countries to return to the GATT arrangement.224  The failure of the 
import substitution model of trade, strengthened the multilateral trade system in 
GATT and encouraged developing countries to reform the existing structure of 
GATT in a manner which supported their special pattern of development. This 
approach resulted in several rounds of negotiation until finally the Uruguay 
Round of negotiation led to the establishment of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) which succeeded in integrating textile and agricultural goods to the 
general regime, introduced intellectual property to the multilateral forum and 
created a powerful and efficient mechanism for dispute settlement. The WTO 
succeeded in introducing a new solution for addressing the problem of inequality, 
i.e. the trade-based policies. 
 
Generally trade liberalization in an adjusted manner for developing countries has 
been viewed as a solution which has resulted in opposite outcomes than the 
impact which financial liberalization has on income distribution. While trade 
liberalization and export growth in a studied manner have been found to be 
associated with lower income inequality, increased financial openness is 
associated with higher inequality and deepens the gap between rich and poor.225 
The trade-based policies have proven to be the most efficient policies in helping 
the low-income countries, rather than having an aid-needed economy which is 
structured according to the foreign aid amount received from advanced countries, 
move towards an integrated economy which provides them with a sustainable 
development-based approach and ensures that they obtain a reasonable and 
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acceptable share in international trade.226  This set of policies in fact establishes a 
new set of redistributive policies based on trade considerations which could act as 
an alternative for the aid-based redistributive policies. The trade-based policies 
have contributed to the world's wealth creation and provide evidence of the power 
of the removal of tariffs and non-tariffs barriers to trade in enhancing the world 
economic situation, and therefore these policies have been adopted as the strategy 
upon which the justice requirements and mainly international difference principle 
would be applied as the strategy of justice theory addressing the problem of 
inequality. 
 
2.3.3. DJ and Wealth Distribution in National Order: 
Wealth Distribution 
The second step for the wealth distribution process would be the distribution of 
wealth on a national level by the nation-states among their citizens. The second 
step of distribution actually completes the first step of wealth creation on the 
international level without which the goal of wealth distribution would be 
fruitless. The target of justice principles is to make all individuals better-off on a 
global scale and the two-stage distribution process is only due to the existing 
limitations and restrictions in international relations. Hence, any wealth creation 
on an international scale which is not completed by the distributional mechanism 
on a national level would not be viewed as a successful and complete mechanism 
and the mission will still be unfinished.  
 
The aim of this research is not to study the alternative approaches of distribution 
on a national level. The national distributional instruments which are normally 
referred to are more or less developed and established in particular two efficient 
distributional mechanisms; the first instrument insists on the establishment of an 
efficient tax regime putting the disadvantaged members of the society in a more 
advantaged position and the second instrument highlights the strengthening of the 
social standards of society thereby improving the life standards of the citizens and 
guaranteeing a minimum level for the weakest members of the society. In fact the 
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two-stage wealth distribution at the national level guarantees the minimum level 
of economic rights for citizens of the nation and in the second stage addresses the 
inequality among the citizens by establishing a distributional-oriented tax regime. 
The reinforcement of social standard in societies by trade-based policies, the 
theory of parallelism originating from the second principle of justice which 
supports social development in parallel to economic development and the impact 
of what trade-based strategies could achieve in order to enhance the social 
standards of the societies will be the subject of study from the justice point of 
view to the trade-centered policies. 
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II. The Principles of Justice in WTO 
and International Trade 
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1. The First Principle of Justice in WTO 
and International Trade 
The implementation of the theory of justice on the adopted structure and strategy 
in international relations requires a two-stage test of the principles of justice. The 
first stage looks for the accomplishment of the first principle of justice in the 
structure of the leader organization as well as detailed provisions of the strategy 
which the leader organization will follow in order to address the problem of 
inequality. The first principle of justice in fact follows the same approach which 
the corrective feature of justice follows and calls for equal treatment among all 
individuals and members of the society. The first principle of justice on the 
international level advocates the same level of rights, duties, opportunities and 
treatment among all individuals and members of the international community. 
This equal treatment provides the necessary basis for the WTO structure to move 
toward an ideal pattern according to the principle of justice. The ideal pattern and 
target for the structure and platform which provide the hard-ware of justice is 
implementation of procedural justice in its real sense. The procedural justice 
which requires fairness and the transparency of the structure and processes within 
the structure conforms to the notion of equal treatment and therefore the first 
principle of justice can accommodate the requirements of procedural justice. 
However the strategy is a matter of substantive justice which after being assessed 
according to the requirements of the first principle moves toward the second 
principle of justice. 
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1.1. WTO's Structure and Global Governance; 
Question of Procedural Justice 
A comprehensive justice-based study of the adopted body and policy requires that 
in the first step the structure of the World Trade Organization as the most 
appropriate body of global governance be studied based on the requirements and 
principles of procedural justice and in the second step, the trade-based policies be 
addressed as the adopted strategy according to substantive justice. Procedural 
justice requires that in the decision-making process of the WTO, the decisions are 
made by the legitimate agents and also in a transparent manner. In addition, the 
executive power of the WTO, in order to be deemed compatible with principles of 
procedural justice, should provide for the implementation of the legislative power 
by the democratically legitimized institution with the possibility for important 
stakeholders to participate, and finally the judiciary power's decisions should be 
consistent with the decisions made by the legislative power in providing the 
opportunities for the involved parties to appeal and seek review of the issued 
award.227 
 
The WTO, and previously GATT, in a structural sense, succeeded in introducing 
a rule-based structure in which all members, whether powerful or weak, were 
treated by the same rule and principles. The political considerations were kept out 
and all WTO Members enjoy the same level of power in decision-making and 
also access to the dispute settlement mechanism. While the experience of 
international organizations presented a model in which the outcomes shaped the 
rules and in which a lack of procedural justice in their decision-making, execution 
and governance or dispute settlement processes was exhibited, the Uruguay 
Round and WTO establishment presented a rule-based mechanism in which all 
members could participate in decision-making on an equal footing, execute and 
implement the decisions by their own national government and have 
unconditional access to the judicial power once they felt that their legitimate 
interests have been lost and a commitment has been violated. 
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However the fact that the WTO has been adopted as being more efficient and 
being the closest existing international institution to the principles of justice, does 
not imply that it fits all requirements of justice and is the ideal organization 
according to the justice principles approach to international structure. The 
application of ideal justice principles to the activities of the real World Trade 
Organization which has had an active existence of more than fifteen years reveals 
several gaps and deficiencies in the function and structure of the WTO. The 
failure to deal with these problems, fill the gaps and remove the deficiencies 
would prevent the WTO from fulfilling the requirements of justice. Therefore in 
order to make the WTO an organization capable of coordinating and leading 
global governance, the application of international justice principles serves to 
highlight several problems and deficiencies in the legislative, executive and 
judicial powers of the WTO. 
 
When comparing the WTO's structure with the structure of national states, three 
different powers of states could be recognized and extracted from the WTO's 
structure. In fact structure in a practical sense refers to the procedure in which the 
decisions are taken, the framework in which the decisions taken are executed and 
the mechanism which should function in order to settle and resolve the disputes 
and claims arising as a result of the execution of these decisions. In this sense the 
concept of structure constitutes of three different powers; legislative power, 
executive power and judicial power. Therefore, the WTO's rounds of negotiations 
and the WTO's Ministerial Conferences could be viewed as the legislative power 
of the WTO, the Dispute Settlement mechanism as the judicial power and finally 
the WTO's Members as the executive power themselves having the discretion to 
implement trade regulations. 
 
1.1.1. Bargaining and Decision Making (Legislative) 
Power and Procedural Justice 
The legislative power which is studied as the first power in the WTO’s structure 
includes the process of bargaining and decision-making among the WTO 
Members. This process is conducted mainly through the rounds of negotiations, 
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Ministerial Conferences and the WTO's General Council and is therefore a 
member-driven process. In contrast to other international organizations in which 
the decision-making process passes through a bureaucratic organ of decision-
making, in the WTO decisions are taken by WTO Members themselves and the 
WTO Secretariat has no role in the decision-making process. The member-driven 
process is so sensitive and significant that all decisions are and must be taken by 
the affirmative answer of all WTO Members, i.e. the decision-making rule known 
as the rule of consensus. The consensus rule in the WTO currently exists as a 
golden rule in WTO decision-making whereby WTO Members will not deviate 
from this concept even in decisions where by WTO Agreement, there are lower 
requirements for making the decision.228 WTO Members have shown their 
interest by insisting on following the consensus rule on occasions such as voting 
for accession in which the WTO Agreement has provided for a minimum amount 
of two-thirds of votes.229 
 
Another feature of the WTO's legislative power is the single-undertaking 
approach in the WTO rounds of negotiations which when multiplied by the 
consensus rule of decision-making together make the legislative power of the 
WTO a unique power and process. The single undertaking suspends all accords 
and successes in different issues in order to reach an accord on all issues and 
agendas and requires all participants to accept or reject the outcome of multiple 
negotiations in a single package, rather than selecting between them. 
Consequently, in general, nothing will be finalized and implemented and any 
agreed issues and provisions will not enter into force until the package is totally 
agreed upon which the whole package becomes binding and the WTO Members 
will then have to implement the decisions and ensure conformity of all their 
individual domestic laws to the agreed principles and provisions. 
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The consensus rule if viewed with the single-undertaking feature represents a high 
standard of democracy for the WTO legislative power through which even a 
marginalized member of the WTO could block or even veto all the achievements 
of the negotiation round. The member-driven nature of the WTO and the golden 
rule of consensus have proved to be workable and by accepting the agency 
relationship and the fact that the nation-states are acting as agents of their nations, 
the WTO's legislature power has been viewed as a great achievement and 
regarded as close to the requirements of procedural justice in the sense that all 
WTO Members enjoys the same level of power and have the same voice in the 
WTO's decision-making process. 
 
The legislative process of the WTO has been viewed as one of the most efficient 
decision-making mechanism when compared to the decision-making processes of 
other international organizations. This mechanism, though significant in its 
features, has deferred difficult decision-making in the forum in favor of the status 
quo. The consensus rule and single-undertaking features ensure continuation of 
the status quo unless all WTO Members agree on all provisions and regulations of 
the negotiation round thus making it difficult for any changes in the existing 
situation in order to move toward a more just situation. 
 
The WTO's decision-making process from a justice point of view reveals several 
deficiencies, gaps and problems which indicate how far the WTO is from being 
the ideal coordinator organization in global governance. These problems which 
are generally categorized as legitimacy and sovereignty problems clarify how far 
the WTO is from being the ideal organization and how to move toward the one-
organization pattern of global governance by highlighting  what kind of reforms 
and modifications should be done thus enabling the WTO to play the leading role 
in the global governance framework. These reforms and modifications should be 
viewed as the ideal prescriptions some of which are feasible and could take place 
in the current international situation while others would be difficult to implement 
and would be considered as the ideal principle for long-term action for which the 
legislative power of the WTO should evolve. 
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1.1.1.1. Direct Democratic Input and Transparency 
The first problem of the WTO's decision-making power is encountered when 
addressing the issue of legitimacy and looking at the well-known problem of 
agency. The agency issue looks at the direct democratic input of the WTO's 
legislative power and puts in question the capability of governments as the real 
agent of the individuals. Additionally, the agency problem becomes more 
complex when some domestic arrangements for decision-making among WTO 
Members such as the Fast Track Authority in US are taken into consideration 
together with the direct and indirect influence of interest groups in the decision-
making of the agents.230 In fact, the issue of agency exists in all international 
institutions and forums which include national governments as the members of 
that international forum. While the ideal global justice approach looks at the 
individuals themselves and asks for direct election of the representatives by the 
citizens, the real facts and limitations of the current international relations show 
the difficulty of implementing such an approach. The sociological study of the 
issue of legitimacy requires that for an institution to be legitimate, it must be 
widely believed by the people to have the right to rule,231 however the theoretical 
aspect views the nation-states as the representative of their nation and that the 
national decision-makers are accountable for defending the interests of their 
citizens. 
 
However, the alternative approach in order to deal with the problem of agency 
and lack of direct democratic input is to increase the transparency of the decision-
making process of WTO and improve the openness of WTO. This solution would 
become more significant in situation which a considerable part of WTO activities 
specially the trade negotiations are done in secrecy. The secrecy of the 
negotiations and process of decision-making has acted against the democratic 
requirements and has exacerbated the problem of agency and legitimacy. The 
secret negotiations have resulted in certain decision-makings such as introduction 
of TRIPS which was not only favoring the developing countries in general but 
also it favors entirely special interest of certain powerful industrial lobbies in 
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these countries and mainly in US.232 The improvement of transparency provisions 
in WTO negotiations by making the agendas, negotiations and outcomes open to 
the public and by opening the forum to the public has been viewed as means of 
avoiding decision-making which only protects the interests of certain powerful 
groups and could contribute to the possibility of the supervision of individuals on 
the whole process of decision-making and amelioration of the issue of agency.233 
 
1.1.1.2. Risk of Regulatory Capture 
One of the significant risks of legislation in every legislative body, internationally 
and nationally, is the risk of regulatory capture in the sense that powerful interest 
groups and lobbies gain influence over the process of legislation and shift the 
legislative power in a direction which enacts regulations and takes decisions 
which protects the interests of those interest groups rather than the interests of the 
whole society. This risk would affect the decision-making process in a negative 
manner and would derail the legislative power from distributional-centered laws 
and regulations to legal enactment of lobby-based rules and provisions. The WTO 
as an international organization with great impact on the trade and economy of the 
member states and consequently the private sectors active in different parts of the 
various economies has been vulnerable to this risk in an indirect manner. In fact 
the vulnerability of the lobby groups to the WTO decisions has resulted in the 
vulnerability of the WTO to the risk of capture by this group. The most important 
example of this risk can be seen in the introduction of Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property which was initiated and supported by the highly influential 
pharmaceutical industry.234 
 
The risk of regulatory capture exists more or less in all international organizations 
including the WTO. However the decision-making mechanism of each 
international institution should uphold a process through which this risk is 
minimized. The WTO as an international organization and as compared to other 
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international organizations has been successful in minimizing this risk due to the 
consensus rule of decision-making. The consensus rule in the WTO decision-
making process has provided a platform in the WTO which by requiring the 
positive vote of all WTO Members has reduced the risk and limited the scope of 
interest groups which would deviate the organization from its distribution-
centered agenda. Moving towards a justice approach would require WTO to 
consider distributional concerns in its decision-making and regulatory capture 
would act against this approach. 
  
1.1.1.3. Principal Supplier Approach 
The traditional method of the decision-making process during the GATT period 
was based on a so-called Principal Supplier Approach. The Principal Supplier 
Approach of decision-making was the old approach of decision-making through 
which the big and significant players in international trade managed the whole 
process of decision-making.  As a matter of fact the substantive inequality among 
the GATT Members encroached on the procedural process of decision-making by 
marginalizing the less-advanced members of GATT. The highlighting of 
problems, development of the agenda, the defining of solutions, conduct of 
negotiations and finally the decision-making were all entirely influenced and done 
mainly by the US, European Countries, Canada and Japan which hammered out 
the deals.235 
 
The justice requirements reject any sort of principal supplier approach which 
fosters the interest of certain classes of countries especially the developed 
countries. Justice requires low-income countries to have a voice as well and to 
take part as active players in all the steps of decision-making at the WTO. The 
justice principles require the WTO to move from a Principle Supplier Approach to 
a multilateral approach which recognizes the role of other less-developed 
members and to facilitate consensus-rule in decision-making by providing the 
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necessary basis for detaching from a unilateral approach in legislation and to give 
weight and position to other coalitions of less-developed countries.236 
 
1.1.1.4. Trade Ministers and Non-Trade Issues 
Other structural problem of the WTO's legislative power is the sole involvement 
of trade ministers in the negotiations and decision-making. Despite the fact that 
the WTO has now become a multilateral and global forum for discussing trade 
and non-trade issues, the negotiations are done solely by the trade ministers of the 
WTO Members. The position of non-trade issues within the WTO umbrella, as 
will be discussed later, has been approached through two opposite views; the first 
approach perceives the WTO as only a specific-trade forum and the opposite view 
puts the WTO in the position of leader and coordinator organization in global 
governance. The first approach rejects any place for non-trade issues in the WTO 
and thus refuses for them to be presented on the WTO agenda. However, while 
the second view accepts the involvement of non-trade issues in the WTO, it does 
not agree that decisions should be taken by the trade ministers on non-trade 
issues.237 Moreover, the trade ministers are perceived as the administrative 
authorities who are most influenced by the special interests of lobby groups and 
multi-national companies and therefore leaving the negotiations and decision-
making on non-trade issues to the trade ministers is not only against proper 
decision-making according to the procedural justice, but also improves the agenda 
of special interest groups and acts against the distribution-centered policies.238  
 
1.1.2.  Executive Power and Procedural Justice 
The second pillar of the WTO's power which is the executive power addresses the 
question of who has the power and responsibility to implement the regulations 
legislated by the legislative power as well as implements the decisions taken by 
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the judicial power and the dispute settlement process. Generally the execution and 
implementation of the WTO Agreements and dispute settlement decisions are 
through the national governments of the WTO Members and these member-states 
are the executive power of the WTO. In fact the WTO Law gives considerable 
discretion to national governments over the use and implementation of national 
policy instruments and this approach of the WTO Law to the role and discretion 
of the WTO Member-states was shaped as a result of the implementation costs in 
evaluating all instruments and proposals for the execution of the WTO 
Agreement. Despite the fact that the national states have been considered as the 
responsible body for the execution of the trade rules and principles and viewed as 
the executive power of the WTO, the national governments generally impose their 
national policies in both an implicit and explicit manner even if they are found to 
be in violation of international trade commitments.239 
 
The high cost of negotiating and finalizing a fully efficient agreement and the 
nature of the WTO provisions in allowing the discretion of national governments, 
the existence of  the "Escape Mechanism", the imposition of maximum tariff 
bindings and the rule-approach bindings instead of outcome-approach bindings 
have resulted in claims that the WTO is an incomplete contract by researchers and 
academics.240 This incompleteness has induced the researchers to study between 
two opposite approaches of a No-Agreement option or a nash equilibrium which 
gives all discretion to the government of member-states and the First Best 
Agreement which includes all domestic policy instruments and forces the 
members-states to respect all WTO decisions on the domestic policy 
instruments.241 This challenge puts forward the importance of the executive power 
in WTO resulting in the formula of a combination of states discretion and also a 
set of trade policies and instruments which controls the scope of the states' 
discretion as the executive power scheme in the WTO Agreement.  
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These policies monitor certain fundamental principles of WTO regulations to be 
respected and are mainly the Most-Favored Nation principle and the principle of 
National Treatment. These principles focus on the necessity of having procedural 
and substantive equality in the implementation of the WTO Agreement and 
ensure and guarantee procedural justice in the WTO's executive power. These 
principles as the general rules of executive power are the proper instruments of 
justice and equality in the execution and implementation of the WTO's decisions, 
regulations and provisions, however while these principles can provide procedural 
justice among WTO Members with equal standing in the world's economy, in 
order to cover the distributional concerns among unequal members of the WTO, a 
new set of rules and principles should be developed. 
 
The WTO Members' governments are the responsible bodies and players for the 
implementation of the WTO decisions which represent the executive power of the 
WTO. In fact the WTO Members' governments are the only existing bodies which 
are responsible for executing the WTO's decisions and all the provisions. The 
decisions made by the WTO's legislative power and the provisions of the WTO 
Agreements all put certain limitations and restrictions on the behavior of 
governments in order to control the WTO's executive power. However the justice 
theory looks for certain restrictions and conditions for addressing the problem of 
inequality for which the justice principles show certain weaknesses in the 
executive power of the WTO in relation to the execution of decisions made by the 
WTO's legislative power.  
 
1.1.2.1. Problem of Sovereignty 
Some researchers believe that the restrictions and limitations imposed by the 
international trade regulations on states' behaviors have restricted the states' 
autonomy. This conservative approach looks at the traditional concept of national 
government and rejects putting any restrictions on the national-sovereignty of the 
nation-states.242 However, the global justice approach and national sovereignty 
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requires the formation of global governance in which even though the nation-
states have a certain level of discretion, they should still act within the established 
framework and the limitations and restraints of international relations. 
Considering the individuals as the main pillar of justice framework with the 
current limitations in international relations, a move from the traditional notion of 
national sovereignty and the erosion of nation-states' discretions toward a supra-
national body responsible for  global governance seems necessary. Hence, from a 
global justice perspective the supra-national institution responsible for global 
governance would gradually take on the roles and responsibilities of the nation-
states and the traditional concept of national sovereignty which was the basis for 
the primary establishment of international law. Therefore the application of 
justice principles by the executive power of the WTO not only justifies the 
restrictions on the state's autonomy and national-sovereignty of nation-states but 
also views that as part of broader move towards a justice-based structure in 
international relations.  
 
1.1.2.2. Hypocrisy in Approaching Free Trade 
Another important obstacle in the execution of the WTO rules and 
implementation of WTO Agreements is the hypocrisy of certain WTO Members 
in applying the principle of free trade and the comparative advantage approach. 
While the primary concept of the WTO establishment was the major shift from 
the theory of nationalism and mercantilism to the free trade and efficiency 
approach based on comparative advantage theory, certain WTO Members are still 
adopting a half-mercantilism, half-free trade approach towards international trade. 
The equal treatment arising from the first principle of justice requires all WTO 
Members to approach the same issue on an equal basis and be treated equally in 
the distribution of burdens and benefits. 
 
A well-known example of this double-standard approach refers to the trade 
regime of agricultural goods in the WTO in which the high level of agricultural 
goods' tariffs and also the issue of agricultural subsidies in certain developed 
countries represents an example of hypocrisy when considering free trade. In 
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addition the history of incorporation of intellectual property rights and access to 
medicine in the WTO regime represents a clear example of a position of double-
standard taken by countries such as US. This hypocrisy is reflected in the fact that 
while the US government was working on the process of improving access to low 
cost medicines for US citizens, it was also working with the pharmaceutical 
companies in international trade negotiations in order to introduce stricter and 
higher standards of intellectual property, thereby making it more difficult to 
access medicine internationally especially for the least-developed and developing 
countries.243 
 
1.1.2.3. Asymmetry of Economic Opportunity 
Another important problem in the performance of the executive power is the 
asymmetry of economic opportunities in WTO framework in favor of high-
income and the developed countries which is a legacy from the GATT period.244 
Many believe that the GATT performance during the past decades has led to the 
marginalization of the low-income and the developing countries. The GATT rules 
were shaped in a manner which preserved the economic interest of developed 
countries while helping and supporting them in keeping a protectionist approach 
in their own domestic markets.245 Consequently, the trend of international trade 
was directed and shifted towards a situation which resulted in an asymmetry of 
economic opportunities favoring developed countries and disadvantaging 
developing and least-developed countries.246 
 
The implementation of international justice principles requires that all individuals 
enjoy more or less the same level of opportunities in international trade and 
advocates the removal of any asymmetry of economic opportunities. By the 
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establishment of the WTO and the entry in to force of the rules and regulations 
agreed in the Uruguay Round, the GATT image of being a club only for the 
developed countries disappeared and new players and actors emerged as a result 
of low-tariffs and the removal of the barriers to trade together with enhanced 
access to the markets of developed countries. The asymmetry in benefiting from 
international trade opportunities was improved and the developing countries 
started to gain better standing in the international market. The launch of the 
Development Round (Doha Round) and the intention to improve the Special and 
Differential Treatment all show positive signs of reducing the asymmetry in the 
WTO Members' participation and enjoyment of opportunities. Therefore, in order 
for the WTO to be viewed as a just organization it is necessary for the WTO 
Members to enjoy the same level of opportunities in international trade.  
 
1.1.3. Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Judicial Power) 
and Procedural Justice 
The third pillar of WTO which is the WTO's judicial power addresses the dispute 
settlement mechanism established as a result of the Uruguay Round of 
negotiation. The core nature of every dispute settlement arrangement and the 
judicial power in any structure is the corrective justice which any judicial 
mechanism in order to be seen to be a just and efficient mechanism should follow 
to achieve the corrective justice requirements.247  Corrective justice provides 
equal standing and equal voices for all the WTO Members, and the WTO's 
dispute settlement as one of the most efficient dispute settlement mechanisms, 
provides this equal standing. Coinciding with a reliable enforcement mechanism, 
the establishment of any just and efficient judicial mechanism would always 
benefit the weak and less powerful members of society more than the powerful 
ones. In reality the powerful members of society always have other means of 
defending their positions and imposing their interest and the establishment of any 
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platform which produces binding awards and decisions would be mostly in favor 
of the weaker members of the addressed society.248  
 
The Uruguay Round introduced a new mechanism of Dispute Settlement (DS) 
which obliged WTO Members to use WTO DS in the event of any conflict or 
dispute. Consequently, the panel and Appellate Body decisions became legally 
binding by shifting from the positive consensus in GATT to the negative 
consensus in the WTO and the dispute settlement coverage extended to other 
areas of international trade. The obligation to use the dispute settlement 
mechanism and prohibition of resorting to unilateral sanctions coincided with the 
quasi-automatic nature of the mechanism which reduced the possibility of 
blockage and abuses, and provided a new efficient regime of dispute settlement 
which became capable of handling even the most complex and difficult cases and 
disputes. Despite the fact that the WTO's judicial power is not limited only to 
dispute settlement through panels and includes other means of dispute settlement 
such as Good Offices and Conciliation and Mediation,249 the dispute settlement 
process of WTO through panels and the Appellate Body has been the instrument 
most resorted to and which has presented an efficient and reliable arrangement. 
This set-up within the WTO context and in parallel with principles such as MFN 
has made the decisions of the panel and appellate body not only applicable to the 
parties of dispute but also to the non-parties benefiting from the outcome of the 
disputes especially the small countries. 
 
The WTO's dispute settlement is a successful and efficient international dispute 
settlement mechanism which could be viewed as a unique and unprecedented in 
certain aspects and features. Due to the lack of effective and binding dispute 
settlement arrangements in international law, the WTO's achievement was a 
significant outcome in that it mostly favors the weaker members of international 
trade and prohibits unilateral sanctions mainly enforced by developing countries. 
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Any sort of dispute resolution mechanism in general would be a positive step 
towards justice as compared to the absence of any kind of dispute resolution 
regime. 
 
The efficient implementation mechanism and countermeasures of the WTO DS, 
the negative consensus procedure and the automatic proceedings present an 
efficient multilateral regime of dispute resolution. However, the application of 
justice principles to the WTO's judicial power requires improvement of certain 
features and rules of the mechanism and also requires solving some functional and 
structural problems of the judicial power of the WTO. These problems all present 
a certain deficiency of the WTO DS when compared to the ideal principles of 
justice theories which seek to make the WTO, a qualified and operational 
institution in coordinating global governance and handling international problems.  
 
1.1.3.1. Principal-Agent Problem 
The agency issue and the principal-agent problem which is one of the major 
issues in the decision-making process of the WTO as well as a general issue in all 
international institutions in which the nation-states participate, also exists in the 
WTO's judicial power. The problem of agency could become more important and 
critical considering the fact that according to Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU), the only competent entity who could resort to the WTO DS are the 
national governments while the non-governmental institutions or private sector 
could not initiate a WTO dispute settlement case, by themselves. The national 
governments are the only capable and legitimate actors who could initiate a 
dispute settlement case and no other international actor could resort, 
independently from their national governments, to the WTO dispute settlement. 
Hence, any sort of nullification or impairment of benefits of the private sector 
activists in international trade, in order to become a WTO case, should be vested 
in a government action of the complainant against the other WTO Member.  
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Consequently, initiation of a dispute settlement process as a case in the WTO 
would be subject to certain significant restrictions on governmental decisions and 
actions and political considerations which affect and exacerbate the principal-
agent problem in judicial power of the WTO. Justice requires that the judicial 
organ of the WTO move gradually toward lesser influence and less effect from 
the political considerations and national limitations and also toward a gradual 
openness of WTO dispute settlement on qualified entities who could initiate a 
legal case in WTO. In addition, increasing the transparency measures of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement would decrease the gravity of the agency problem in the 
judicial organ of the WTO by making it possible for non-governmental actors to 
monitor the dispute settlement process and the national governments positions and 
actions. Therefore, general public openings of hearings and proceedings to 
improve the transparency of the process and ensuring that the non-governmental 
groups and scholars are capable of having access to the information and can 
control the whole process of dispute settlement can help in dealing with the 
agency problem.  
 
1.1.3.2. Legal vs. Political Approaches: Mostly Used by 
Developed Countries 
The justice approach and requirements of justice framework requires a pure legal 
approach toward dispute settlement in which according to the principles of 
corrective justice, all members should be treated in the same manner irrespective 
of their development level and political power. In the primary phases of the 
establishment of the GATT dispute settlement mechanism, the dominant approach 
was the understanding that international economic relations should be managed, 
rather than be regulated. This approach which opened the door for diplomats and 
political considerations in drafting the rules and clarifying the practices of dispute 
settlement was mainly reflected in the necessity to have positive consensus for all 
dispute settlement processes from the initiation of a case to adopting and 
implementing a decision.250 Despite the fact that the majority of evolutions within 
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the dispute settlement mechanism occurred outside diplomatic efforts and all the 
legal processes of dispute settlement from the submission of evidence to the 
evaluation, hearing and making of decisions were developed by lawyers, the 
major principles and principal features governing the dispute settlement input and 
output during the GATT period has made the mechanism more negotiable and 
manageable.  
 
The decisive approach of GATT Members in the Uruguay Round and the 
establishment of the WTO convinced the negotiating members that in order to 
have a successful set of international trade rules and regulations, the whole system 
should be more regulated and the mechanism should move from managing toward 
regulating the international economic relations.251 This move which necessitates 
the involvement of lawyers in the first attempt, during the GATT resulted in 
drafting the dispute settlement procedures in 1979 and consequently in 
establishment of the Legal Affairs Division in GATT in 1982. Finally this 
evolution terminated in  the establishment of a new regime of DS which by 
introducing the negative consensus rule, putting second-stage the judicial and 
legal review of the Appellate Body and detailing the implementation stages from 
the specific implementation of the decision to the retaliatory measures, presented 
a new legal-centered regime of dispute settlement. The evolution from the 
political-centered GATT DS to the more legal-oriented WTO DS was a major 
step in balancing the power among the unequal members and a significant 
outcome toward a more just situation.  
 
However, the pure corrective nature of WTO DS has caused WTO DS to be used 
mostly by the developed countries while the developing and least-developed 
countries have been involved in WTO DS cases at a low level either as a 
complainant or respondent.252 While it is evident that the huge volumes of 
international trade which increase the possibility of violation of WTO provisions 
justify the costs and energy to be invested for the dispute, certain other factors and 
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variables play an important role in making the WTO DS more frequently used by 
developing countries.253 The cost of litigation, the difficulties of fact findings, the 
lack of market power to make the complaining party capable of retaliation and the 
legal capacity of the low-income countries have made the low-income countries 
less likely to be challenged.254 Additionally these elements and reasons have 
the developed and least developed countries incapable of engaging actively in the 
WTO DS leading to the marginalization of the developing and least-developed 
countries which rarely challenge others.255 
 
The implementation of justice principles requires the WTO DS to be shifted to a 
proper framework which support the low-income countries' standing in the WTO. 
Despite the fact that the developing countries have been more active than before 
in the WTO settlement in recent years, still the level of participation in WTO DS 
is unbalanced from equality point of view.256 Having to deal with the unbalanced 
participation of the WTO Members in the WTO DS has resulted in a call for 
special and differential treatment in the WTO DS which without interfering in the 
corrective justice nature of the WTO DS, provides legal assistance and also 
facilitate the small-scale claims and disputes which cannot feasibly be presented 
in the current WTO DS but are on a sufficiently important level and are critical to 
the developing and least-developed countries.  
  
1.1.3.3. Political Considerations 
Some of the significant obstacles of the WTO DS in becoming a proper and 
competent forum for dispute settlement are the political considerations among the 
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WTO Members. The vulnerability and fear of low-income countries from the 
political reaction of the developed countries has made low-income members 
reluctant to initiate a dispute settlement case in the WTO. The threats of 
retaliation in other economic and non-economic areas, withdrawal of the GSP 
programs and concessions or other cross-linked punishments have made the weak 
and lesser-developed countries unwilling to go through the official WTO DS. 
Some of these claims, while they may seem to be unimportant compared with 
other huge WTO DS cases, are critical and of significance for those low-income 
countries.257 
 
However the weight of political considerations and economic threat in the 
initiation of WTO DS dispute should not be exaggerated and due to the fact that 
the WTO cases are generally against a particular sector of the developed 
countries' economy, in practice the developed countries may even welcome cases 
being initiated against them. Therefore, the political considerations should be 
viewed on their real scale, however the influence of political concerns and cross-
linked retaliations impact negatively on the regulated WTO DS and act against the 
requirements of the principles of justice. The involvement of political influence 
on the decision-making of the low-income countries in the process of WTO DS 
would not be fully compatible with the justice and equality approach and justice 
requirements call for removal of all political considerations in this regard. 
 
1.1.3.4. Competition with other international DS 
Mechanisms: Forum Shopping 
While according to the DSU, Article 23.1,258 the WTO Members should bring any 
dispute arising under the WTO covered agreements to the WTO dispute 
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settlement and they are not authorized to take any unilateral retaliatory measure.  
However a series of reasons has resulted in overlapping jurisdictions over the 
trade disputes and therefore the possibility of proceedings being carried out in 
different dispute settlement forums. These reasons which include the overlap of 
WTO disputes with other disputes on national and regional levels, the rapid 
increase of WTO disputes due to the expiration of transitional provisions of the 
WTO, the establishment of world-wide courts overlapping with or interacting 
within the jurisdiction of the WTO, the interpretation of the WTO rules by 
domestic courts, the inclination of private sector to follow the forums to which 
they have direct access and the fact that WTO provisions themselves provide for 
the access to domestic courts, have resulted in the issue of forum shopping in 
WTO dispute settlement.259 
 
Forum shopping between the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and other 
forums of dispute settlement has been a point of discussion for scholars and 
researchers of international law. This competition has been encouraged as a result 
of elements such as the different applicable laws, the availability of remedies and 
the timeliness of proceedings.260 While some believe that the possibility of forum 
shopping between the WTO DS and other international and regional DS 
mechanisms are negative due to several party-related and society-related 
concerns,261 in contrast, others look at forum shopping as a positive phenomenon 
which motivates each dispute settlement mechanism to make it better and more 
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successful and provide a flexibility which helps the stability of mechanism.262 
However, despite the fact that forum shopping would induce the DS mechanism 
to be more efficient and till now the dispute settlement process of WTO has 
proved to be the most efficient and successful mechanism, the global justice 
approach to the judicial power of global governance where even non-trade issues 
should be discussed requires a comprehensive and unified approach to the 
settlement of disputes. This approach requires that all disputes be considered and 
processed based on codified justice-oriented principles with specific powerful 
remedies and that implementation measures be provided for all WTO Members 
on an equal basis. 
 
1.1.3.5. Negotiation-Adjudication Problem 
An important difficulty of the WTO dispute settlement process which falls short 
of justice principles is the possibility of affecting the WTO Members' obligations 
by the panels and Appellate Body's interpretations. Despite the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding Article 3.2263 which forbids any adding or diminishing 
of WTO Members' obligations, due to the existence of gaps and arising 
unforeseen cases in practice, the judicial body of WTO could take decisions and 
give interpretations which probably could create or remove burdens and 
obligations.  
 
The issue should be studied in conjunction with the difficulties at the negotiation 
stage and decision-making process of the WTO which requires consensus among 
all members and therefore the temptation to vaguely draft some regulations and 
articles in order to reach consensus among all WTO Members which then shifts 
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the problem from the decision-making process to the dispute settlement stage.264 
Hence, the problem could change in nature from a pure dispute settlement 
problem to a negotiation-adjudication problem. In fact, due to the consensus 
legislation in the WTO, it would be difficult to change or even interpret the laid 
rules and it would create pressure and shift the burden of interpretation to the 
dispute settlement process. The adaptation of decisions by the WTO DS Body, 
though it establishes a kind of democratic check and control on the DS process, 
also acts through the negative consensus veto which reduces its role to a formal 
and not effective procedure. To deal with the negotiation-adjudication problem, it 
has been proposed that it becomes possible for a special minority of WTO 
Members to block the panels' decisions.265 This proposal while it represents a 
solution also has its side-effects which affect the efficiency of the mechanism and 
undermine the significant achievement of the Uruguay Round; i.e. the autonomy 
and efficiency of the arrangement. 
 
In order to avoid the side-effects and find a solution for the problem, the DS 
mechanism should be improved in a manner which guarantees that the panel and 
Appellate Body decisions do not create a binding precedent and which makes 
them faithful to the text of the WTO Agreement. Therefore a stronger relation 
between the WTO framework and international law which would lead to a better 
standing of international norms in to WTO DS jurisprudence, will reduce the 
gravity of the problem and help in solving the issue in a sustainable manner.266 
 
1.1.3.6. Gaps and Weakness 
The implementation of justice principles on the judiciary power of the WTO 
reflects certain other deficiencies and gaps in the existing WTO dispute settlement 
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mechanism. The dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO, in order to move in 
line with justice principles and make the WTO judicial power closer to the ideal 
situation of global governance, needs to solve these problems and fill these gaps. 
The limited range of remedies, the absence of retrospective remedies, the 
uncompensated harm during the implementation period, the inefficiency and 
impracticality of the non-violation complaints, the considerable time of the 
settlement process, the non-existence of provisional measures or interim relief and 
the lack of reimbursement provisions for legal expenses, the possibility of having 
retaliation in other areas of importance such as TRIPS, etc are all issues which a 
comprehensive justice-oriented approach to the WTO DS, requires addressing  in 
order to make the current WTO DS mechanism, the proper judicial power for the 
global governance.  
 
1.2. First Principle of Justice and International 
Trade 
The concept of free trade is based on a liberal approach to the economy which 
believes that by specializing in the production of certain goods and opening the 
markets to competition by the producers, the cost of production will reduce and 
will result in an improvement in the general welfare of the world's citizens. The 
classical international trade theories inspired by the ideas of theorists such as 
Adam Smith resulted in the abandonment of mercantilist restrictions on 
international economic relations especially in investment and trade.267   Adam 
Smith developed a new definition of the notion of "Wealth of Nations" and 
believed that the wealth of nations is not represented by stocks of gold but rather 
by the resources which the citizens of society have for consumption. The classical 
theory of international trade gradually developed into a modern approach to 
international trade favoring free trade and adopting the comparative advantage 
theory. The modern approach, developed mainly by David Ricardo, which called 
for shaping the principles of political economy based on comparative advantage 
theory, constituted the paradigm in the aftermath of World War II period, 
formation of GATT and consequently the establishment of WTO. This approach, 
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which in theory fits with the requirements of the first principle of justice, has 
resulted in certain major principles of international trade presented as the result of 
the Uruguay Round of negotiations. 
 
1.2.1. Governing Principles of International Trade: 
Uruguay Round and Pareto-Efficiency Approach 
The international trade model introduced as the international strategy of 
addressing the problem of inequality is governed by several principles and rules. 
These principles and rules have played an important role in presenting the trade 
strategy as a potentially powerful and capable solution for addressing the gap 
existing between the rich and poor nations and individuals. In fact, free trade by 
itself, irrespective of any principle and rule which advocates a distributional-
oriented way, not only does not help the justice agenda but also acts conversely in 
exacerbating the inequality, as indicated by past experience. Therefore, any 
success attributed to international trade in fact is originated from regulated 
international trade which respects certain principles and rules. These rules and 
principles which were agreed and established as result of the GATT period and 
the Uruguay Round of decisions provided a platform of equal treatment based on 
the free trade approach and comparative advantage theory. These principles and 
rules include the principle of Equal Treatment, the Removal of Trade Barriers and 
the Principle of Predictability.  
 
1.2.1.1.  Equal Treatment 
The primary and central element of international trade governed by the 
multilateral trade forum is the equal treatment of all WTO Members. This primary 
principle in international trade transactions and also at a national level has 
resulted in the introduction of two important and central principles which are the 
principle of the Most-Favored Nation (MFN) and the principle of National 
Treatment which constitute the main pillars of the WTO Agreement.  
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MFN which appears in several WTO Agreements has been viewed as one of the 
two fundamental nondiscriminatory and equal treatment principles on which the 
GATT and WTO system have been constructed and unlike other principles, MFN 
covers almost all WTO Agreements which by requiring WTO Members to extent 
the grant of the most preferential tariff to all WTO Members has made 
international trade a forum through which all WTO Members can profit from the 
opportunities provided by the international trade forum.268  
 
The principle of National Treatment (GATT Art.III) aims at regulating the 
treatment of WTO Members within their market between the imported goods and 
services and the national ones. National treatment requires that imported goods 
are not subject to discrimination in terms of national regulations and internal 
taxations with the domestic like products, once they succeed in satisfying the 
border tariffs and measures and enter into the domestic market of the WTO 
Member.269 In fact the principle of National Treatment acts together with the 
MFN to ensure that the trade liberalization commitments are not compromised 
and offset through any discriminatory actions and measures among the WTO 
Member markets.270 The principles of MFN and National Treatment while 
constituting the major pillars of international trade forum form the principle of 
Equal Treatment which aims at guaranteeing the opportunities of international 
free trade for all WTO Members and protecting them from any discriminatory 
actions. 
 
1.2.1.2.  Removal of Trade Barriers 
This principle generally addresses the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
international trade in order to achieve the free cross-border flow of goods and 
services. According to this principle, the free trade approach and comparative 
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advantage theory requires that the international system be developed free of tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers to trade through a gradual process of rounds of negotiation, 
and act as a guarantor of the liberties for international actors embedded in the 
international trade system. Therefore for the trade forum to function properly, the 
organization should engage in a gradual process of removing tariffs, non-tariffs, 
technical and non-technical barriers to trade in order to achieve the full freedom 
of the flow of goods and services across borders. 
 
1.2.1.3.  Principle of Predictability 
Another important element of international trade looks for more clearance in 
terms of the WTO Members' rights and obligations in both the WTO Agreements 
and also the Members' schedules of commitments in order to make the WTO 
Members' actions more and more predictable. The possibility of predictability in 
the multilateral trade forum would make the WTO a reliable forum and make it a 
more equal organization in which all WTO Members could rely on the value of 
economic concessions and level of access to the international markets.271 
 
1.2.2. Free Trade Winners and Losers 
The first principle of justice in international trade requires the free flow of goods 
and services in a totally equal and free manner. However in the free trade model 
based on comparative advantage, certain actors in international trade would be the 
winners and others the losers as a result of the implementation of free trade. The 
knowledge of who wins and who loses in free trade is important and crucial due 
to the fact that the least-developed and the developing countries have claimed that 
during the GATT period they have always been the losers while the developed 
countries have been the winners of free trade implementation. Therefore, in order 
to make the low-income and least-developed countries more of the winners rather 
than the losers in the current international trade framework and in future rounds of 
negotiation, it is necessary to know the case within which if the trade barriers are 
                                                          
271 Cedro, "John Rawls Justice as Fairness and the Wto." p.28 
138 
 
totally removed and the WTO Members are competing freely and equally based 
on the comparative advantage theory, who would be the winners and who would 
be the losers.  
 
To examine the impact of free trade on WTO Members, two models of 
assessment have been developed. The Specific-Factor Model272 represents the 
importance of comparative advantage theory. According to this model, the export-
competing industries, if they are efficient and enjoy comparative advantage, 
would remain and eliminate the inefficient import-competing industries in other 
countries and by contrast, the import-competing industries would be removed 
from existence if they do not become efficient and competent. The free trade 
theories believe that, by the removal of all trade barriers, the inequalities in 
resources of production would provide opportunities for all international trade 
actors including the low-income countries to specialize in the production of 
certain goods and the offering of certain services which through this process of 
specialization in comparative advantage would bring benefits and advantages for 
all international trade actors thereby contributing to the justice character of the 
system. 273 
 
However a more general analysis of the impact of free trade by the Specific-
Factor Model illustrates the impact on national economies. In the second model, 
within a pure free trade competition scenario, those WTO Members who own 
most of the factors of production would benefit and in contrast, the members with 
ownership of very few factors of production would be at a disadvantage.274 
Therefore, those countries that benefit from extensive lands such as China and 
Australia, cheap and professional labour such as India and China and high capital 
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like the US, European countries and Japan would be at an advantage while others 
would find fewer opportunities to compete in free trade situations. In addition, the 
empirical studies conducted during the GATT and also the WTO's establishment 
does not prove the claims of free trade theorists. Despite the fact that the 
specialization of production of certain goods could contribute to world-wide 
wealth and also improved welfare among equal competitors, free trade 
competition not only has positive results in welfare increase among the unequal 
competitors but also has a negative impact on the current standing of international 
trade actors. This negative impact has exacerbated the gap between the high-
income (developed) and the low-income (developing and least-developed) 
countries and provided a wider range of opportunities for the developed countries. 
Therefore even though free trade has been viewed as a powerful instrument in 
current international relations, there is a requirement that it should be 
reconsidered from the perspective of the justice framework and be studied with 
justice features of international trade. 
 
1.2.3. WTO Provisions and the First Principle 
The application of the first principle of justice to the current regime of 
international trade in the WTO presents certain deficiencies and problems in 
fulfilling the requirements of this principle. In other words, while the end-target of 
the theory of justice in international trade strategy is to achieve substantial justice 
which calls for implementation of the second principle of justice, the move 
toward the second principle of justice requires an analysis of the current 
provisions and rules based on the first principle of justice. The application of the 
principle to the existing regime of international trade highlights important 
deficiencies and problems within the WTO covered agreements.   
 
1.2.3.1.  High Level of Tariffs 
One of the significant problems which does not conform to the free trade 
approach and violates the first principle of justice is the high level of the trade 
tariffs between the high-income and developed members of WTO, and the 
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developing and least-developed Members. The structured tariffs have made it 
difficult for the low-income countries to improve and increase their exports and 
have removed the motivation for them to move from exporting only the raw 
materials to the exportation of a value added chain of goods.275 Currently the level 
of tariffs of developed countries against developing countries are four times 
higher than their tariffs against developed and industrial countries and this 
disparity makes it difficult to access the markets of developed countries and 
therefore hinders the development of the developing and least-developed 
countries. This problem, by weakening the ability of the low-income countries to 
compete with their international rivals, results in a gradual loss of their 
comparative advantages and a non-diversified basket of exporting products. 
 
1.2.3.2.  Difference between Fairness in Regulations and 
Commitments 
Another significant element when considering the obstacles to moving the 
Organization toward a just institution from the perspective of the first principle of 
justice is the commitment established by each WTO Member in their individual 
schedule of commitments. Studying the legal provisions set in the Agreement 
indicates a relative fairness and alignment with justice principles. However, 
looking solely at the Agreement and the rules in the WTO framework would not 
result in obtaining a true perspective of the Organization. A comprehensive 
overview of the Agreement with the individual schedules of commitment of each 
WTO Member shows that the acceptable framework of the Agreement has been 
disregarded and forgotten almost in its entirety and the first principle of justice 
which calls for equal treatment has been violated. The problem is illustrated in 
several cases in the WTO Agreement especially the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture in which the rules established present a good overview of a relatively 
fair arrangement and a good move from a non-desirable situation to a better 
condition. However reading these provisions in conjunction with the scheme of 
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commitments of individual members highlights a different outcome and results in 
an entire unjust and unfair mechanism.276 
 
1.2.3.2.1. Rules of Origin 
The rules of origin are a set of rules and provisions which determine the country 
of origin of particular goods and put forward the formulae which determine 
whether or not these goods would be considered as manufactured in a certain 
territory. These rules which are critical in international trade provisions especially 
in trade policy instruments such as safeguard measures, like anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties, play a major role in international trade and the free flow of 
goods between the low-income and high-income countries.277 The fact that there 
is no binding regime of rules of origin in WTO has provided the possibility for the 
powerful members to design carefully and on each good specifically the 
complicated rules of origin in order to tailor the impact of free trade on the 
domestic industry of the powerful members.278 The problem of rules of origin 
shows itself more in the Special and Differential Treatment and different GSP 
programs which will be studied later. 
 
1.2.3.2.2. Agricultural and Cotton Subsidies 
Originating from the difference between the Agreements' Regulations and scheme 
of commitments of individual members, the level of subsidies paid to the 
agricultural and cotton sector of the developed countries and powerful members 
of the WTO is a major problem in the move toward free international trade. 
Agricultural policies and subsidies were always one of the controversial issues 
during the trade negotiation rounds during the GATT as agriculture and cotton 
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was one of the primary sectors in which the developing and least-developed 
countries had found their comparative advantage. In fact, one of the most 
influential elements in the failure of negotiations to establish the International 
Trade Organization (ITO) was the fact that the developed countries especially the 
United States refused to align their agricultural policies with the general rules of 
competition in international trade law.279 
 
The Agreement on Agriculture was negotiated and designed as an outcome of the 
Uruguay Round aimed at promoting the reduction of exports subsidies, improving 
the market access opportunities and reducing and eliminating the subsidies for 
domestic production. However, the subsidies which the farmers in US receive 
now have been calculated as three times more than the entire US AID budget for 
Africa's 500 million people. The subsidies paid by the developed countries in 
agricultural goods and cotton made all the concessions made by these countries to 
the developing countries useless and in vain. The Agreement on Agriculture and 
the cotton agreement were on the single undertaking package of the Uruguay 
Round and formed a part of the trade-off between the developed and developing 
countries. The general regime of international trade was introduced for 
agricultural goods and cotton and in return other concessions such as the 
introduction of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) were 
made in favor of the developed countries. However, the level of subsidies 
permitted under the scheme of commitments made the concessions on the 
agricultural sector worth zero and consequently the cotton subsidies which twenty 
five thousand American farmers receive still puts at a disadvantage to a very large 
and significant extent ten million poor cotton farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa.280  
 
The history of the negotiation rounds and the implementation of the Agreements 
present a clear example of the hypocrisy of the powerful members of the WTO in 
approaching free trade. The international principles of justice require that the 
inequality be examined on a global scale and not be limited to the national 
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boundaries. Statistics reflect that the US subsidies paid to its farmers is more than 
the entire GDP of an African country such as Burkina Faso, whose economy is 
affected by more than two million people of its population being dependent on 
cotton production with over half of them living below the poverty line.281 The 
principle of justice requires that the situation of US farmers, among whom the 
level of poverty is literally zero and the farmers in Africa who mainly live below 
the poverty line be assessed and compared to each other. This has resulted in the 
understanding that the WTO concession-exchange mechanism has been designed 
and functions on unjustified privilege for certain sectors in certain countries and 
the WTO has provided the possibility for the advanced economies to implement 
the solutions that were tailored to their specific needs and have them vested in 
legal and binding principles and rules.282 
  
1.2.3.3.  Gaps in Agreements and Legal Provisions 
Other important problems which exacerbate the disparity and inequality among 
the WTO Members are the existing gaps in the legal provisions and WTO 
Covered Agreements. One of the reasons for the WTO's successful record in 
opening international markets and increasing the overall wealth on a global scale 
is largely due to the detailed regulations agreed by the WTO Members during the 
rounds of negotiations. On the contrary, this significant element will result in a 
negative impact at the same level of importance if the Agreements keep silent on 
an issue or if the Agreements are not developed and updated to address new issues 
being raised.  
 
 The existing gaps in the applicable rules and provisions of the WTO generally 
cause a series of "race to bottom" behaviors among the WTO Members putting at 
stake the efficacy of the WTO as a unique organization in its own efficiency and 
its relationship with other international arrangements and international 
organizations. In other words the non-regulation of the relationship of the WTO 
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and other international organizations as well as the relationship of the 
international trade agenda with other non-trade issues could negatively affect 
international competition in the multilateral trade forum. The existing gap in 
international labour standards and the ambiguity of the WTO's legal position on 
issues such as  human rights in general,  labour standards specifically, currency 
manipulation and the anti-dumping investigations have provided the possibility of 
opportunistic behavior among the WTO Members. This possibility has caused a 
"race to bottom" approach among certain WTO Members in which they gradually 
ignore or circumvent the world-wide accepted rules and protect their domestic 
economic sectors in order to justify their protectionist approach and to keep their 
comparative advantages and competitiveness in international trade. 
 
However, the WTO's precedent shows that the WTO would not feel 
uncomfortable if it interferes in areas which do not directly relate to international 
trade but could affect and distort directly or indirectly the equal competition in the 
multilateral trade forum. These non-trade issues which do affect equal 
competition and the free flow of goods and services are known as trade linkage 
issues which are the subject of study when studying international trade based on 
the second principle of justice. However as a general approach and conclusion the 
current gaps provide a justified basis for the protectionist behavior of the WTO 
Members and these gaps should be regulated in a manner which does not affect 
negatively and in any discriminatory manner the international flow of goods and 
services. 
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2. The Second Principle of Justice and 
International Trade: Question of 
Substantial Justice 
The free trade approach outcome which was established as the result of the 
success in the Uruguay Round of negotiations was due to the fact that the 
powerful players of international trade became able to accommodate the interests 
of each other and to establish a common position in the negotiation round against 
the rest of the world.283 The establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade presented the situation in which some players win and some lose, 
however those who win, win more and could compensate the others. Therefore, 
the free trade school is based on the assumption that only efficiency values, 
whether in a win-win situation or a situation which the gains of winner exceed the 
loss of losers, should be considered in the process of economic policy making due 
to the understanding that the policies that enhance global efficiency will also lead 
to a better distribution of wealth.284 
 
The utilitarianism approach was looking at the consequence of the introduction of 
free trade across the world and due to the increased quality and decreased prices 
in GATT and consequently in WTO, they favored the efficiency-based free trade 
approach. They believe that free trade should be free from tariffs and non-tariff 
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barriers and the primary principles of free trade such as MFN and National 
Treatment have been established to guarantee equal liberty in order to contribute 
to welfare growth which would finally end in a win-win outcome and a more just 
distribution of wealth. In addition, the free trade theory found support from the 
influential school of libertarianism. Removing the tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
trade brings the free movement of goods and services across boundaries and 
contributes to the consumers' ability to choose. In fact this decrease in price and 
increase in quality bring more individual liberty and supports the main concept of 
libertarianism which looks for a free non-regulated paradigm for individual 
transactions. The free trade approach has been supported by libertarians based on 
the issue that it brings more individual liberty.  
 
Therefore, the utilitarianism and libertarianism approaches have been considered 
to be more close to free trade and the traditional theory of international trade.285   
However, the liberal egalitarianism approach has also been viewed as compatible 
with the free trade approach according to its first principle which looks for equal 
liberty. The first principle of justice looks for equal treatment among all members 
of the society. In fact a situation would be judged as just situation, according to 
the first principle, in which all members of the international society enjoy the 
same level of treatment and opportunities and the free trade approach provides 
such a framework for players of international trade. However the theory of justice 
is constituted from two pillars and the second principle of justice goes beyond the 
equal treatment for all and calls for new features beyond free trade. While the free 
trade school does not admit any incorporation or even consideration of non-trade 
concerns within its approach, the second principle of justice known as the 
difference principle, calls for the unequal members to be treated unequally in a 
manner which favors the weakest and the lowest-income members. The second 
principle of justice which advocates the unequal treatment in favor of the weaker 
members goes beyond mere procedural justice and considers the establishment of 
substantial justice in international relations. 
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The implementation of the first principle of justice in the WTO's structure and 
international trade strategy and making them compatible with the requirements of 
procedural justice is less than half way done. The structure which acts as the hard-
ware of global and international justice should be designed, shaped and 
transformed into a framework within which the software of justice can act and 
operate. In fact, suitable hardware acts as a prerequisite and necessary condition 
for the application of principles of justice and it provides the proper platform for 
the justice-based strategy to function. In other words, without the proper 
hardware, the software would malfunction and without the right software, the 
preparation of the hardware would be useless and result in nothing. Hence, 
dealing with the structural issues of the problem of inequality and resolving the 
problem of procedural equality among the WTO Members would not make any 
change as long as substantive inequality exists. 
 
The adopted strategy for global governance in order to move international 
relations towards the justice principles and address the problem of inequality is 
the trade-based set of solutions. This set of solutions was selected due to the great 
power and influence of international trade which has expanded significantly over 
the past decades. This expansion which had reached more than 60 per cent of 
world GDP, compared with less than 30 percent in the mid-1980s,286 has shown a 
powerful instrument capable of bringing about a solution compatible with 
sustainable development. Therefore the trade-based solutions have been taken as 
the adopted strategy and software for the application of principles of justice in 
order to have a strategy closer to the justice outcomes and distributional concerns. 
With the existing asymmetry in the executive power of the WTO, the existence of 
procedural and structural equality would be ineffective and in vain.  
 
In order to address the problem of inequality comprehensively, effectively and in 
a coherent manner the question of substantive justice in the adopted structure and 
                                                          
286 A Joint Study of International Labour Office and the Secretariat of World Trade Organization, 
"Globalization and Informal Jobs in Developing Countries," (2009). p.9 
148 
 
strategy raises itself.287 The assessment of the WTO structure and its different 
powers based on the first principle of justice presented a great deficiency and 
problem which consequently failed the WTO's structure due to its inability to 
fulfill the requirements of the principle of justice. The problem in executive 
power relates to the asymmetry of the WTO Members in enjoying the same level 
of opportunities which the multilateral trade forum provides for WTO Members. 
This problem, though it shows itself as a procedural problem in the WTO 
structure, in nature is a matter of substantial justice and strategy. Hence the 
existing asymmetry in executive power of the WTO is not only a procedural and 
structural deficiency but also a substantive problem which relates to the strategy 
and software of global justice. With the current gap and existing inequality among 
the WTO Members, trade strategy would not only not be a part of the solution to 
the problem of inequality, but would also be accused of acting as an exacerbating 
element for inequality. Therefore for the WTO, in order to be considered as the 
leader organization in the global government scheme, there is no alternative other 
than making sure that the software as well as hardware of the organization is in 
line with requirements of justice.  
 
2.1. International Trade Strategy and Inequality 
The second principle of justice will be called on and resorted to once inequality 
exists. The history of international economic relations and the current situation 
presents an established situation in which some members benefit more from the 
economic opportunities while certain other members are in an entirely 
disadvantaged position. The fact that currently about 82 per cent of world's wealth 
belongs to about 23 per cent of world's population and the remaining wealth (18 
per cent) to the remainder (77 per cent) is evidence of the importance and 
significance of the problem of inequality in current international relations.288 
Inequality and the gap between the poor and rich not only has not remained stable 
but has also widened. The Report of the Asian Development Bank illustrates the 
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fact that "If inequality had remained stable in the Asian economies where it 
increased, the same growth in 1990-2010 would have taken about 240 million 
more people out of poverty."289 Therefore the free trade approach of the WTO has 
accelerated the widening of the gap between the low-income and high-income 
countries and the deepened inequality has triggered the need for substantial justice 
and the implementation of the second principle of justice.  
  
The impact of free trade on economic inequality and the implementation of the 
second principle of justice in two different layers are studied under a broader 
subject of the trade linkages in the WTO. In other words, for introducing 
international trade as the strategy for addressing the problem of inequality, two 
questions on the possibility and desirability of using the international trade 
strategy as the distribution-oriented instrument should be answered; the question 
of  whether or not the nature of the WTO trade agreements are capable of 
encompassing and including the requirements of justice and distribution, and 
secondly whether it is desirable for international trade in the WTO structure to be 
viewed as an instrument for addressing the problem of inequality or not. 
Therefore, in order to craft the required justificatory basis for the implementation 
of the second principle of justice in the international trade strategy, two basic 
subjects should be studied: first the nature of the WTO Agreement and secondly 
the issue of trade linkage in general which reflects in most cases the problem of 
inequality among the WTO Members. 
 
2.1.1. WTO as a Whole Treaty or Combination of 
Bilateral Treaties 
The application of justice principles and distributional concerns to the WTO and 
international trade requires that in the first step the relevancy of these principles 
and concerns to the WTO and its agreements which regulate the flow of goods 
and services across national boundaries be studied. The relevancy of the 
principles of justice to the WTO Agreements and commitments raises the 
question of the nature of the WTO Agreement. The nature of the WTO is an issue 
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which has been the subject of debates and still is a point of controversy among 
researchers and scholars. Some believe in the WTO Agreement as a unique and 
distinct international treaty which includes all issues and provisions mentioned in 
the WTO covered agreements. This approach looks at the WTO as a whole and a 
multilateral treaty which deals with several conflicting interests and encompasses 
all issues in the same forum and in a multilateral, general and unified approach. 
On the other side, the alternative approach views the WTO as a combination of 
several bilateral treaties and contracts instead of a unique agreement.290 
According to this approach, the WTO is made up of several bilateral treaties 
between WTO Members and these bilateral treaties should not be put in a 
multilateral scheme to form a unique treaty.291 Therefore, the second approach 
believes in the contractarian nature of the WTO which looks at the WTO as a 
treaty formed by several contracts between the WTO Members. 
 
The general and primary principle in contract law which forms the basics of the 
concept of contract is the freedom of contracts. Freedom of contracts requires 
freedom of the parties of the contracts from any intervention by the state or from 
any imposition by any other party in setting the provisions and rules of contract. 
The notion of freedom of contract presents the concept of corrective justice in 
contract law, according to which the standard of justice and equality in contracts 
is adopted by the contract itself and hence the parties to the contract are bound to 
the conditions set in the contract which reflects their intention at the time of 
forming the contract.292 Therefore, deviation from the provisions and violation of 
the contract would take place, according to the contract law, only on two basis; 
firstly when the rights of one of the parties set in the contract have been breached 
by the other party and secondly when it appears that one of the parties of the 
transaction has been forced to enter into the transaction.293 
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The dominant approach of contract law looks at minimal intervention of 
legislature and the neutral role of the state in the transactions freely concluded 
between the members of the society. This impartial, neutral and minimalistic 
approach admits only the tax regime for fostering distributional concerns and any 
other interventionist instrument backed by any legitimate concerns would be 
unacceptable.294 Therefore, adopting the contractarian approach as the nature of 
the WTO would block the intervention of distributive justice and ensure the 
failure of any attempt and effort to apply distributive justice principles in the 
WTO. Although it could be claimed that the primary and principal vision and 
expectation of the low-income countries when joining the multilateral forum was 
to improve their economic welfare and accelerate their development process 
through international trade, the contractarian approach of private law and 
consequently the first approach due to the nature of WTO sticks to the provisions 
agreed in the covered agreements and leaves only a limited scope of application 
for distributive justice and consequently limited instruments for distributional 
concerns. 
 
However, the first approach to the WTO which sees the WTO as a unique 
multilateral treaty believes that the WTO should be viewed as a whole package 
and a unique body of regulations and dispute settlement mechanisms without 
dividing it into several bilateral treaties.295 According to this approach, defining 
the WTO as a package of several bilateral treaties and studying the nature of the 
WTO based on the contractarian approach would fall short of defining certain 
aspects and elements of the WTO. Therefore, the researchers mainly believe in 
the multilateral nature of the WTO which views the WTO as a whole and 
multilateral treaty. This view provides the justification for the intervention of 
legislature in favor of any legitimate target and opens the way for changing any 
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rule or cancelling its application whenever the legislature finds that modification 
and intervention necessary in fulfilling a public goal.296 
 
2.1.2. Problem of Priorities and Different Approaches to 
Trade Linkages 
The WTO in spite of being viewed as a specific organization and a trade forum 
includes the rules and principles that encompass diverse aspects that go beyond 
mere trade issues. The broadened and intensified scope and influence of the WTO 
has resulted in the situation whereby nowadays international trade has intervened 
and overreached into other territories which are of major importance for the 
international community. The impact of international trade on other non-trade 
issues was one of novel outputs of the WTO's creation which with its effective 
dispute settlement mechanism, forced other subjects such as human rights, 
environmental topics and labour standards to link themselves to trade.  
 
The binding nature of WTO rules and the implementation of these rules by WTO 
Members has led to the fact that trade law has encroached increasingly on the 
other non-trade areas. The lack of applicability of international law was so 
rigorous that the production of a series of agreements in which the commitment of 
Members were not just words but real and objective obligations which as a 
consequence of their interpretations could result in hundreds of millions of dollars 
of claims and retaliation, forced other areas of international law to follow the 
WTO as the leading organization. The trade forum has succeeded in dictating 
what should be done and what should not be done in the public policies which 
have a direct impact on international trade and on the capacity of WTO Members 
in speeding up their process of development.297 This encroachment of trade on the 
other areas which has been named "trade linkage",298 "trade and" problems299 or 
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"fair trade" issues,300  has made trade the subject and the trade forum the focal 
point of other international fields and caused lots of problems and controversies.  
 
The increasing impact of international trade resulted in encroachment of trade law 
on other social areas forcing them to define themselves with trade law.301  While 
the trade linkage in general also includes the issues which have a direct relation to 
trade and which have been addressed explicitly in WTO rules, the linkage also 
specifically refers to issues which have not been addressed precisely in WTO 
agreements and WTO provisions which however have been impacted by 
international trade.302 "Linkage Problems" have presently become one of the most 
important agenda in international trade law and the trade policy domain. The legal 
and social areas that feel they have been limited and ignored are doing their best 
to define a decent position in the heart of international trade law and within the 
trade forum. These linkages in a broad sense include the linkages between trade 
and environmental standards, labour rights, development and inequality, human 
rights, cultural diversity and competition policy.   
 
During the GATT, the trade linkage challenges have been manifested on many 
occasions and during rounds of negotiations. However, the creation of the WTO 
in 1995 which made the rules, procedures and dispute settlement mechanism more 
effective and operative, ushered the problem into a new phase in which the claims 
and solutions were considered much more seriously than before. The 
implementation of the legal provisions of the WTO intensified the process of 
overreaching into other institutions’ territory thus making it difficult to 
characterize the trade and non-trade elements of the WTO.303 The importance of 
trade linkage problems in the WTO was highlighted in the 1999 Seattle 
Ministerial Conference that the resulting mass protestation led to the failure of the 
Conference. 
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The failure of the Seattle Conference resulted in the fact that the impact of trade 
on other non-trade areas became increasingly important. This failure was mainly 
due to the difference of opinion on labour rights which was manifested in the 
position of the administration of the then President of the United States and labour 
unions which favored the imposition of sanctions on those countries which did not 
respect CLS (Core Labour Standards) on the one hand and the position of 
developing countries which were against this idea on the other hand.304 
Subsequently, in the Doha Round, many non-trade issues such as the 
environment, competition policy and investment have been considered and 
inserted as part of the agenda of the negotiation round and found their way to a 
higher level of incorporation in the WTO system. 
 
Different approaches have been presented and studied and several proposals have 
been made to explain and direct the position of the multilateral forum and on how 
to deal with linkage issues in the WTO. These proposals are generally classified 
into two different approaches. Firstly, the idea which believes handling the two 
kinds of issues (i.e. trade and non-trade) are impossible and therefore deny any 
involvement of non-trade issues in to the trade forum by calling for an entire pure 
trade forum. However the second approach has a positive view regarding the 
possibility of managing the improvement of both trade and non-trade issues in the 
same forum. This approach which considers a pro-active role for the WTO when 
faced with non-trade problems has been continued in two different ways. The first 
approach which looks for an explicit linkage between trade and non-trade subjects 
in the WTO and the second which favors the moderate option of looking for an 
implicit link within the trade forum between trade and non-trade issues.  
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2.1.2.1. No Linkage: Current Approach 
The first category of solutions is based on favoring no linkage between trade and 
non-trade issues. According to this view, the WTO is a powerful  institution with 
a great legacy of reducing trade barriers among nations and therefore in order to 
continue this role and maintain its position, it should stick to its limited but 
important role which is focused on the trade agenda and continue the same 
process as it has done until now. They believe that any engagement of WTO in 
regulatory bargaining will lead to protecting special interests at the public 
expense.305 Therefore, the WTO must focus on promoting private contracts and 
reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers to mitigate wealth transfer and should keep 
its administrative structure light in order to continue its monitoring duty. 
Therefore, those favoring a non-linkage between trade and non-trade issues 
believe the WTO should limit itself to the trade agenda and allow nations to set 
their policies in their own jurisdictions. The no-linkage approach rejects the idea 
of making the WTO a vehicle for wealth transfers and believes that any 
intervention of the WTO into issues other than trade would put the efficiency of 
the multilateral trade forum at risk.306 
 
2.1.2.2. Explicit Linkage 
The second approach has presented a clear linkage between trade issues and non-
trade issues. Bridging trade and non-trade issues through an explicit link asks for 
the trade forum to establish an explicit link and incorporate the non-trade issues in 
to the trade forum. The expansionary approach which advocates for the explicit 
linkage provides that any violation in a non-trade area would be deemed to be a 
violation of a trade obligation. Therefore, though a real global government 
structure should include all issues whether trade or non-trade issues together, 
obviously this approach cannot operate and be applied within the current WTO 
structure and any obligation to implement non-trade issues explicitly requires the 
evolution of the current WTO structure in a way that could handle all non-trade 
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issues under the same umbrella. This evolutionary and expansionary approach 
provides substantial implications for the multilateral trade forum and forces it to 
share the decision-making process with others. As a consequence, the WTO 
would be expanded in two ways: the structure and the dispute settlement 
mechanism.  
 
Accordingly, the WTO, in order to expand its agenda to include non-trade issues, 
should make tremendous changes in its institution and its structure should be 
transformed to one which could accommodate the non-trade issues. The first 
proposal on the expansionist basis calls for a broader structure and believes in 
leveraging the WTO success by turning it into a "World Economic 
Organization".307 However the second proposal views a distinct department for 
each non-trade issue within the WTO and these departments would have periodic 
negotiation rounds beside the main negotiation round, called "Mega Round" 
negotiations. The issues which do not implicate other departments would be 
decided in departmental negotiations and the issues which implicate others or 
need concessions from other departments would be referred to the Mega Rounds. 
In departmental negotiations, the WTO Members would reach agreement at a 
lower cost and by agreement on a departmental scale, the Mega Round task would 
be eased and reaching agreement would be more achievable.308 
 
On dispute settlement two solutions have been proposed based on the 
expansionist approach. The first solution which looks for a separate dispute 
settlement procedure has not found adequate support due to the argument that it 
will not bring the same success which the WTO DS brought and could even put 
the existing achievements of WTO at risk. However, the second solution calls for 
opening the doors of the WTO Dispute Settlement to a wider set of commitments 
and making the WTO DS available beyond the trade area. The expansionist 
approach in dispute settlement which calls for availability of the Dispute 
settlement mechanism for non-trade problems and for maintaining the efficacy of 
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the system, proposes having panelists with diverse backgrounds while enabling 
WTO Members to suspend concessions and to be permitted to retaliate in cases of 
violation of non-trade obligations.309 
   
2.1.2.3. Implicit Linkage: Current System Improvement 
The third approach calls for the establishment of the linkage between trade and 
non-trade issues in an implicit manner. This approach looks for soft reforms 
within the WTO system with little steps forward that facilitate the subsequent 
steps. It does not accept that the trade forum should not care about non-trade 
issues, nor does it look for bridging between these issues in an explicit way. 
Instead, it focuses on the available tools within the WTO system and by proposing 
solutions to make these tools more efficient and operative, it tries to avoid both 
legitimacy problems which are caused as a result of the non-linkage approach and 
efficacy problems caused by the explicit linkage.  
 
2.1.2.3.1. Negotiation Stage 
The explicit linkage studies the existing potential within the current in force WTO 
Agreement and proposes several instruments in the negotiation and the dispute 
settlement stages for each of the linkage issues to establish an implicit linkage and 
further proposes the incorporation of non-trade problems in the trade forum. The 
implicit linkage advocators propose the possibility of changing the standards, 
(non-trade issues) and renegotiate its tariffs and concessions with its trading 
partners.310 For WTO Members in the current mechanism of the WTO this tool 
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permits the WTO Members to raise their standards with the possibility of 
compensating for potential economic losses within the current WTO arrangement.  
 
However, this possibility requires the agreement and approval of all other trade 
partners for any change in the schedules and in order to obtain approval, the WTO 
uses a certification procedure through which the Secretariat of the WTO circulates 
a member's proposed changes to all WTO members, who may notify objections. 
The fact that the concerned members must negotiate to reach a satisfactory point 
for overcoming any objections before the Director-General of the WTO can 
certify the proposed changes to a schedule as final and binding has resulted in the 
fact that this potential can rarely be achieved and therefore makes it difficult to be 
presented as an efficient solution.311 
 
Following this approach, some academics have proposed an economic view to the 
schedules of commitment of WTO Members within which those WTO Members 
who decide to raise or lower their national standards would be allowed to raise or 
lower their committed trade tariffs to the extent of market access value.312 They 
highlight the importance of market access commitments as the cornerstone of the 
WTO Agreement upon which the WTO Members are allowed to change their 
national standards and tariffs freely while respecting the economic value of their 
commitments. According to this economic approach to the WTO commitments, 
the externalities resulting from the disrespecting of international standards which 
do not have an economic value and relate to humanitarian concerns and human 
rights values, are not entitled to be addressed in the WTO. Therefore the WTO is 
only concerned with pecuniary externalities which include both the race-to-the-
bottom and regulatory chill and the proposal provides the justificatory basis for 
WTO Members to change their tariffs whenever they decide to change their 
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standards in order to maintain the economic value of their market access 
commitments and the WTO Agreement does not concern itself with non-
pecuniary externalities.313 
 
2.1.2.3.2. Judicial Process 
Since the establishment of the WTO, one of the real driving forces behind the 
WTO's approach toward the trade-linkage issue has been the dispute settlement 
(DS) system. The interpretations of the WTO covered agreements rendered by 
Panels and the Appellate Body have played a significant role in completing the 
WTO agreement. While these interpretations, which are unavoidable elements of 
the dispute settlement mechanism, became necessary due to gaps and political 
ambiguities within the WTO contract, such tools could even bridge the trade and 
non-trade issues on the judicial stage. However these interpretations caused from 
the existing gaps which have been named by some commentators as "Creative 
Ambiguities", provide the WTO DS with a legitimacy problem within the WTO 
judiciary power.314 
 
The legitimacy problem in fact reflects the existing debate on the nature of the 
WTO DS. While the political and diplomatic approach to the WTO DS could 
open the way to look more flexible at trade linkages and non-trade issues, the 
legalistic approach requires that the DS organs act on principles that confer them 
power. As a result of a long debate on the nature of the GATT DS mechanism 
concerning the issue of whether there should be a rule-based system with a 
legalistic approach or a flexible diplomatic mechanism with a political approach, 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) tends to lean more to the rule-based 
legalistic nature for WTO DS.315 
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The trade-linkage issue shows itself in the legalistic approach, in the relation of 
the WTO Agreement with other international agreements and norms. In other 
words, the issue of incorporating the non-trade issues and international standards 
which have been left outside of the WTO forum has been studied in a broader 
scheme of WTO law and international law. In describing the relationship between 
WTO and international law several opposite views have been presented and 
discussed. At one extreme side of this debate, some researchers have looked at the 
WTO as a special forum totally distinct from international law which should be 
governed and ruled by its own rules and regulations (Lex Specialis).316 They refer 
to the WTO DSU Article 3317 which asks the panels to only consider WTO law 
and believe in the relevancy of only customary rules of interpretation in 
international law to the WTO and refuse any substantive link between 
international law and WTO law.318 According to this view, the panels must act on 
principles that confer on them power and if they rule on domains which are 
currently contested, it would be transformed from a legal to a political domain, 
hence undermining their institutional position. Therefore, any "delegalization" of 
WTO DS proceedings would delegitimize the system and the more the system 
becomes politicized, the greater would be the possibility of non-compliance and 
the non-resolution of disputes.319 
 
On the other positive extreme side, others look at the WTO Agreement as a 
product of international relations that should take into account the international 
norms and standards.320 They hold the trade forum accountable to human rights 
by permitting trade sanctions against violation of preemptory norms and as the 
WTO is an organization formed within the ambits of international law, the UN 
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Charter takes precedence over conflicting obligations and hence, human rights 
must be protected.321 
 
However other moderate views and solutions in between the two positive and 
negative approaches have been presented and these look to establish a bridge 
between the WTO and international law in a softer manner. Some academics have 
called for a so called "Passive Virtues" solution in which the WTO DS should 
play a constrained role in contested issues of trade linkages. The advocators of 
this approach believe that when a trade measure, based on an international treaty 
is challenged in the WTO, panels could defer from going forward unless and until 
the dispute resolution procedures under that international treaty have been 
exhausted.322 
 
2.1.3. Dilemma of Legitimacy and Efficacy: WTO as 
Complimentary Solution 
The discussion of trade linkage is significant in a global justice framework from 
different aspects. The issue of permitting non-trade issues to find a voice in the 
WTO and to find a decent position in international trade agenda facilitates the 
process of introducing trade strategy as the adopted software for the 
implementation of global justice and for reducing the current inequality among 
individuals across the globe. In fact, the mere caring by the multilateral trade 
forum about global problems other than trade issues makes the international trade 
strategy and the WTO the competent strategy and body for global governance in 
which the powerful trade strategy facilitates the process of dealing with global 
problems. The concepts of trade and inequality are in themselves evidence of a 
linkage problem when their interrelationship is viewed, hence any positive 
address of the problem associated with linkage would also be considered to be 
positively addressing the problem of inequality which seeks the solution to these 
issues from the multilateral trade forum. 
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Therefore to approach the WTO as the leader of global governance and trade 
strategy as the adopted strategy for global justice there is no way other than 
accepting non-trade issues in the multilateral trade forum and letting them have a 
voice in the WTO negotiations, decision-making and dispute settlement. The no-
linkage approach which denies any involvement of the WTO and international 
trade into non-trade issues, while putting into question the leadership of the WTO 
in global governance, serves the conservative approach which rules out the 
relevancy of the principles of justice in international relations, and would 
therefore not fit with the adopted framework of justice. On the other side, global 
justice calls for global consideration of all non-trade issues within the WTO as the 
leader of global governance and advocates the expansionist approach to the trade 
linkage agenda. This consideration even though it seems necessary and significant 
for moving towards the global justice principles, needs to respect the requirements 
of existing facts and current limitations within the WTO and international law. 
 
The explicit linkage approach has been criticized on several issues such as the 
implementation stage and the level of permissible retaliation putting at risk the 
efficacy of the system. It may cause excessive sanctions, the overreaction of the 
targeted countries and may generate disagreement on the nature and outcomes of 
the alleged violations resulting in the destabilization of the whole WTO system.323 
The kind of enlarged WTO jurisdiction proposed by the expansionist approach 
would put the WTO's efficacy at risk if real-world consequences are not taken 
into account, and the proposed dispute settlement is so ideal that even the 
advocators of this approach have proposed the possibility of permitting the 
dispute settlement mechanism to be a default rule.324 Therefore, the current 
limitations on the WTO and international relations do not provide the required 
circumstances to follow the target of global justice to have a global government 
which include all non-trade issues and global problems in an explicit manner.  
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2.1.3.1.  Implicit Linkage: The Way Between  
The way between the ideal global justice pattern and the current limitations and 
facts is to include the non-trade issues into the WTO in an implicit manner. 
However, the implicit linkage, being approached either through the negotiation 
stage or through the dispute settlement mechanisms have both certain 
considerations and limitations which should be viewed in adopting the approach 
of the trade forum toward the issue of trade linkage. 
 
The establishment of implicit linkage through the negotiation process, looks 
sound from an academic point of view and in theory will be the best solution, 
however this seems difficult to be implemented. The negotiation process requires 
passing the consensus barrier and any consensus on such issues with such 
diversity as the WTO Members is nearly impossible.325 On the other side, any 
circumvention of consensus rules in a sense that the process be contemplated to 
operate without interfering in the negotiation process and making the WTO 
Members free to change their commitments while respecting the same economic 
value of the commitments, encounters significant problems regarding the 
calculation of the economic value which, due to the high probability of excessive 
calculations, would generate bad-faith claims. Therefore, the establishment of any 
implicit linkage between trade and non-trade issues through the change of 
standards, even if it passes through the consensus process will be difficult to 
achieve, and if it goes through circumventing the consensus rule would not only 
encounter the difficulties, but would also be limited to the pecuniary externalities 
of the non-trade issues.326 
 
However the judicial power of the WTO has shown a positive sign to the non-
trade issues in certain cases. Reviewing the interpretations of the dispute 
settlement organs of the WTO shows the creation of some sort of relation between 
trade and environmental issues even though WTO members have not explicitly 
framed environmental standards within the trade forum, and by giving a broader 
                                                          
325 Shaw and Schwartz, "Trade and Environment in the Wto. State of Play.", p.153 
326 Bagwell, Mavroidis, and Staiger, "It’s a Question of Market Access." p.74 
164 
 
interpretation to GATT Article XX exceptions327 it has accepted measures 
imposed unilaterally in favor of certain non-trade issues.328 In fact certain legal 
instruments within the WTO Agreements have been carved out in order to make 
an implicit link between trade issues and some important non-trade subjects. 
These legal instruments such as the "Like Products", "Public Morals" or "Effects 
Doctrine" are all possibilities which have been the subject of detailed legal 
assessments. The judicial interpretation of the WTO panels and Appellate Body 
have moved the multilateral trade forum forward in incorporating non-trade issues 
and helped in introducing international trade as the strategy for addressing the 
problem of inequality. 
 
However in resorting to any of the existing instruments, apart from the 
reasonableness and relevancy of the argument in the theoretical framework which 
should be considered, the consequences and outcomes of its application are of 
importance to keep the mechanism as efficient as it is. In other words, while the 
justice framework and international trade as the adopted strategy for addressing 
the subject of inequality requires that international trade should not be limited to 
trade issues and should incorporate other non-trade problems, the judicial 
interpretations also in themselves have several ramifications which should be 
considered.329 
 
Apart from the suspicions of developing countries regarding the pro-western bias 
of the WTO in general and specifically the WTO DS principles, all WTO 
Members are generally reluctant to grant a wider scope of justification and 
discretion to the judicial organs of the WTO; i.e. panels and Appellate Body.330 
The general understanding of WTO Agreements considers the Covered 
Agreements as the only texts which should be respected in the first instance by the 
judicial organs of the WTO and any deviation from the general rule which tends 
to include international standards and norms other than those included in the 
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WTO Agreement would raise the problem of legitimacy in the judicial power of 
the WTO. Moreover, the enforcement of the pure-trade obligations in the current 
WTO DS mechanism depends on the ability of the WTO Members to identify the 
violations of the WTO Agreements and their willingness to bring complaints 
against other WTO Members which undermines the efficiency of this sort of 
solution. 
 
These challenges and the legitimacy problem of judicial process represent the 
limits of the judicial interpretation in establishing the linkage between the trade 
and non-trade issues. Any solution put forward within the judicial process and 
WTO Dispute Settlement should take into account these limitations and should be 
developed in a manner which avoids the problems to the maximum extent 
possible in order to enjoy a high-level of support to be presented as a legitimate 
solution. The discord among academics regarding the possibility of considering 
the non-trade issues and international standards which are global problems is so 
high that considering the incorporation of any non-trade issue within the WTO DS 
immediately, without respecting the applicable WTO rules and regulations, would 
put the role and efficiency of the WTO at risk unless a relevant and proper legal 
instrument could be found which, based on the specific non-trade agenda, 
enhances and improves its position in the multilateral trade forum.  
 
2.1.3.2.  International Trade Strategy as the Complimentary 
Solution to Inequality 
The "Global Government" approach which looked at a unified body responsible 
for distribution of all advantages and burdens requires the WTO and a trade-based 
solution to be the substitute of all other solutions and instruments within other 
international bodies. However the "Global Governance" framework adopted as 
the applicable theory requires the WTO's solutions to be considered as 
complementary to the current arrangements on the specific non-trade issues and 
other specific-agenda institutions and organizations. Therefore for the WTO to act 
as the coordinator of the existing mechanisms and international trade to act as the 
strategy for the implementation of the international difference principle, there is 
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no solution other than to admit the concept of trade linkage in the theoretical 
domain. The linkage issue provides the justificatory basis for international trade to 
address the non-trade issues and enables it to channelize its power in to looking 
for solutions to the global problems. Despite the fact that the WTO has been 
placed at the cross-roads, many issues have still been left outside of the WTO 
negotiation agendas, no agreement has been reached on certain linkage matters 
which have been inserted in the Doha agenda, and it has been decided that certain 
linkage issues would be excluded from the agenda of the multilateral trade forum.  
 
However, the specific study of explicit linkage between trade issues and each of 
the non-trade issues on a case-by-case basis would result in different judgments 
from the justice point of view. Incorporating non-trade issues in to the trade forum 
has been viewed in some cases as beneficial, in some cases as harmful and in 
other cases as having no benefit to the problem of inequality depending on the 
specific non-trade issue and the circumstances.331 Despite the fact that the 
developing countries in some instances have favored the non-trade side of this 
debate such as competition policies,332 in most instances, the developed countries 
are those who have claimed for a higher level of implementation of the standards 
and have put pressure on trade areas to incorporate and recognize the non-trade 
issues, which has necessitated a detailed study and consideration of existing views 
for the incorporation of any non-trade issues within the WTO forum. This 
confrontation between two sets of countries, in which one belongs to the club of 
rich and high-income countries and the other to the low-income ones, represents 
the significance of the problem of inequality and puts the linkage between trade 
and inequality in a salient position.  
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However, the trade and inequality linkage could be viewed from general and also 
a specific point of view. In the general sense, the inequality could be studied as 
the major cause of other problems in the sense that the linkage problems have 
originated from the existing inequality among the WTO Members. In fact the 
inequality has impacted and influenced other linkage areas such as intellectual 
property and labour rights in a manner in which the linkage problem could be 
considered as a consequence of inequality. Resorting to the argument that 
developed countries have polluted the environment during their development 
process or referring to labour standards developed during the industrial revolution 
in Europe or the vital role of slavery and violation of labour standards in 
America's early development, all indicate the priority of the problem of 
inequality.333 
 
While the general approach to the inequality linkage studies the entire 
ramifications of the problem of inequality and its impact on other global 
problems, the specific view to inequality deals with the impact of free trade in 
reducing inequality among the WTO Members. This specific point of view refers 
to the power of the WTO and international trade in addressing the problem of 
inequality and affecting the process of wealth distribution on international and 
national levels. The process of wealth distribution on an international level has 
been studied under the title of development, constituting a subsidiary linkage 
between trade and development. 
 
2.2. Trade and Development Linkage 
The first model of development was presented based on the efficiency approach 
which advocated free trade as a significant instrument in fostering development in 
the less-developed members of the trade forum in certain countries. This view has 
been reflected in the WTO Agreement particularly in the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization and its Preamble which seeks the 
realization of the development process via trade liberalization.  According to this 
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approach, the competition generated as a result of trade liberalization will lower 
the value added to the final goods and services and result in a decrease in 
inequality while facilitating the process of development.334 Free trade could bring 
opportunities and provide certain instruments for the players in international trade 
to strengthen their economy and expedite their development process. These 
opportunities generally refer to the high level of accessibility to the markets of 
other countries especially the more developed and wealthiest countries which 
could improve the export of the developing countries especially the least-
developed ones. In fact, due to the small scale of the domestic markets of the low-
income countries, the export of their products in which they have comparative 
advantage would have a great impact on their development and provide these 
countries with a sustainable solution.  
 
The positive relationship between development and free trade constitutes the 
major paradigm of the multilateral trade forum since the establishment of GATT 
until the present time. The free trade approach attempted to change the dominant 
school of development which advocates import substitution as the development 
path for the developing and least-developed countries. Export promotion and 
export diversification were proposed as the alternative way and were adopted by 
the members of global trade as a better prescription. The implementation of free 
trade in international trade, even though it had significant achievements, also 
created several economic and social problems due to the existence of asymmetry 
among the WTO Members. The huge volume of criticism led to the belief that 
free trade, notwithstanding the significant records of improvement in several East 
Asian countries, has not contributed to the prosperity of low-income countries. In 
fact the criticism is mainly directed at the details of the trade agreements which 
are viewed as being structured in a way that does not confer any advantages to the 
developing countries.335 
 
                                                          
334 Ronald D. Fischer, "The Evolution of Inequality after Trade Liberalization," Journal of 
Development Economics 66(2)(December 2001). p.556 
335 Stiglitz, "Social Justice and Global Trade.", p.18. 
169 
 
Despite the major records of the positive impact of free trade on the development 
of certain developing countries especially in East Asia, free trade has fallen short 
of generating a powerful stream and sustainable process of economic activity in 
the least-developed countries. The international experience proves that the smaller 
economies are more vulnerable to the international approach of liberalized trade 
and they do not only benefit from the opportunities provided within WTO, but 
also may be unable to keep their previous standing in the international economy 
and international trade. The weaker members of the WTO due to the smallness of 
their economy are affected negatively and in some instances heavily by opening 
their borders to the free movement of goods and therefore this does not only 
improve their economy but also in several cases it has exacerbated the issue of 
inequality in these countries.336 This vulnerability impedes the development 
process of the weaker members of the WTO thus making free trade not only a 
development facilitator but also an obstacle to development of the developing and 
least-developed countries. The relative openness of the economy of the low-
income countries and their asymmetry with powerful actors of international trade 
mainly in production resources and economic stability have made trade in an 
entire free and liberalized manner riskier for them resulting in the belief that free 
trade is considered as the best and therefore more just option in international 
trade, however only among the competitors who enjoy a relative level of 
development. 
 
Any approach toward free trade should consider the priority of every subject over 
other issues. Apart from the practical results, free trade is in conflict with the 
development approaches of the less-developed countries generally on two major 
issues: the infant industry and also the strategic trade theory.337 Free trade requires 
the WTO Members to open their borders and enter into pure free competition 
while any introduction of a new industry in countries which have not reached a 
certain level of development requires a period of protection in order for them to 
become competitive with their international competitors. Moreover, the strategic 
trade theory, though is illegal under the WTO Agreement, motivates the WTO 
Members to adopt certain actions such as export subsidies in order to maximize 
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their own benefit and minimize their trade partners' shares in international 
trade.338 Therefore free trade, in order to stop exacerbating the economic standing 
of low-income countries and integrate them in international trade transactions, 
should be balanced with a powerful element of development which will then 
result in a positive linkage between trade and development. In fact, the target of 
development justifies the links with trade which calls for the reduction of the 
impact of complete free trade and for balancing the decision-making in favor of 
the developing and least-developed countries in order to craft a central role for 
development in the trade forum.  
 
2.2.1. Move toward Development-Based Policies: Doha 
Round 
The public goal which arises from the requirements of the second principle of 
justice addresses the issue of wealth distribution on a global scale in favor of the 
disadvantaged members of the international community. The concept of 
development has been studied as the primary concept which, for the 
implementation of the second principle of justice in trade strategy, acts as the 
necessary element. In fact the concept of international global justice in 
conjunction with the current facts and existing limitations of international 
relations have resulted in the implementation of the second principle of justice in 
two different stages. While the public goal of distribution on an individual scale 
should be implemented in two levels, the first stage of the implementation of 
principles of justice addresses how the competition of international players to 
achieve a greater share in global trade reflects the concept known as development. 
Development has been considered as the first pillar and prerequisite for the 
process of wealth-distribution which has been set as the goal of national 
economies in order to become successful participants in international trade and to 
benefit to the maximum extent possible from the opportunities which have been 
provided as a result of competition in international trade.  
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In fact the prerequisite for distributing any wealth among the marginalized 
members of society is that those members have a better share of the creation of 
wealth on an international level and that this process of wealth creation takes 
place under the concept of development. While the implementation of global 
justice within the current limitations in international law requires the creation of 
wealth for the member states in the first instance, the development in its 
efficiency-based model eventually seeks the integration of the developing 
countries into the world economy and the elimination of poverty at the national 
level.339 Therefore the understanding that the free trade approach which 
dominated in the Uruguay Round has left them worse-off and the benefits they 
gained as a result of the free trade were not the benefits they had anticipated, 
resulted in the initiation of the developmental approach to international trade 
which called for the WTO to shift from a pure free trade forum to an organization 
shaped and prepared to expedite the process of development in developing 
countries.340  
 
The inequality created and exacerbated as a result of the implementation of 
certain provisions and measures of the Uruguay Round left the weaker members 
of the WTO worse-off and made the developing and least-developed countries 
skeptical of entering into any new trade deal under the WTO umbrella. This 
unwillingness was weakened by the assurances which the developing countries 
received that their problem would be addressed in the Doha Round before the 
main agenda and it would be supported by developed countries be discussed and 
negotiated. In fact the Doha Round created a fast track mechanism which by 
giving some leverage to the developing countries sought the assurance of the 
developing and least-developed countries in terms of resolving their issues before 
the completion of the whole negotiation package.341 
 
The trade forum in the Doha Round launched a new approach toward the 
development-based targets by distancing itself from a pure free trade policy and 
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establishing a new solution under the category of trade-based policies.342 In the 
Doha Round, certain demands were put on a fast track agenda and were 
considered as obtaining some leverage and concessions from the developed 
countries in order to ensure the satisfaction and participation of developing 
countries in the Negotiation Round. These concessions, although granted in order 
to make the low-income Members of the WTO comfortable that the results of this 
Round of Negotiation would finally modify certain decisions and regulations 
adopted in the past, present a major shift from the traditional international trade 
theory based on the complete freedom of movement of goods and services and 
pure comparative advantage theory to a new development-centered approach. 
These concessions are not only limited to the new interpretations of past 
obligations and binding regulations but also include certain new decisions and 
provisions vested either in the title of interpretation or a new substantive decision 
the implementation of which will result in the roll-back of prior commitments and 
legal provisions established in the GATT Rounds of Negotiations especially the 
Uruguay Round.343 
 
These concessions declared in the Doha Declaration include certain provisions in 
the current applicable international trade regime which the developing countries 
viewed as preconditions of entering into any new phase of trade liberalization. 
The anti-dumping proceedings were addressed and certain micro clarifications 
have been made to discipline the use of anti-dumping measures. While the anti-
dumping measures were resorted to as a protectionist instrument for the 
developed countries, the developing countries called for the setting of a more 
objective framework in which the anti-dumping measures could take place and 
the Doha Round provided certain concessions on this basis.344 In addition, in 
relation to export subsidies of the developing countries, the possibility of having 
extensions on the transitional period changed to a sort of right allowing the 
developing countries to have the opportunity to seek extension and the Doha 
                                                          
342 Ibid., p.1081. 
343 Ibid., p.1073. 
344 IMPLEMENTATION DECISIONS, supra note 2, art. 7.1: “Where an investigation of the same 
product from the same Member resulted in a negative finding within 365 days prior to the filing 
of the application and that, unless this pre-initiation examination indicates that circumstances 
have changed, the investigation shall not proceed.” 
173 
 
Declaration made the criteria upon which the extension should be granted more 
objective.345 However a significant part of the concessions made by developed 
and high-income countries in favor of the developing countries in the Doha 
Round relate to intellectual property rights and the Trade-Related Aspects of the 
Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS). 
 
2.2.2. TRIPS Refinement 
TRIPS resulted from a long and complex negotiation and interaction of different 
interests and conflicting ideas in the Uruguay Round.346 Following the conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round and establishment of the WTO, TRIPS became an integral 
part and third pillar of the multilateral trading system and it called upon all WTO 
Members to provide protection for product and process patents, including 
pharmaceuticals and vaccines.347 The inclusion of IP standards in the WTO treaty 
was heavily pushed by the developed members of WTO,348 and particularly the 
United States which pressured for higher standards of IPR protection with the 
understanding that intellectual property protection protects not only products but 
also technologies and services which are major exporting items of the developed 
countries. In fact, while the developed countries are a major exporter of IP rights 
themselves, the implementation of TRIPS would protect the export of the IP 
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rights of patented processes, techniques and designs, copyrights, trademarks and 
franchises which take place in the structure of a license.349 
 
The implementation of TRIPS was a considerable victory for the developed 
countries because even though it was against real free trade and movement of 
goods in its traditional sense, it was justified based on market failure which 
therefore required the intervention of the regulator.350 The introduction of IP 
protection during the negotiation of the Uruguay Round was criticized by the 
developing countries but they finally dropped their resistance in 1986 in the Punta 
del Este Declaration351 in which they accepted to "develop a multilateral 
framework of principles, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in 
counterfeit goods."352 
 
Finally, TRIPS found its way through the trade forum by constituting a major 
item of the "single undertaking" of the Uruguay Round in the tradeoff for 
developed countries' promise to liberalize sectors such as textiles and agriculture 
which was of particular interest to developing countries.353 In other words, while 
the TRIPS Agreement was considered as a loss for developing countries, the 
whole Uruguay Round package was perceived as a net gain deal and developing 
countries accepted the whole WTO package of agreements based on the 
understanding that the benefits of the other Uruguay Round Agreements would 
outweigh the negative economic and social externalities of the TRIPS provisions. 
In fact, the improved access to the market of the developed countries and the 
reduction of the risk of unilateral sanctions adopted by the developed countries 
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motivated the developing countries to give the green light to TRIPS to form the 
third pillar of the trade forum following the GATT and GATS.354 
 
2.2.2.1.  TRIPS and Development 
The TRIPS Agreement, while it did not fit with the traditional free trade theory, 
enjoys a justificatory basis in the neo-classical approach and modern free trade 
theory. The concept of introduction of intellectual property in the liberal school of 
economy has been justified through two different approaches; the consequentialist 
approach and the rights-based approach. They are both theoretical approaches to 
international property rights, whether consequentialist or right-based, even though 
each looks at the IPs from a different perspective, and supports the concept of  
putting in place certain protective measures in order to motivate the innovation 
and creation of innovative processes, technologies, artistic works etc. However, 
the TRIPS standards in practice and in the stage of implementation encounters  
conflicts with the development process of the countries which are either in the 
process of development or are trying to start and speed up their entry into this 
process. In other words, the TRIPS standards, although desirable in theory, 
conflict with development-centered policies to the extent that the implementation 
of the IP standards made impossible or delayed the process of wealth creation in 
low-income countries.  
 
Moreover, from a human rights point of view, the introduction of IP rights in the 
international and multilateral trade forum resulted in a conflict between 
intellectual property rights and in a particular sense, human rights through the 
claim by developing countries of their right to development.355 They believed that 
the recognition of intellectual property in the manner as prescribed by TRIPS has 
caused several problems for the development process of developing and least-
developed countries which not only has impeded their development but also has 
conflicted with other significant widely-recognized human rights such as the right 
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to health. However, the dominant development feature of the Doha Round 
highlighted the importance of the impediments facing the development of 
developing and least-developed countries. 
  
The right to development though widely recognized and supported by the 
developing and least-developed countries as a complex example of a human right, 
did not enjoy sufficient support in the club of the high-income and developed 
countries.356 They rejected the concept of development as a right for the low-
income and developing countries in a manner which imposed duties and 
obligations for the high-income and developed countries and viewed the right to 
development more along ethical lines rather than a full human right which 
brought with it the respective legal obligations. Consequently any legal approach 
to the concept of development did not find success in being introduced as a legal 
obligation, however a lesser duty of assistance in an ethical sense found its way 
into the Doha Round of negotiation calling for the WTO Members to address the 
issue of access to medicine and also the transfer of technology from the developed 
countries, who were the major owner of technologies, to the developing and least-
developed countries as this issue was exacerbated mainly after the entry into force 
of the TRIPS Agreement. The development-centered consideration of TRIPS 
generated a huge demand for refinement of the TRIPS Agreement, clarification of 
certain TRIPS provisions which have created significant impediments in the 
development of the less-developed countries and the introduction of flexibilities 
within TRIPS which are more aligned with development policies and strategies.   
 
2.2.2.2.  Clarification, Reinterpretation and Roll-Back in 
TRIPS 
The TRIPS Agreement was drafted in a wide manner and had broad coverage357 
which by providing the minimum standards, made the WTO Members free to 
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implement more extensive protection and to determine the most appropriate 
method of giving effect to TRIPS provisions.358 However, in order to facilitate the 
implementation of these standards, the TRIPS Agreement includes several areas 
of flexibility to enable the developing and least-developed countries to adapt their 
national laws and standards to the minimum requirements of TRIPS. Despite 
considering these flexibilities in implementing its provisions, certain conditions 
have been set which prevent developing and least-developed countries from using 
and benefiting from these flexibilities.359 Therefore, the developing nations sought 
to reduce the negative impacts of TRIPS implementation and succeeded in 
introducing certain clarifications of TRIPS provisions and agreeing on certain 
roll-backs from previous commitments with the developed countries to reduce the 
negative impacts on their development process.360 
 
2.2.2.2.1. TRIPS and Access to Medicine: Balance between 
Incentive and Access 
While TRIPS had a minor impact in countries which had already provided more 
or less the same level of patent protection for pharmaceuticals, it had the most 
significant impact on those countries that were forced by their obligations under 
the TRIPS Agreement to introduce intellectual property protection.361 Patent 
protection generally and pharmaceutical protection specifically are introduced to 
ensure the incentive for the investment in the Research and Development (R&D) 
of such products remains. Due to the fact that the pharmaceutical companies 
invest heavily in R&D and have considerable regulatory approval costs, they rely 
on patents and other types of intellectual property rights (IPRs) to recoup their 
investment costs.362 While the R&D and regulatory approval costs are incurred 
mainly by the company which develops a medicine for the first time and 
subsequent producers of the same medicine face much lower costs, without a 
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certain period of restricted competition, the developers of new medicines will be 
unable to recoup their costs, and no more incentive would remain to develop new 
medicine.  
 
The WTO Members' obligations to respect IP rights led to a general increase in 
the price of medicines in developing and the least-developed countries, making 
the problem of access to medicines complex especially for pandemics such as 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. However, the incidence of disease in the 
developing countries and the fact that a high percentage of the individuals 
infected with HIV and diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis are located in 
developing countries which require patented medicines for combating these 
diseases, made the developing and least-developed countries vulnerable to the 
TRIPS provisions.363 The implementation of the TRIPS Agreement prohibited the 
supply of generic copies of new medicines and the supply of generic medicines 
become limited to older medicines for which patents had expired.364  
 
The purpose of patents is to provide a temporary monopoly to rights holders as a 
stimulus to inventions and their commercialization which gives the patent owner 
the right to prevent the competition from using the information to produce the 
same products and the possibility to set prices higher than they could otherwise. 
Therefore, the price of patented medicines is often much higher than the price that 
would prevail if generic competition were allowed and such differences lie behind 
the concerns of TRIPS which has resulted in substantial increases in the price of 
medicine since the entry into force of TRIPS.365 There is therefore a direct link 
between the patentability of drugs on one hand and the availability of medicines 
and the realization of the right to health on the other.366 
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The high price of medicines led to the deprivation of the majority of the people in 
developing countries from necessary medicines to which the people of developed 
countries had access,367 and this had a negative impact on the implementation of 
domestic public health policies in many developing countries by adversely 
affecting their access to medicines.368 Consequently the developing nations where 
patents were in place sought to reduce pharmaceutical prices through measures 
that the pharmaceutical manufacturers believed would infringe their intellectual 
property rights, however they were challenged and became the target of litigation 
by the developed countries especially the US.369 Therefore, at the request of the 
African Members of the WTO, the TRIPS Council held a special discussion on 
intellectual property and for the first time access to medicines was put on the 
agenda of a WTO body and in the Council's regular meeting in June 2001.370   
Issues such as the definition of "national emergency" and its occurrence, the 
clarification required for certain provisions such as parallel imports and the 
implementation period for LDCs and developing countries were topics of concern 
for the lesser developed members of the WTO. The work that subsequently took 
place in the TRIPS Council fed into the preparatory work for the WTO 
Ministerial Conference held in Doha, Qatar in November 2001 and into the 
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Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health adopted by consensus by 
the WTO Ministers at that Conference.371 
 
While Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health provided the 
flexibilities and cases in which the Member States were allowed to use the patents 
without the authorization of the rights-holders, the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health emphasizes that “the TRIPS Agreement does 
not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public 
health” and reaffirms “the right of WTO members to use, to the full, the 
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose”.372 
The Declaration makes it clear that the TRIPS Agreement should be interpreted 
and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect 
public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.373 It 
contains a number of important clarifications of some of the flexibilities contained 
in the TRIPS Agreement, while maintaining Members' commitments in the 
TRIPS Agreement.374 These interpretations were mainly on the compulsory 
license processes, the importation regime of the WTO Members and the extension 
of the implementation deadlines for developing and least developed countries 
which all aimed at improving and enhancing the access of the low-income 
countries to medicines and pharmaceuticals and to provide the minimum 
conditions necessary for the development of developing and least-developed 
countries.375 
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2.2.2.2.2. Compulsory License and Freedom of Using 
Compulsory licensing376 is one of the instruments by which the developing 
countries could soften the harshness of key provisions of TRIPS and intellectual 
property and to remedy the problem associated with pricing or availability.377 
Despite the fact that TRIPS allows compulsory licensing in an explicit manner, 
developing countries have not used this instrument as expected. This limited and 
restricted approach of developing countries to the application of compulsory 
licensing originated from two different factors; the first refers to the national 
circumstances of the developing countries and the second to the degree of 
international pressure.378 While the licensee must have the know-how to reverse 
engineer and manufacture the medicine without the cooperation of the patent 
owner, the developing countries and especially the least developed ones do not 
have the ability and the administrative and legal infrastructure to manufacture 
high quality medicines locally. Additionally, they should also plan for a 
sufficiently large market to justify the costs of investment and manufacture and 
adequate remuneration to the patentee, yet this group of countries lack such a 
market.379   
 
On the other side, the fear of the possible sanctions which could target the 
developing countries bilaterally or multilaterally have contributed to the 
unwillingness of developing countries to use compulsory licenses.380 As there are 
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relatively few developing countries which are in a position to overcome these 
domestic and external problems, compulsory licensing, which seems an efficient 
and feasible instrument to attract the low-income countries, has not been used 
frequently by developing countries. One of the so-called concessions made during 
the Doha Round, addressed the ability and legitimacy of the developing countries 
to resort to compulsory licensing as a legal instrument to deal with public health 
problems.381 The Doha Declaration made it clear that these countries are free to 
resort to compulsory licensing and the WTO Members have the right to determine 
the grounds on which they decide to grant them.382 
 
2.2.2.2.3. New Interpretation: "National Emergency" in 
Compulsory License 
Though in the TRIPS Agreement, the right of the WTO Members to use 
compulsory licensing in national emergencies was recognized, the developing and 
least-developed countries were reluctant to use this instrument. The reason was 
both internal and external variables which made the compulsory license solution 
vague and also costly in their cost and benefit calculations and the criteria set by 
the TRIPS Agreement to permit the use of compulsory licensing for medicines 
have made it almost impossible for some countries to utilize the provisions.383 
 
In the Doha Round and Doha Declaration, the right of countries to determine what 
constitutes a national emergency has been clarified in order to make compulsory 
licensing more accessible for developing countries. The Doha Declaration made it 
clear that "each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency or other circumstance of extreme urgency" and that public health 
crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
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Conference." p.2 
382 (WTO), "Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and Trips.", p.4 
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epidemics, can represent such circumstances.384  In addition, while it reaffirmed 
the fact that the license-issuing Member is required to compensate the rights 
holder, it requires that the amount of compensation would be fixed in the process 
of negotiation which provides a significant leverage for the compulsory license 
issuer in these negotiations.    
 
2.2.2.2.4. Roll Back: TRIPS Amendment 
The major change approved in the WTO and post-Uruguay Round is a roll-back 
of a significant commitment in the TRIPS Agreement in using compulsory 
licensing in medicines. The traditional regime of a compulsory license in which 
the licensee of the compulsory license was not allowed to export goods 
manufactured to other WTO Members and countries, made the use of a 
compulsory license in improving the problem of access to medicine and 
addressing the issue of right to health useless due to the fact that the least-
developed countries did not and could not have the manufacturing capacity and 
the necessary market to make generic versions of patented medicines feasible. 
 
Consequently, the Doha Declaration directed the TRIPS Council to find a way to 
allow countries with insufficient manufacturing capacity for pharmaceuticals to 
take advantage of compulsory licensing provisions to improve their level of 
access to the necessary medicines leading to the amendment of the TRIPS 
Agreement. This Amendment makes it easier for low-income countries to obtain 
cheaper generics of patented medicines by allowing pharmaceuticals made under 
compulsory license to be exported to countries lacking the production capacity 
and infrastructure and also deals with avoiding double remuneration to patent-
owners, regional trade agreements involving LDCs, non-violation and retaining 
all existing flexibilities under TRIPS. It also covers, in a new annex, provisions 
containing definitions, notifications, avoiding sending goods to wrong markets, 
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developing regional systems to allow economies of scale and annual reviews in 
the TRIPS Council.385 
 
However, the decision is still considered a temporary waiver, 386 and will only 
become a permanent amendment to the TRIPS agreement once it becomes 
approved by two-thirds of WTO Members.387 Moreover, the donation of 
medicines to poor countries will still encounter important obstacles. On the one 
hand there are some diseases which are exclusive and particular to some regions 
in which marginalized populations and poor people in low-income countries exist, 
and on the other hand, health intervention and research and development are 
inadequate and underfunded to produce drugs for these diseases in such poor 
countries.388 Consequently, in certain rural area settings where poverty is 
widespread and where some diseases are exclusive to those areas, pharmaceutical 
firms usually refrain from investing and therefore, essential medicines against 
these diseases will often be unavailable or inadequate.389 
 
2.2.2.2.5. New Interpretation: Right of Determining Import 
Regime 
The other new interpretation favoring developing countries is to do with parallel 
import regimes. In the TRIPS Agreement, the issue of parallel imports was left 
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open and the WTO's decision on WTO Members' discretion to determine their 
own import regime could be challenged and be subject to dispute in the WTO 
dispute settlement body. The Doha Declaration recognized the right of WTO 
Members to determine their own parallel import regimes in medicines.390 
Therefore, the Declaration allows "parallel imports" of medications from nations 
where prices are lower to the countries which the prices of medicines are higher 
due to financial and non-financial reasons.391     
 
2.2.2.2.6. Roll Back: Extension of Transition Period 
While the developed countries were required to implement TRIPS obligations a 
year after the TRIPS Agreement took effect; i.e. January 1996, developing 
countries were permitted for a certain period to defer the obligation to extend 
product patent protection to the areas of technology which could not be easily 
protected under their national laws on the general date of application of the 
Agreement.392 The TRIPS Agreement recognizes the technological and economic 
limitations of the least-developed countries, and therefore provides the eleven-
year transition period and the possibility for further extension of the transitional 
period. Based on this possibility a least-developed country Member could obtain 
an extension only "upon duly motivated request" which made extensions available 
on a case-by-case basis, but gave no guarantee that any extensions would be given 
and gave no hint concerning the grounds for denying the extension.393 
 
These deadlines and case-by-case mechanisms established under the Uruguay 
Round made it difficult for the least-developed countries to maintain even their 
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low level access to certain necessary medicines bringing fears that it could cause a 
humanitarian crisis. The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, following pressure from the low-income countries and the NGOs, extends 
the transition period for pharmaceutical products for all least-developed countries 
for an additional ten years, until 2016, for the minimum requirements relating to 
patents394 and frees least-developed countries from the obligation to implement 
the TRIPS Agreement until January 2016395 regarding the protection of patents of 
pharmaceutical products, without prejudice to their right to seek other extensions 
of the transition periods provided in the TRIPS Agreement.396   
 
2.2.2.2.7. TRIPS and Technology Transfer: Balance between 
Development and Minimum Standards 
By the entering into force of the Uruguay Round, the anti-development features of 
the legal provisions became the subject of discussions and resulted in the criticism 
of the developing countries. One of the major criticisms addressed the problem of 
the transfer of technology from the developed and high-income WTO Members to 
the developing and least-developed countries. While in the pre-TRIPS period, the 
developing countries were not forced to respect the legal provisions and 
procedures set out in the TRIPS for using the technologies and inventions 
registered and protected under the intellectual property standards in developed 
countries, by taking into account the effect of TRIPS, they were required to enter 
into negotiations with the IP holder and seek their consent and pay the respective 
fees.397 The developed countries were arguing that by protection of IP rights, the 
enterprises which were owners of IP rights would increase the export of their 
high-tech goods to the developing countries and would more easily disclose the 
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information regarding the protected rights, hence facilitating the transfer of 
technology to developing countries. The debate in fact was in the same context in 
which the access to medicine took place in which on one side, the goal of creating 
incentives for innovation stands and on the other side, the problem of access and 
the limitation which the TRIPS Agreement has caused by setting minimum 
standards for IP protection.398 
 
The Doha Declaration states that "Members shall provide incentives to enterprises 
and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging 
technology transfer to least developed country Members." This provision which 
goes far beyond an ethical duty or advice, however falls short of being a concrete 
and clear obligation. While the Doha Declaration clearly states a mandatory 
provision for the WTO Members to facilitate technology transfer to the least-
developed countries, in practice this only requires the developed countries to 
prove that they are meeting their obligation in encouraging the technology 
transfer to the least-developed countries. 
 
2.2.3. Doha Round and Development 
While the long-standing dilemma of access and motivation for innovation and 
finding an equilibrium point have always been subject to debate and discussion, 
the introduction of the TRIPS Agreement and its implementation following the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round have changed the existing balance in favor of 
innovation as a major concession to the developed countries. The legal provisions 
obliging WTO Members to set certain strict minimum standards and to increase 
their current regime of intellectual property protection, significantly affected the 
level of their access to patented goods and services such as technologies and 
medicines and consequently the development process of the least-developed and 
developing countries was put in danger; the process which relied heavily on the 
easy access to the protected goods and services. The launch of a new round of 
negotiation required the involvement of all WTO Members in the Negotiation 
Round and the developing countries looked at this possibility as an opportunity to 
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address the unbalanced situation more in favor of the developing and least-
developed countries. Developed countries agreed to present certain 
reinterpretations and roll-backs of previous commitments made in the Uruguay 
Round as a concession to the developing and least-developed countries to provide 
them with incentives to participate in the negotiation round.  
 
The Doha Round was structured in a manner which ensured addressing and 
discussing a considerable part of the demands of developing countries and least-
developed WTO Members in order to bring them to the negotiating table. In fact, 
the Doha Round was launched with the target of speeding the development in 
lesser developed countries and looked at stopping the asymmetry of economic 
opportunities in favor of certain powerful and developed Members of the WTO. 
Naming the 2001 Doha Round of negotiations as the Development Round, it 
presented the development approach to international trade and the belief that 
“international trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic 
development and the alleviation of poverty”.399 However to motivate the 
marginalized Members of the WTO to take part and follow a new round of 
negotiations, it presented several economic concessions with a view of giving 
some guarantees that the asymmetry created by the GATT Rounds of 
Negotiations especially the Uruguay Round would be stopped and removed; these 
concessions not only included new interpretations of the existing commitments 
and legal provisions but also in some cases a roll back of certain previous 
commitments mainly in the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
However, the concessions made in favor of the developing countries in Doha  
appeared to be more of a type of good gesture to decrease the external pressure on 
the developing and least-developed countries rather than a real contribution to 
their problems. Certain concessions in access to medicines provided only a 
temporary solution for access to necessary medicines in epidemics and others 
such as capacity building and technical assistance provided a mere framework to 
make the developing and least-developed countries capable of implementing 
WTO obligations which actually provided more support to the free trade approach 
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rather than the development-oriented policies. Other vague concessions mainly in 
technology transfer, even though they seem fine in theory, still contain significant 
obstacles in achieving the goals and have been made only to entice the low-
income countries to participate in the negotiation round. However, these 
concessions, even though they were made to make the WTO's bicycle move 
forward, reflect a major shift from the traditional theory of free trade which was 
the dominant approach in pre-Doha WTO and GATT to a new approach in which 
free trade should also care about the development of the low-income and lesser 
developed Members of the WTO.400 
 
The dominant approach in the multilateral trade forum since its inception in 
GATT and the WTO was the traditional pareto-efficiency based free trade 
approach. However, the Doha Round’s decisions opened the door for non-trade 
concerns and presented the concept of wealth creation for all WTO Members and 
the notion of development in the sense that in a totally free competition model, 
the process of wealth would be shaped in a totally advantageous manner in favor 
of developed and powerful members of the trade forum. The Doha Round’s 
importance was because for the first time the developed countries accepted the 
theoretical concept of deviating from certain traditional free trade principles in 
order to integrate other economies of the low-income countries in to the global 
economy and to use international trade as an instrument for fostering development 
in the lesser-developed countries and alleviating poverty. 
 
In fact the Doha Declaration by recognizing the major role of international trade 
in the development process of the WTO Members, and providing the possibility 
of rolling back from established commitments under the free trade umbrella, 
prepared the necessary theoretical legitimacy for the non-trade and developmental 
concerns to shape the process of decision-making in the WTO. However, a 
comprehensive view toward development as a primary step toward just 
distribution policies requires that the legal provisions and the structure of the 
WTO Agreement be designed in a manner which fosters and facilitates the 
process of development for the lesser-developed countries rather than some 
                                                          
400 Wilkinson, "The Wto in Hong Kong: What It Really Means for the Doha Development Agenda." 
190 
 
nominal concessions which only have a minor impact on the development of these 
countries. 
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3. Move toward the Distribution-Based 
Trade Strategy 
Adopting international trade as a suitable and available strategy in moving the 
current international arrangements toward a more just system of wealth 
distribution raises the question of the approach which could make international 
trade more capable in addressing the problem of inequality. Several approaches 
toward international trade have been put forward and discussed as the right 
pattern for the WTO in fostering a trade agenda by which each approach tackles a 
specific/special goal in the trade agenda and a framework is then designed 
through which an international trade strategy could contribute to the prosperity of  
people around the world. 
 
The free trade approach reflected in the Uruguay Round and introduced in the 
WTO and previously in GATT established a mechanism based on rules which 
look for mutual advantage in international trade relations. These rules called only 
for the implementation of the legal rules of the WTO in international trade 
relations irrespective of the outcome which would be generated from the 
application of these rules and legal provisions.  Consequently, the establishment 
of the WTO and the appearance of the outcome of provisions and decisions 
emanating from the Uruguay Round did not satisfy the developing and low-
income countries and led to the conclusion that the outcome was not the outcome 
which they were bargaining for. The low-income countries expected better 
participation in global trade through engaging in the Uruguay Round and WTO 
however what actually materialized was not what they had expected and the 
eventual outcome was far more than what they had initially considered.  
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The asymmetry in trade and economic opportunities was intended to be stopped 
by the launch of the Doha Round of negotiations.401 Development was intended to 
be the main feature of the Doha Declaration and the decision was made for certain 
modifications to take place as concessions to the least-developed countries. The 
Doha Declaration resulted in certain development-oriented modifications which, 
in practice, were of less value for the development process of developing and 
least-developed countries. The concessions made within the umbrella of the Doha 
Round are not of substantially important value for the real development process of 
the developing and least-developed countries and serve to address certain primary 
and basic human rights, mainly the right to health, which was affected negatively 
by the entry into force of the Uruguay Round decisions. These concessions which 
were only made to provide the necessary motivation for these countries to 
participate in the negotiations however indicates a major shift from the previous 
free-trade dogma to a distributional-oriented organization and a slow 
transformation of a pure-efficiency organization to a semi-efficiency semi-
distributional institution.402 
 
While development is a main prerequisite and first step in wealth creation for 
low-income countries on international level, the Doha Declaration provides the 
necessary justificatory basis for the introduction of the development-based 
concepts of trade policy into the trade forum. However, the final goal of 
distributive justice theory is to ensure wealth distribution through a just manner 
among the individuals across the world which therefore goes beyond a mere 
development framework. The WTO mechanism should not only be repaired from 
the developmental point of view, but should also be shifted toward a mechanism 
which justly and fairly distributes the wealth created in the development process, 
hence the main problem of the Doha Declaration from a distributional point of 
view is the lack of a distributional framework.  
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The just structure would not be deemed to be functioning properly unless a 
justice-oriented strategy is adopted as the principle guide for decision-making, 
decision-implementing and the settling of disputes in the justice-based structure. 
Procedural justice by itself would not result in more just results and the just 
procedure though viewed as a prerequisite, could not and would not be viewed as 
the sufficient cause and element required. On the other hand, the free-trade based 
approach when applied as the strategy for situations with differences in factor 
endowments, varying access to technology etc., should result in positive outcomes 
according to the factor-price equalization theorem for integrated economies, it 
still would not bring about a more just result and would also widen the income 
gap between high-income and less-income countries. This substance in 
international strategy should be shaped and inspired by justice requirements and 
thus necessitates having a comprehensive solution for dealing with the problem of 
inequality irrespective of unjust or just holdings. This comprehensive solution 
with its justice-based features will lead to the implementation of distributive 
justice, namely the second principle of justice in international relations.  
  
The justice-based approach to international trade looks from a distributional point 
of view to free trade rather than a pure free trade or a development-based 
approach. The distributional concerns generally go further than the developmental 
forms and pass the limitations existing in the principal-agent theory in 
international law calling for the outcome of free trade to be the just distribution of 
wealth among the individuals and members of society on a global basis. The 2009 
Ministerial Conference presented a significant transformation from an entire-
efficiency approach toward a more distributive ends and goals approach in the 
attitude of the WTO Members. They called for a shift from a purely rule-based 
approach of the WTO to an approach within which the outcomes are taken into 
consideration and become important at least in decision-making and dispute 
settlement. The post-Doha decisions initiated a new phase of moving from a more 
efficient and free trade-based approach toward a distributional-oriented outlook 
and for the first time they acknowledged the significance of outcomes in the 
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World Trade Organization by calling for "an ambitious, balanced and 
development-oriented outcome."403 
 
3.1. International Difference Principle and Trade 
on International Level 
As discussed in the second chapter, the implementation of the principles of justice 
on a global level has seemed to be impossible in a unified way. The existence of 
national boundaries has prevented the justice principles from implementing the 
distributional requirements on individuals across the world. The current principal-
agent approach in which the nation-states are the members of the WTO and the 
states are deemed as the representatives of the individuals living in that society 
has made the process of direct wealth distribution among individuals impossible. 
In fact the concepts of nation-states and sovereignty have forced the principles of 
justice to consider the implementation of the distribution of wealth on two 
different levels: the international level and the national level. 
 
The existing limitations have added a layer between the global governance 
coordinators and the individuals which requires that the process of wealth 
distribution be conducted in a first layer among the nation-states transacting in 
international trade and in a second layer among the individuals on a national level. 
Consequently as a first step, the principles of justice should shape the rules 
governing the distribution of resources among WTO Members which should 
result in the creation of wealth for the developing and least-developed countries. 
None of the levels will independently satisfy the justice agenda in the complete 
sense and therefore international trade, as the adopted strategy for addressing the 
problem of inequality, should improve the process of wealth distribution on both 
international and national levels. Therefore, the policies adopted through the 
decision-making power of the WTO, should look toward the redistribution of 
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wealth and resources from the wealthy Members of the WTO to the poorer 
countries and in this sense the development-centered trade strategy should be 
adopted to make the low-income countries powerful enough to compete in 
international trade on an equal basis.  
 
However wealth distribution on an international level could also be interpreted in 
the context of a wealth creation process for the developing and least-developed 
countries as it creates wealth in favor of lesser-developed countries to make them 
capable of engaging in wealth distribution on a national level. In addressing 
substantive inequality on an international level, two different approaches have 
illustrated two distinct distributional patterns for the international trade strategy 
within the WTO; the first approach which looks for a tremendous change in the 
WTO approach from a rule-based mechanism to an outcome-oriented 
arrangement and the second approach which while it preserves the rule-based 
features of the WTO, looks for certain significant changes within the existing 
WTO arrangement to cover the international difference principle.  
 
3.1.1. WTO as an Outcome-Based Organization: Two-
Stage Mechanism 
Despite the fact that the free trade dogma has not permitted the distributional 
values to find an independent force in WTO law-making and dispute settling, in 
general policy the WTO Members have shown a soft shift toward incorporating 
these values in the trade forum. The International Conference on Financing for 
Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus, held at 
Doha in 2008, introduced a new concept of “balanced and development-oriented 
outcome” and the approach which if followed accordingly would see the WTO 
transform from an organization which only cares about the removal of the trade 
barriers and wealth creation to an organization which also facilitate the 
distribution of wealth.404 
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Therefore, the WTO would become an organization in which apart from the fact 
that the principles and rules would be applicable to all WTO Members, the 
outcomes should also be balanced. This transformation from a rule-based 
mechanism to an outcome-centered arrangement, has been interpreted and 
presented as a major shift from the free trade approach to a distributional-oriented 
approach; a shift from "reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements 
directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to 
the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations"405 to 
"an ambitious, balanced and development-oriented outcome" which "should 
support the expansion in the exports of developing countries, reinforce the 
potential for trade to play its due role as the engine of growth and development, 
and provide increased opportunities for developing countries to use trade to 
support development."406 However, to define international trade and the WTO's 
position in approaching the international difference principle within the outcome-
based framework, the rule-based and outcome-based approaches within the WTO 
should be studied. 
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recent commitments concerning trade and the critical importance of rejecting protectionism and 
not turning inward in times of financial uncertainty, especially as this might particularly affect 
developing countries. On this basis, we will urgently re-engage and strive to reach agreement by 
the end of the year on modalities that lead to a successful and early conclusion to the World 
Trade Organization Doha Development Agenda with an ambitious, balanced and development-
oriented outcome." 
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3.1.1.1.  Dilemma of Rule-Based and Outcome-Based 
Approaches 
The discussion of rule-based and outcome-based approaches to the WTO was 
resolved in favour of rule-based approach for the regulations approved as result of 
the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the WTO. However, the rule-based 
approach toward the WTO regulation which was looked upon as a victory of the 
legal approach over the diplomatic and political approach, intersected with the 
issues of inequality and distributional concerns raised by the developing and least-
developed countries. The importance of the distributional concerns related to the 
tendency of a major group of WTO Members to keep their membership in WTO 
and to keep proceeding with the process of trade liberalization while ignoring 
these concerns could lead to divergence among WTO Members and put the 
existence of WTO at stake. 
 
Moreover, the scheme established and enforced by the free trade-efficiency 
during the decades of the GATT and years of WTO has been viewed as having 
ambiguities and deficiencies in approaching the distributional values in 
international trade. The mechanism which was structured as an incomplete 
contract has led to a dilemma in establishing justice principles in the multilateral 
trade forum. The lack of specificity and limited knowledge regarding the 
consequences of implementation of the decisions and provisions have provided 
the possibility for one party to act opportunistically and to obtain the benefits of 
the trade bargain with other trade partners and WTO Members but without 
incurring the costs of the trade bargains.407    
 
Following the establishment of the WTO and appearance of the results and 
consequences of the Uruguay Round, the distributional concerns have become 
more and more important. The demand for a just institution and more balanced 
outcomes all resulted in the nomination of the new round of negotiations as the 
Development Round. As a result, in the Doha Round of negotiations, the WTO 
Members accepted to modify certain Uruguay Round-based provisions to render 
                                                          
407 Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms Markets, Relational 
Contracting  (The Free Press, New York, 1985)., p.64-67. 
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some new interpretations and to reinterpret certain existing commitments in order 
to convince these classes of countries to participate in the new round of 
negotiations. The WTO has been viewed as a bicycle in the sense that if it doesn't 
go forward it will fall over and if therefore the liberalization process does not 
move forward, it will, like a bicycle, be pulled down because of the gravity of 
special interests.408  The bicycle example represents the exact sense of outcome 
approach in the WTO which in order firstly for keeping the existing successful 
arrangements and secondly to motivate the WTO Members to launch new rounds 
of negotiations and new ranges of trade liberalization, should consider the 
outcomes. Therefore, if the WTO outcomes are not as expected by a considerable 
number of WTO Members, which is the case for developing and least developed 
countries in the Uruguay Round,409 the WTO will not move forward and it will 
fall over. 
 
The lack of a comprehensive international mechanism for redistributing wealth 
and the exacerbation of inequality by the applicable WTO Regulations motivated 
the developing countries to try to insert the outcome-based approach on 
distribution of wealth into the negotiation round and the fact that the bicycle of 
the WTO is required to sometimes move backward in order to go forward through 
the giving of concessions by industrial countries to provide a more balanced 
playing field in the Uruguay Round Agreements and the Doha Round prove the 
recognition and importance of outcomes in WTO.410 
 
3.1.1.2.  Right vs. Policy: Theoretical Root 
The rule-based mechanism of the WTO and the outcome-oriented approach of the 
trade forum originate from the theoretical roots of the schools which adopt their 
                                                          
408 Robert B. Zoellick, "The Wto and New Global Trade Negotiations: What's at Stake, Address 
before the Council on Foreign Relations," Available at: http://www.cfr.org/world/wto-new-
global-trade-negotiations-s-stake/p4149 (30 Oct. 2001). 
409 J. M. Finger and J. J. Nogus, "The Unbalanced Uruguay Round Outcome: The New Areas in 
Future Wto Negotiations," The World Economy 25, no. 3 (2002). p.321 
410 Gerhart, "Slow Transformations: The Wto as a Distributive Organization.", p.1080. 
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principal criteria of decision-making and judgment based on the consequentialist 
or rights-based justifications which were reflected in several points in WTO law. 
The reflection was in the intellectual property rights and related issues addressed 
in the Doha Round mainly the critical issue of access to medicine. The 
consequentialist justification advocates an exclusive right for inventors, authors or 
artists to prevent others from reproducing and selling their works and to 
encourage inventors to invent, authors to write and artists to paint. Accordingly, 
the greater the quantity of inventions and creative works which are eventually 
released into the public domain, the more the public benefits through economic or 
cultural enrichment, or enhanced quality of life.  
 
However, the rights-based justification looks at the IPRs as a real property right 
and an issue of human rights rather than of public policy.411 The rule-based 
arrangement originating from rights-based justifications requires that the trade 
forum only set the rules of the international trade and leave the markets to decide 
who the winners are and who the losers are. According to the traditional liberal 
approach, the invisible hand which is guided by the comparative advantage theory 
would clarify who wins in the free market competition and who loses. However, 
the WTO Members, especially the developing and least-developed countries, due 
to their uncertainty and lack of information over the effects of implementation of 
rules and regulations, were pushing more for the outcomes than the rules and this 
interest was reflected in the Doha Round. The major criticism of the developing 
and least-developed countries addressed the issue of double-standards in the 
multilateral forum and the WTO Covered Agreement. They put in question the 
real rule-based approach of the WTO by highlighting the two important 
Agreements of the WTO Agreement, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing and 
the Agreement on Agriculture, as the Agreements which were structured based 
entirely on the outcomes, while the rules of the Agreements were derived from the 
desirable ends of the interested parties among the high-income members of the 
WTO.412 
                                                          
411 Pauwelyn, "International Trade Law Course Pack, Chapter 19. Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights." 
412 Ambassador Celso L.N. Amorim, "The Wto from the Perspective of a Developing Country," 
Fordham International Law Journal 24(1), no. 6 (2000). p.97 
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The hypocrisy in approaching free trade therefore supported within the 
developing countries, the concept of balanced outcome as a new guide principle 
for the whole international trade mechanism. As a result, while the dominant 
feature, fundamental principle and primary overview of the WTO forum was 
based on the emphasis on the significance of the rules and rights-based approach, 
the increasing demand and ideal of the WTO Members and the developing 
countries was on the outcomes and consequentialist approach which found semi-
legal support in the Doha Round. Consequently, the dilemma continued in 
incorporating the distributional goals in the trade forum which led to the 
importance of the issue of the flexibilities within the WTO Rules. 
 
3.1.1.2.1. The Flexibilities: Instruments of Outcome Approach 
The justification and establishment of the flexibilities in the WTO framework 
originate from the outcome-based and rule-based approaches of the multilateral 
trade forum. Several flexibilities have been designed in current WTO obligations 
which the WTO Members could resort to as exceptions thus obtaining flexibility 
within the WTO regulation. These flexibilities have been seen as necessary 
requirements to establish a balance between the ex-post results of the 
implementation of WTO provisions and the ex-ante expectations of WTO 
Members in making decisions and approving regulations.413 The existence of the 
concept of the flexibilities has made the WTO mechanism which is a rule-based 
arrangement not totally detached from the concept of an outcome approach. In 
fact while the flexibilities have been viewed as a mechanism which seeks to 
balance the outcome for the Member resorting to it, it has also been perceived as 
acting against the expected outcome from the point of view of the trading partners 
of that Member State. In addition, the non-violation provisions (GATT Art. 
XXIII) have been structured in order to make the WTO  capable of dealing with 
unanticipated circumstances. This legal instrument which approximates the 
outcome-oriented framework of international trade enables the WTO Members to 
take actions against the measures which, even though they are not against the 
applicable rules of the international trade in Covered Agreements, act against the 
                                                          
413 Gerhart, "Slow Transformations: The Wto as a Distributive Organization.", p.1064. 
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reasonable expectation of the WTO Members as an anticipated outcome of 
decision-making.414 
 
However, the flexibilities embedded in the WTO mechanism and the legal 
instrument in general, fall short of materializing the real outcome-based 
mechanism. The flexibilities within the WTO system are all seen as legal 
exceptions to established WTO obligations which only provide certain limited 
justified defences and cannot be considered as a general rule and principal 
element and cornerstone of an outcome-based mechanism. Moreover, the non-
violation complaints, even though they seem to be more of a general rule than an 
exception in WTO dispute settlement, play a limited role and are not capable of 
handling the distributional concerns. Therefore, any claim for the WTO to be an 
outcome-based organization will not be met unless structural and strategically 
changes are made in the Organization and the implementation of the concept of 
development-oriented and balanced outcome which requires that the outcome-
oriented principles be established in the WTO as a general approach and dominant 
feature of the WTO.  
 
3.1.1.3. WTO as a Transfer Payment Organization; Kaldor-
Hicks and Distributive Approaches 
While the outcome approach looks for a balanced result at the end of the 
implementation of international trade rules, the flexibilities have only little 
success in reducing the pressure of the unexpected results of the rule-based 
approach. In the interpretation of the concept of balanced outcome and the 
implementation of the right mechanism to achieve that, it has been proposed that 
the WTO which functions under the Kaldor-Hicks approach, provide a 
mechanism in which the losses of the losers be compensated by those whose gains 
exceed others. WTO is viewed as an efficient mechanism according to the 
                                                          
414 Henrik Horn, Joseph Francois, and Niklas Kaunitz, "Trading Profiles and Developing Country 
Participation in the Wto Dispute Settlement System," International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development Issue Paper No. 6(December 2008). 
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Kaldor-Hicks concept which is the weakest approach towards efficiency and 
which has been presented as an alternative to the Pareto-efficiency mechanism.  
However, to fulfil the “balanced outcome” perspective, a compensation 
mechanism should be developed in which once a decision or action is found to be 
compatible with the efficiency principle, compensation of the losses incurred by 
the losers is done by offsetting these losses against the gains of those who benefit 
the most.415 
 
In other words, compensation payments would be developed and occupy a 
significant position following the ruling on the efficiency of a decision or 
transaction and the party that gains the most from a transaction; a decision or a 
policy change could compensate the party that gains less from that decision and 
transform the win-loss game to a win-win game.416 According to the Kaldor-
Hicks concept, the mere fact that the gains of the winners exceed the losses of the 
losers makes the transaction efficient in a sense that it would increase the 
worldwide wealth.417 Although the Kaldor-Hicks approach expands the scope of 
efficiency from win-win transactions to transactions which are win-loss but in 
which the gains of winners exceed the losses of losers, the fairness and balanced 
outcome approach looks for just redistribution of wealth among the members of 
the global society. Therefore, this approach represents a scheme of redistribution 
which has the potential to lead to a situation where the party which has gained 
more will compensate the other party by a direct transfer. 
 
The opponents of the one-stage approach in implementing distributive justice 
argue about the differences in the nature of the exchange mechanism which 
constitutes the WTO and the mechanism of wealth redistribution. While the 
exchange approach is a positive sum game, the distributive perspective is a zero 
sum game which offsets the gains of each party.418 Therefore, the implementation 
of the redistributive approach and arriving at a balanced outcome cannot be 
                                                          
415 Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract  (Harvard University Press, 1993)., 
p.7. 
416 Gerhart, "Slow Transformations: The Wto as a Distributive Organization.", p.1070. 
417 Ibid., p.1072. 
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achieved through mere bargaining and a new stage is required to complete the 
first stage's function and to equally distribute gains by making transfer payments 
from those who benefited the most to the members who benefited the least. 
Accordingly, as the barter system of the WTO's decision-making is unable to 
address the inefficiencies and to maximize the welfare, efficiency and also the 
legitimacy of the mechanism, the WTO should develop a system of direct transfer 
payments.419 This direct transfer payment mechanism provides a double-
transaction scheme in which the parties should negotiate to reach an efficient 
decision in a Pareto sense, however they should transfer directly the wealth 
created to the less advantaged parties and members until the stage where the gains 
can be viewed as balanced whereby not only the efficiency requirements but also 
the fairness principles are met and obtained. 
 
3.1.2. WTO as a Rule-Based Organization: One-Stage 
Mechanism 
For the WTO as a multilateral forum, to keep its salient role in global governance 
there is no way other than moving from its efficiency-biased principles toward the 
equality-oriented rules and requirements of distributive justice. Inequality and 
economic weakness are major obstacles to enjoying the opportunities within the 
WTO umbrella and the asymmetry in benefiting from the opportunities would put 
at stake the legitimacy of the WTO. Therefore the advanced and developed 
countries should detach from their mercantilist and opportunistic approaches and 
introduce considerable evolutions in the attitude and principles of the trade forum 
to make the WTO function better. However, this approach towards the concept of 
balanced outcomes could be viewed in a broader sense as an introduction of 
distributive values and justice concerns within the umbrella of the trade forum.  
 
Moving toward more balanced outcomes requires that in the current competition 
between the international trade actors, the trend of the multilateral trade forum 
moves from the efficiency policies and free trade values to a distributional and 
redistribution approach to the resources and wealth creation which form key 
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components of international trade, from the wealthy members of the WTO to the 
poor and low-income countries. The balanced outcome requires that the forum 
considers an important position for the wealth distribution rules and that the WTO 
Members should sacrifice the Pareto efficiency principle in its absolute sense in 
favor of distribution. Therefore the parties should negotiate rules and principles 
which while respecting the efficiency values and rules in a relative sense, consider 
the just and fair outcome as an essential prerequisite and therefore sets up a 
mechanism which incorporates the distributional outcomes in setting the rules and 
principles.  
 
However, the justice-oriented concept does not consider direct wealth transfer as a 
sustainable and long term approach and requires that the concept of balanced 
outcome be reflected through the incorporation of distributional principles and 
fairness outlook into the negotiations and decision-making process which results 
in rules, principles, regulations and provisions which by their implementation 
results in a just and fair outcome; i.e. the balanced outcome is obtained. The 
justice-oriented concept which seems to be the most appropriate vehicle for 
moving toward the balanced outcome illustrates that instead of having a double-
transaction mechanism in which the principal transaction fulfills the efficiency 
requirements and the second one the distributional conditions, a set of rules and 
regulations within the territory of the WTO should be made and established the 
implementation of which will result in balanced outcome.  
 
Due to the fact that the process of wealth creation in international trade is an 
outcome which should be materialized in the current legal establishment of the 
WTO and not as a second and parallel arrangement to the existing mechanism, the 
evolution of the trade forum should take place in a manner which fosters the 
development features of the WTO and change the direction of international trade 
transactions in favor of wealth creation for the low-income and weaker members 
of the trade forum. The Doha and subsequent developments present an important 
theoretical change to the WTO from a Pareto-efficiency organization to an 
organization which has decided to also include the distributive goals and 
principles in its legal regime. The capacity building measures, roll backs and new 
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interpretations of existing commitments and obligations in favor of less-
developed countries and the firm declaration of the WTO regarding not only 
looking to be a rule-based establishment but also for pursuing development-
oriented and balanced outcomes highlights new and important signs of a major 
intention to shift from a pure efficiency forum to an efficiency-distributive 
mechanism.  
 
3.1.2.1.  International Difference Principle: Unequal 
Treatment for Unequal Members 
The generally applicable rules and principles of the trade forum reflect mainly the 
first principle of justice theory asking for equal treatment among equal members 
of the international society. The two major pillars of equal treatment, i.e. the 
Most-Favored Nation and National Treatment, proves that the main skeleton of 
the global forum, to a large extent, is looking towards moving in line with the 
requirements of the first principle of justice theory. However, the second principle 
of justice deviates from the general principle of equal treatment and looks for 
unequal treatment among the unequal members of the international society and 
therefore any change and deviation from the primary and general rule of MFN 
and National Treatment (equal treatment) should fall under the scope of the 
second principle of justice; i.e. the international difference principle. Therefore 
achieving balanced outcomes and implementing the just principles requires that 
the standards, rules and provisions of the international regime in general and 
WTO in particular be shifted and transformed into a mechanism with equal 
treatment for equals and unequal treatments for unequals which will result in 
balanced outcomes. 
 
Studying the current regime of international trade in the WTO highlights several 
obstacles in the WTO rules which prevent moving toward a justice-oriented 
approach in WTO and which do not facilitate the development process for the 
least-developed and developing countries. These obstacles not only align the 
WTO with the efficiency approach and mutual advantage scheme, but also widen 
the current gap between the high-income and low-income countries and act in a 
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way which exacerbates the existing disparity among the WTO Members. The 
resulting outcome was the pressure on smaller economies to substitute efficiency-
oriented policies with social-welfare oriented strategies affecting the employment 
rates and wealth disparity in the economy.420   
 
Consequently, addressing the problem of inequality in the WTO from a justice 
perspective requires a comprehensive distributional-oriented review of the whole 
WTO legal regime instead of a double-transaction mechanism which changes the 
general direction of the Organization from a pure efficiency forum towards the 
distribution principle. However, the prerequisite and necessary condition for this 
transformation is dealing with the current unjust provisions and the removal of 
exacerbating elements. The second principle of justice necessitates the deviation 
from the first principle of justice in favor of distribution to the disadvantaged 
members of the society. Therefore, while the deviation from the first principle of 
justice is only allowed in favor of the low-income members, in the WTO 
regulation on several occasions this deviation has occurred not only for the benefit 
of the low-incomes but also for the developed members of the international 
community. The unjust deviation not only does not bring about the concept of 
equal treatment for all, but also has established the understanding of unequal 
treatment for unequal members, with the benefit however accruing to the 
wealthiest members.  
 
The international difference principle, on the contrary, encourages different 
treatment between members with different economic standings and puts forward 
the concept of unequal treatment for unequal members, however with the benefit 
accruing to less advantaged members. The development approach to trade goes 
back to the early stage of the establishment of GATT during which the dominant 
approach of the trade forum was the free trade approach and the attempts of the 
developing countries led to the introduction of certain initiatives which originated 
from development insights to serve as solutions in addressing the inequality 
among the WTO players. These initiatives and solutions which aim at making the 
low-income countries capable of taking a larger share of the global trade includes 
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the Regional and Preferential Trade Agreements (RTAs and PTAs) among 
different classes of countries and the Special and Differential Treatment (S&D) in 
favor of the developing and least-developed countries.  
 
3.1.2.2.  Regional and Preferential Trade Integration 
Following the high records of GATT in the removal of trade barriers and the 
establishment of the WTO, developing and least-developed countries have found 
that trade liberalization in the multilateral trade forum has been structured in a 
manner which excludes certain important areas in which they have significant 
comparative advantage from competition. The disappointment in opening the 
markets of the developed countries for the goods in which they had comparative 
advantage led them to move toward establishing different models of preferential 
and regional trade arrangements.421  
 
The history of regionalism presents two different waves of the move toward the 
regional and preferential solutions as a means of having better development and a 
greater share in international trade. The successful establishment of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 motivated the lesser developed countries to 
establish Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) among themselves in order to 
encourage the flow of goods between countries with relatively the same level of 
economic standing.422 These South-South arrangements such as Central American 
Common Market (CACM)423 and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)424 
were formed based on the understanding that by restricting the imports from 
outside the region, the partners would find a less-competitive platform and 
therefore improve their comparative advantage. However, the initiative of 
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regionalism in the 1960s was not successful due to the fact that the regional 
members of these arrangements were mainly exporters of primary commodities 
and lacked the necessary infrastructure for the production of industrial goods.425 
Moreover, the inequality among the regional partners was exacerbated due to the 
creation of growth poles in these arrangements which finally resulted in a 
decrease in the revenue of the governments as a result of a decrease in imports 
and the removal of tariffs.  
 
The end of the cold war and the breakup of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (COMECON) in 1991, which opened the way for Eastern Europe 
countries to join the European Union, coincided with China joining the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and brought up the second wave of the 
rush to regionalism in the 1990s. The distinct feature of the second wave of 
regionalism was the establishment of RTAs and Preferential Trade Agreements 
(PTAs) between the industrial and less developed countries which resulted in the 
establishment of north-south arrangements and agreements; agreements between 
the European Union and countries in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean 
region and between United States with the Caribbean Basin Region (Caribbean 
Basin Initiative), Sub-Saharan Africa (African Growth and Opportunity Act), 
South America (Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act) and Middle 
Eastern countries (Qualified Industrial Zones).426 
 
3.1.2.2.1. Regionalism as a Means of Wealth Distribution 
Regionalism is usually fuelled by political motivation and the understanding that 
these agreements could enhance the negotiating power of the trade partners and 
provide the possibility of having more leverage in getting concessions and aid 
budgets. However, despite the political motivation of establishing a regional trade 
agreement, in which the negotiating power of the members would be enhanced, 
the major motivation for moving toward regional and preferential agreements is 
                                                          
425 Anthony J. Venables, "Winners and Losers from Regional Integration Agreements," available 
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economic advantage and the issue of how these arrangements could improve the 
process of development in these countries. Entering into the regional trade 
agreements could provide the chance for the low-income countries to introduce a 
certain degree of preferential access for their domestic industries which they 
believe in their competitiveness in order to make them ready to compete on a 
worldwide scale.  
 
These regional trade arrangements aim at integrating the countries of a region or 
of a same level of development and provide them with the possibility of 
preventing the economic trading sectors from being faced with a huge flow of 
trading competitors.427 Some have perceived south-south commodity trades as an 
engine of growth which, by increasing Asian demand for energy and industrial 
raw materials, facilitates the shift in the composition of food demand and the 
establishment of regional trade in food staples which could be an important 
instrument in reducing inequality and poverty.428 In fact, the regional and 
preferential-based solutions have been viewed as a trade-based instrument for 
development which by providing opportunities for developing countries to 
improve and build up their comparative advantage, providing protection in certain 
economic sectors and also providing a larger home market, could increase the 
competitiveness of their products beyond their boundaries on a smaller scale than 
global markets and therefore improve their attractiveness for investment, thus 
improving their development standing and ultimately making them more efficient 
in the global marketplace.429  
 
However, the regional trade agreements have been criticized not only from a 
Pareto-efficiency perspective but also from development-oriented approaches. 
The Pareto-efficiency approach criticizes the PTAs and RTAs for causing trade 
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diversions in the sense that the imports of semi-efficient partners will substitute 
the efficient extra-regional imports and will remove the incentives for fostering a 
general free trade agenda and for removing trade barriers on an international scale 
to facilitate more trade liberalization.430 Therefore, as a consequence not only will 
the resources be wasted and the efficient allocation of resources distorted, but also 
the trading members of these arrangements would lose their previous tariff 
revenues.431 
 
The development-oriented approach believes that the RTAs and PTAs fall short 
of being a comprehensive solution to the problem of inequality. The general 
approach of the preferential and regional trade agreements, whether from a south-
south perspective or through a north-south framework is inconsistent with the 
theoretical model of global justice. While the global justice school requires that 
the features of global government be implemented as much as possible in the 
structure of the proposed solution, the PTAs and RTAs are normally viewed as 
diverting the structural leadership away from the global governance body; i.e. the 
World Trade Organization, and this makes it difficult to adopt comprehensive 
distributional policies on a global scale. On the other hand, the two different 
waves of regionalism all become unsuccessful in facilitating development-centred 
and distributional policies and reducing the inequality among the developing 
countries and the rest of the world.   
 
The south-south arrangements were faced with the lack of powerful and 
significant trade partners in the agreements and the fact that countries such as 
African countries were only exporting primary goods and the customers of their 
goods were in the developed countries made regional integration useless and 
unable to fulfill their real function.432 Moreover in some cases, the establishment 
                                                          
430 John McMillan, "Does Regional Integration Foster Open Trade? Economic Theory and Gatt's 
Article Xxiv," In Regional Integration and the Global Trading System, K. Anderson and R. 
Blackhurst, eds., London, Harvester Wheatsheaf (1993). p.3 
431 Robinson and Karen Thierfelder, "Trade Liberalization and Regional Integration: The Search 
for Large Numbers," Trade and Macroeconomics Division International Food Policy Research 
Institute TMD Discussion Paper NO. 34(January 1999). 
432 Venables, "Winners and Losers from Regional Integration Agreements.", p.16. 
211 
 
of these arrangements exacerbated the inequalities within the members of the 
same agreement in a region by causing the business offices and industries to be 
shifted to certain economic poles of the region which has led to the increase in 
inequality within the low-income members of the same agreement.  
 
Similarly, the north-south arrangements, approached in the second phase of 
regionalism have not shown any considerable meaningful outcome in reducing 
inequality and helping the southern countries to take their place as important trade 
participants on a global scale. While the north-south arrangements have been 
justified based on the higher accessibility of the less-developed countries to the 
markets of developed countries in order to encourage them to enter in to these 
arrangements, the difficulty of taking decisions and arriving at a common ground 
on the agenda of the regional trade agreements has caused the powerful members 
of the PTAs and RTAs to impose their position through establishing certain legal 
provisions and instruments; e.g. the rules of origin, and they have used these 
bilateral treaties as a means of exerting pressuring for introducing ultra-WTO 
obligations such as ‘TRIPS-plus’ intellectual property protection in developing 
countries.433 
  
3.1.2.3.  Special and Differential Treatment 
While the GATT's primary principle addressed the first principle of justice 
through expanding and developing the free trade agenda and providing a platform 
based on the equal treatment of the Members, the smallness of the national 
economies and domestic markets of the low-income countries were not impacted 
positively from the free flow of goods and services. Therefore, the free trade 
approach and pure equal treatment principle made the low-income and weaker 
economies dependent on international trade in a manner in which any change in 
the market prices of the goods in which they had a comparative advantage or any 
decrease in the level of their market access, significantly affected their economy 
in a negative sense. Therefore, parallel to the dominant economic school which 
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considered liberalized free trade as a positive element for the economic growth of 
both the world economy and the low-income ones, a new theoretical perspective 
was developed rejecting the idea of complete free trade as a solution for 
addressing the problem of inequality and looking for other developmental 
instruments to complement free trade.434 The instruments proposed were 
at odds with the general principle of the trade forum and GATT primary rules.435 
 
One of the most important instruments and the set-up which helps the WTO to 
shift from a pure-trade forum to a more equal and just institution is the special and 
distinct treatment for the marginalized and weaker members of international trade. 
The rationality of the solution lies in the belief that the MFN approach to trade 
liberalization does not necessarily facilitate the process of development and 
growth and therefore industries in developing countries need to be protected from 
foreign competition for a certain period of time in order to become competitive 
with international rivals.436 While many elements within the current regime of 
international trade exist that deviate from the first principle of justice and rather 
than being in favour of the weaker members of the forum are actually more in 
favour of the powerful and advanced members, the implementation of the 
International Difference Principle on a worldwide scale requires not only the 
removal of the negative deviations from the first principle of justice, but also 
requires the adoption of rules and provisions which facilitate and develop the 
notion of positive deviations in favour of the low-income members of the trade 
forum. 
 
The International Difference Principle calls for establishing specific treatments 
and a distinct set of rights and obligations and also a particular level of 
                                                          
434 Chantal Thomas, "Democratic Governance, Distributive Justice and Development," Chi 
Carmody, Frank Garcia, and John Linarelli (eds.), Distributive Justice and International Economic 
Law, Cambridge University Press (2011)., 
435 Joseph M. Senona, "Negotiating Special and Differential Treatment from Doha to Post-Hong 
Kong: Can Poor People Still Benefit?," Journal of World Trade 42(6)(2008). 
436 Bown and Hoekman, Patrick Low, and Alexander Keck, "Special and Differential Treatment in 
Wto: Why, When and How?," World Trade Organization, Economic Research and Statistics 
Division Staff Working Paper ERSD(2004-03). p.1 
213 
 
commitments for the weaker members of international trade in order to facilitate 
the process of development and wealth distribution in these countries, and 
justifies the deviation from the equal treatment of all members as long as the 
unequal treatment favours the less-advantaged members of the international 
society with the aim of correcting and modifying the inequalities embedded in the 
international trade relations. The developing countries and their supportive 
theoretical school try to obtain deviations from the equal treatment and non-
discrimination principles of the GATT and exemptions applied to the developing 
and least-developed countries from the reciprocity approach of WTO with the aim 
of enjoying extra new preferences.437 The proposed exemptions took place within 
a larger picture of crafting a proactive role for inequality in the multilateral trade 
forum. This larger and comprehensive picture, called "Special and Differential 
Treatment" was designed and established in order to be the applicable regime in 
international trade relations between the developed and the developing 
countries.438 
 
3.1.2.3.1. Market Protection and Market Access Provisions 
The S&Ds in the WTO have been presented generally as providing two types of 
concessions to developing countries: market protection and market access 
measures. Market protection, unlike market access, is in principle against the free 
trade approach of the multilateral trade forum; however the importance of 
capacity building in exporting sectors has justified the need for providing market 
protection for the economic sectors in lesser developed countries. The market 
protection provisions of the WTO have been set out generally in the market 
protection for infant industries as well as the market protection policy in using 
subsidies for development measures. The infant industry works on the assumption 
that the least-developed and developing countries have not had the chance to 
improve the production of goods in which they have comparative advantage or 
could have comparative advantage, due to the small size of their markets, and 
therefore to help these countries to build up their comparative advantage and 
                                                          
437 Chin Leng  Lim, "The Conventional Morality of Trade," Chi Carmody, Frank Garcia, and John 
Linarelli (eds.), Distributive Justice and International Economic Law, Cambridge University Press 
(2011). 
438 Hoekman, Low, and Keck, "Special and Differential Treatment in Wto: Why, When and How?." 
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enable them to compete on an international scale, the protection for these 
industries should take place.439 The development measures which authorize using 
the subsidies form the second pillar of the S&D provisions under the umbrella of 
market protection. The development measures are the second category of the list 
of subsidies which starts from the least to the most capable subsidies in terms of 
distorting the market440 and relates to a few specific types of policies for which 
developing countries do not need to assume reduction commitments.441 They 
include the support for investment in the agricultural sector, agricultural input 
subsidies available to low-income or resource-poor producers in developing 
countries and domestic support to producers in developing countries to stimulate 
diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops.442 
 
The S&Ds also include provisions and concessions for improving the market 
access of the lesser developed countries which provide market protection for 
economic sectors and the domestic industries of these countries by having a better 
access to the markets of developed countries. The market access provisions which 
constitute the second pillar of S&Ds have been presented and materialized in 
Enabling Clause and subsequently in GSP programs of the advanced and 
developed economies. The most named GSP programs are the programs initiated 
by United States443 and European Union,444 providing certain preferences on 
certain conditions for the least-developed and developing countries.445   While 
these programs have strict eligibility criteria and also export ceiling on product 
eligibility, they mainly do not cover the goods in which the developing countries 
                                                          
439 Yilmaz Akyuz, "The Wto Negotiations on Industrial Tariffs: What Is at Stake for Developing 
Countries " Third World Network, Trade and Development Series 24(2005). p.39-44 
440 The five categories of subsidies from least to most capable in terms of distorting the market 
are: the "green box", the "development measures", the "blue box", the "de minimis" level of 
support and the "amber box". 
441 Cedro, "John Rawls Justice as Fairness and the Wto." p. 129 
442 World Trade Organization, Agreement on Agriculture, Art. 6.2. 
443 The US GSP program is grounded in The 1974 Trade Act which took effect in January 1976. 
444 The European preferential program, called CARIFORUM, or EU EPA. 
445 Garcia, "Trade, Inequality, and Justice: Toward a Liberal Theory of Just Trade.", p.33 
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have comparative advantage and are with complex rules of origin which make 
them with less practical importance.446  
 
3.1.2.3.2. Capacity Building and Technical Assistance Provisions 
Subsequent to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and entry in to force  of the 
legal provisions, the WTO Members reached the common belief that in an 
existing unbalanced situation and lack of sufficient human resources and 
institutional capacity, a fair outcome would not be achieved. Therefore, the third 
pillar of the S&Ds called for providing technical assistance to the weaker 
members of the trade forum in order to enable them to easily integrate into 
international trade. This set of measures can be traced in different provisions 
which call for the cooperation of Member States on certain occasions such as the 
issue of access to medicine and making them available at affordable prices.447 The 
technical assistance which has been widely used in European integration appears 
in the form of capacity building by the transfer of expertise and technical 
knowledge.448   However international assistance and cooperation is not a 
substitute for domestic obligations and it comes into play in particular if a State is 
unable to give effect to economic, social and cultural rights on its own, and 
requires assistance from other States to do so. In other words, states have the 
obligation not only to guarantee the access to medicines of their own people but 
also to provide economic and technical assistance to enable other States to meet 
their obligations.449 
 
The capacity building and technical assistance provisions made the WTO 
Members commit to generally help the least-developed countries financially and 
technically in order for them to become capable of implementing WTO measures 
and requirements. However one of the most important development-oriented 
                                                          
446 Caaglar Ozden and Eric Reinhardt, "The Perversity of Preferences: Gsp and Developing 
Country Trade Policies, 1976-2000," Journal of Development Economics 78(2005). p.4 
447 Cullet, "Patents and Medicines: The Relationship between Trips and the Human Right to 
Health." p.149 
448 Garcia, "Trade, Inequality, and Justice: Toward a Liberal Theory of Just Trade.", p.38 
449 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment N° 3 (1990) on the 
nature of States parties’ obligations and general comment N° 14, paras.38-42 
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provisions of the Doha Declaration is the Declaration's emphasis on the principle 
of capacity building and duty of technical assistance. The Declaration states "firm 
commitments on technical cooperation and capacity building"450 and recognizes 
them as "core elements of the development dimension of the multilateral trading 
system".451 The capacity building which was aimed at making the low-income 
countries and marginalized WTO Members capable of bargaining and 
implementing the obligations, led to the establishment of the Doha Trust Fund to 
implement the promise of financial assistance; this initiative in reality showed that 
it is a long distance away from enabling the provision of real assistance from 
high-income countries in contributing to solve the developmental problems of the 
low-income countries.  
 
3.1.3. Limited Reciprocity as a Rule: Asymmetric Trade 
Liberalization 
The major dilemma in implementing the International Difference Principle within 
the WTO refers to the dilemma of rule-based and outcome-based mechanisms in 
the WTO decision-making and dispute settlement processes. The dilemma is 
showcased due to the questions that arise as to how the WTO Members should 
benefit from the opportunities created by international trade and how every 
country should benefit from international trade in terms of the expected outcomes 
or the actual outcomes of rules and regulations. While the dominant feature of the 
current mechanism in the WTO has a rule-based approach, any shift from a rule-
based mechanism towards an outcome-based arrangement would require that the 
criteria for decision-making and dispute settlement rules shift from the ex-ante 
negotiation of actual benefits to the ex-post distribution of benefits and also move 
from the expectation-based perspective toward the result-centered approach.452 
 
However any recommendation of such a shift requires significant changes to the 
current regime of international trade and requires the establishment of a second-
                                                          
450 Doha Declaration, Para. 41. 
451 Doha Declaration, Para. 38. 
452 Gerhart, "Slow Transformations: The Wto as a Distributive Organization.", p.1064. 
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stage arrangement which materializes the transfer payment for offsetting any 
unjust outcome. Such an approach, while it may seem difficult to implement 
within the current arrangements and limitations, will be desirable once all steps 
and initiatives within the current approach, i.e. the rule-based approach, have been 
taken in addressing the problem of inequality. In other words, the move toward an 
outcome-based WTO requires a gradual move and implementation of possible 
initiatives within the current mechanism and any immature move would be 
neither possible nor desirable. 
 
The current rule-based approach, examined by the second principle of justice 
highlights the necessity of the question of reciprocity. The question of reciprocity 
touches on the question as to how the WTO Members should benefit from the 
opportunities created by international trade in the sense that the question being 
asked is whether the weaker members of the WTO should be treated equally when 
in competition with advanced and developed countries and when all the WTO 
Members are competing for equal opportunities on an equal footing or whether 
they should rather  not be involved in a full reciprocity situation with powerful 
and high-income WTO Members and should instead enjoy a more favorable 
prescribed situation. While the second principle of justice rejects the idea of full-
reciprocity in a situation where inequality exist, the limited reciprocity comes out 
as an approach recommended for dealing with the international trade rules and 
regulations between the unequal members of the WTO. The limited reciprocity is 
the core approach of the rule-based mechanism toward the problem of inequality 
and the result of the implementation of principles of justice on international trade 
relations. The major outcome of the WTO in the limited reciprocity paradigm has 
been the initiative of Special and Differential Treatment. 
 
S&Ds have been proposed and designed in order to make the developing and 
least-developed countries capable of competing with advanced and developed 
economies and they return to the idea of the necessity for unequal treatment 
between the unequal members of a society. The idea of establishing a special set 
of rules and principles for unequal members of the forum arises from the second 
principle of justice, which advocates providing unequal treatment for unequal 
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members and S&D, in this context is the most significant provision of the WTO 
in addressing the problem of inequality and it therefore generally enjoys the 
theoretical support of the global governance school. However from the 
perspective of global governance and international justice theory, the special and 
differential treatment suffers from deficiencies and loopholes and in practice, the 
crafted S&D arrangement in the WTO does not provide a real unequal treatment 
which facilitates the development process of the less-developed countries. 
 
One of the major deficiencies is the WTO's approach to S&Ds, i.e. the principle 
of self-determination. The WTO Agreement holds the S&D as an entirely 
discretionary task for the rich and developed countries thus conferring the power 
of tailoring their needs and considering their political expediency in granting any 
special concession. The discretionary nature of the S&D in the WTO has made it 
vulnerable to political considerations and economic self-interest. The unilateral 
nature of the S&Ds and the developed countries' discretion in setting the 
provisions of the GSPs has been the cause of not only the problem of political 
considerations but also other problems such as the exclusion of competitive goods 
and the free movement of people and immigration, up to the lack of S&Ds in 
services and these all relate, in principle, to the self-selection nature of S&Ds as 
well as in services.453   
 
Moreover, the conditionality of GSP programs, which has effectively shaped them 
as a tool for promoting international standards desirable for the developed 
countries, has encountered real criticism and it is believed that in certain instances 
EU GSP programs (EU EPA, CARIFORUM) have acted against other issues and 
goals and have been drafted in a manner which acts against the south-south 
trade.454 The dependency of the S&Ds on political considerations, while it has 
been seen as offering positive flexibility, has been largely criticized by the lack of 
legal security it causes for the development policies of the developing and least-
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454 Girvan, "Some Lessons of the Cariforum-Eu Epa." Also Cheikh Tidiane Dièye and Victoria 
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developed countries.455 Therefore despite the fact that this flexibility is an 
advantage of GSP programs and without detracting from the record of GSP 
programs in improving international standards in certain instances, it suffers from 
drastic and major deficiencies and disadvantages that have put the GSP programs 
out of consideration as being a reliable tool and suitable solution.456 
 
The second principle of justice requires the establishment of an arrangement 
which provides unequal treatment for the less-advantaged members of the 
international society in a comprehensive and binding nature; the arrangement, 
instead of being a free discretionary exception to the efficiency rule, should serve 
as a binding rule alongside the efficiency mechanism for regulating the trading 
relationship among the unequal members of the international society. In the 
WTO's current trade strategy, not only is the unequal treatment of the unequal 
members not comprehensive, binding and worth any value, but also the binding 
and valuable unequal treatment exists in favor of the developed and powerful 
members of the WTO. The protection of agricultural goods in some rich 
countries, the tariff escalation structure and high standards in the developed 
countries, which all coincide with the lack of competition, productivity and 
producing capacity in developing and less-developed countries, have 
consequently led to the establishment of special treatment in favor of developed 
and high-income countries.457 
 
Therefore the first step in moving the WTO and international trade toward a 
distribution-based approach starts from the current rules and provisions of the 
WTO. While the two-stage approach which looks for a transfer payment 
mechanism can be desirable in theory, it cannot serve the justice framework as the 
starting point. The current regime of the WTO Agreement has been established on 
a rule-based approach and this approach has been viewed as a great achievement 
of the WTO. Any implementation of the second principle of justice should first 
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consider the existing regime of the WTO as this will make it more possible and 
feasible. The current rule-based approach of the WTO with regulations and 
provisions provides an existing instrument for the problem of inequality; the 
S&Ds. S&Ds which, in theory, seems proper and fits in with the international 
difference principle, suffers from several problems in their ability to offer a 
suitable strategy for wealth distribution on an international level. 
 
A comprehensive approach for wealth creation for less-developed countries, 
based on the second principle of justice, requires that the Special and Differential 
Treatment becomes a legal and rule-based framework and be empty of political 
considerations and be able to move from a unilateral and discretionary program to 
a legally binding framework, which in order to remove any possibility of 
opportunistic behavior and the problem of conditionality of GSP programs, 
provides commitments for the developed countries. Therefore the S&Ds should 
transform into a mechanism which not only includes all goods necessary for the 
competitiveness of the developing and least-developed countries but also adopts 
substantive binding criteria for treating unequally the unequal members of the 
WTO which fits in with the requirements of the second principle of justice.458 
 
3.2. International Difference Principle and Trade 
on National Level 
While the distribution of wealth which originates from the implementation of the 
principles of global justice, reaches a level of wealth distribution among 
individuals on a global scale and across boundaries, the current facts and existing 
limitations require that in order to make the global justice theory practical and 
feasible, the theory be tailored and reshaped based on the current limitations of 
international trade and international law. Distribution of wealth among the 
individuals cannot be achieved unless the wealth created on the international level 
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through the pro-development policies and environment is distributed in the second 
and complementary step among the individuals on the national level.  
 
Despite the fact that the ideal global justice theory considers individuals as the 
citizens of the global society in which the wealth distribution among individuals 
should take place in a direct one-stage manner, the current limitations and present 
structure of international relations impedes such a scheme from being 
implemented. The current international arrangements have been established based 
on the significance of the nation-states as the major pillars of the current 
international order and in order to implement the ideal principles and theoretical 
school of thought, these limitations should be accommodated. While the first step 
looks for the pro-development policies to shift the wealth creation process in 
international economic relations in the direction of favoring the least-advantaged 
members of the multilateral forum, a second stage is required to fulfill the ideal 
end of the global justice approach by guaranteeing that the wealth created 
contributes to the well-being of the individuals and citizens of the nation-states. 
 
 
Therefore, the wealth created for the developing and least-developed countries, in 
order to fulfill the requirements of global justice, should be distributed among the 
individuals on a national level. The distribution of wealth among individuals on a 
national level is the function and agenda of the Rawlsian theory of justice which 
perceive the basic structure as the agent of wealth distribution. However the 
encroachment of international trade to other areas including the national and 
governmental policies of member-states has provided a new agenda for the trade 
forum which addresses the impact of the WTO Agreement on the distribution of 
wealth on a national level. Therefore, the WTO should also take into 
consideration the wealth distribution process on a national level and strengthen 
the policies which help the national governments to achieve the distributional 
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goals on national level among the individuals that are the point of departure in the 
global justice theory.459 
 
The implementation of free trade-based regulations and the rules of WTO have 
resulted in a process of ignoring and also the reduction of certain important and 
critical human rights in favor of free trade. Rights such as international labour 
rights, the right to health and right to development are well-known examples of 
human rights which, when adopting free trade as the substantive strategy for 
international and global justice, should be considered. However the intervention 
of the international trade policy on the wealth distribution on a national level has 
been reflected in the international labour standards. 
  
3.2.1. Free Trade and International Labour Rights 
The international labour standards and namely the Core Labour Standards (CLS) 
have been considered as one of the major pillars of international human rights 
which although are not aimed at removing inequality in a comprehensive 
approach, provide a minimum level for the low-income members of the society. 
The CLS are fundamentally based on humanitarian concerns and the high number 
of members of the International Labour Organization (ILO) which have ratified 
them presents a quasi-consensus in favor of them on an international level.460 
Core labour issues enjoy a high degree of support and even consensus in support 
of them. In addition, trade linkage with labour standards is, unlike human rights 
linkage, issues which are not based solely on pro-Western values and as a result 
the correctness of the implementation of these standards is unlikely to be 
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challenged.461 However the international standards, due to their impact on the 
comparative advantage of the WTO Members, have been the target of the 
encroachment of free trade, resulting in the linkage of free trade and labour 
standards. 
 
3.2.1.1.  Matter of Comparative Advantage and State's 
Autonomy 
The issue of linkage between trade and labour standards in particular becomes 
significant when one consider the fact that on one hand the improvement in the 
standard of human life is one of the duties of international law in general and the 
WTO in particular462 and on the other hand the proponents of the establishment of 
the linkage between labour standards and WTO regulation are not only human 
rights groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) but also the politically 
powerful lobbying groups seeking protectionist goals through enforcing 
standards.463 In fact despite the fact that that the human rights movement and 
enhanced communication networks have in recent years made the subject of the 
trade and labour linkage important from a humanitarian point of view, the 
competitive impact is still the key element.  
 
 
Free trade has a significantly negative impact on labour standards by linking the 
issue with the competition in goods and the matter of comparative advantage. The 
strict observation of core labour standards in international trade would involve 
serious economic disadvantages and negatively affect the ability to compete of the 
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involved members.464 This reality arises from the fact that the more you respect 
international standards and the higher you set your standards' level, the lower 
would be your ability to compete and there would be a greater probability of 
losing your comparative advantages.465 
 
The importance of competitiveness and comparative advantage in the current 
international trade order, which is the key element of prosperity in the efficiency 
model of trade regime, has constrained  the autonomy of states in the sense that 
any change in standards would put the affected industry in a non-competitive 
position. On the other hand, the investment policies have acted in a way such that 
any change in policies which disfavor the international investors, from expansive 
policies in fiscal domain with higher rates of employment to policies to enforce 
the implementation of higher labour standards which lead to higher cost of 
production, would result in the threat of capital exit and put pressure on the 
national states involved.466 These constraints highlight the importance of 
multilateral responses to these problems due to the fact that leaving the states to 
pursue their individual policies on a voluntary basis would not result in a 
desirable outcome. Therefore, the WTO can no longer ignore non-trade issues 
especially labour rights and a broader view is required for dealing with problems 
in a way in which the total aspects of the problems can be addressed; a view 
which integrates these distinct interests without undermining the strength and 
effectiveness of the trading system. 
 
3.2.1.2.  WTO and Labour Rights 
Labour standards are a part of a larger scheme of social development which even 
though taken into account in the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
                                                          
464 Some writers, have named the fact of producing products at a lower price by exploiting 
workers "social dumping".Friedl Weiss, Erik Denters, and P. J. I. M. de Waart, "International 
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Organization, have not been reflected in the WTO's Covered Agreements. While 
the international standards do not enjoy same value in the multilateral trade 
forum, the labour standards have been valued as the third group of international 
standards which cannot be used as a basis for claims, nor can they be used for 
defenses.467 Giving no legal value to labour standards, either on a claim or 
defense basis, has caused problems inside and outside the multilateral forum.468  
 
The WTO however has not been silent on the issue of labour standards and in the 
Singapore Ministerial Declaration has stated that the competent organization for 
labour standards is the ILO.469 This inattention from the trade forum did not 
discourage the labour forum from following the linkage between trade and labour 
standards and in 2008, the International Labour Organization declared that "the 
violation of fundamental principles and rights at work cannot be invoked or 
otherwise used as a legitimate comparative advantage and that labour standards 
should not be used for protectionist trade purposes".470 This declaration, although 
seemingly useful in ILO context, reflects the increasing demand for solving the 
                                                          
467 At first level, there are standards such as intellectual property rights which could be the basis 
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problem of trade linkage with labour standards and the lack of response in the 
WTO context. 
 
One of the significant supporters and international actors who have pushed for 
introducing the non-trade issues in the trade forum are the NGOs. They favor the 
explicit establishment of non-trade issues in the WTO and generally ignore the 
consequences of this establishment on the development processes of the less-
developed countries. Many believe that the NGOs are not fully aware of the 
implications of protectionism and the economic facts and that by insisting on the 
mandatory implementation of labour standards in its complete sense, many jobs 
will be lost in the developing and least-developed countries and consequently will 
harm the workers rather than helping them.471 Moreover, even if there are solid 
doubts regarding the NGOs concerns on human rights, values and respect for 
labour standards in developing countries, there are no doubts that the protectionist 
groups in developed countries have attempted to abuse the slogans and 
obligations in order to protect their own economic interests.472 
 
The issue has led to the general belief among the developing countries that the 
motivation for including labour standards in the trade agenda are not really 
humanitarian at all but rather a hidden protectionist interest and the most 
important reason to which can be attributed the major cause in provoking this 
linkage debate is the matter of competition.473  Therefore, in order to find a 
balancing point between the call for the respect of human rights in developing 
countries and the threat of serving the targets of the protectionist groups, a new 
criterion is needed to call for a "social development" in parallel to the "economic 
development". 
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3.2.2.  Parallelism of Social Development and 
Economic Development 
One of the most important outcomes of the implementation of justice principles in 
wealth distribution is the necessity to consider the weakness and power of the 
national economies in order to set the proper social standards. General standards 
for all nations regardless of their economic circumstances would not be optimum 
standards and a similar set of social standards for all would not result in a just 
outcome in terms of wealth distribution and for addressing the problem of 
inequality. The second principle of justice requires that the unequal members of 
the international society should not be treated equally and that the regulations and 
provisions be structured in a manner which considers the different levels of the 
economies of the nation-states. The unilateral implementation of similar 
international social standards by the developed countries on trade-related and non-
trade related issues has caused many problems in the least-developed and 
developing countries and did not only make a contribution to addressing social 
standards but has also resulted in exacerbating the problem of inequality in 
targeted countries.474 Therefore, in setting necessary social standards for 
implementing wealth distribution, the existing inequalities among the nations 
should be taken into account.   
 
Justice requires that social development be parallel to economic development and 
this parallelism between social and economic aspects of development, which is 
the contribution of the principles of justice to the problem of standards, has been 
manifested effectively in the WTO Agreement. GATT, Article XXXVI mentions 
raising the standards of living and the progressive development of the economies 
of all contracting parties as the basic objective of the WTO Agreement and 
recognizes international trade as a means of achieving both economic and social 
development.475 In fact the main question at the second stage of wealth 
                                                          
474 As an example of the unilateral implementation of a similar set of social standards, a survey 
done regarding the US threat to impose a ban on imports from Bangladesh's goods industries in 
which child labour exists showed that many of the children would meet a fate worse than 
working in factories. A. Panagariya, "Trade-Labor Link: A Post-Seattle Analysis," University of 
Maryland-College Park (June 2000). p.14 
475 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XXXVI (a)(e) 
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distribution which addresses wealth distribution on a national level illustrates the 
role of international trade in fostering the just distribution on a national level and 
among individuals which is reflected in the issue of labour standards. While the 
improvement of labour standards has been viewed as a significant element in 
distributing wealth among individuals, the pressure for higher social standards 
which are ahead of rather than in parallel to the economic development of the 
targeted country will not only not improve the distribution of wealth among 
individuals, but will also impede their development and wealth creation processes 
in the first stage. Therefore any adopted approach and solution for addressing 
labour standards in the WTO, in order to respect the requirements of the justice 
principles, should also respect the requirements of parallelism between the 
economic development and social development of the member states. In other 
words, this approach should provide the basis for the goods which have been 
manufactured in the developing countries under social conditions which are 
parallel to the economic development of the country, to be imported into the 
markets of the developed countries.  
 
3.2.2.1.  Different Approaches to Social Standards and WTO: 
Dilemma of Legitimacy and Efficacy 
Following the encroachment of international trade into labour standards and the 
necessity for respecting the parallelism, the debates focus on how the WTO 
system can be improved in a way that contributes to wealth creation on a national 
scale and prevents free trade from being a means of deepening inequality among 
the individuals in society. This debate has taken place in the context of amplified 
criticism over the WTO in recent years and the seeking of more attention from the 
trade forum on non-trade issues. The huge demand from different participants in 
international law over the issue of labour standards has resulted in the fact that in 
the event that the WTO does not give voice to non-trade issues it would encounter 
an amplified and huge mass of criticism as well as an increase in the unilateral 
adoption of measures by members that would weaken the multilateralism.476 For 
this reason, if WTO closes its doors to non-trade issues it would encounter a 
                                                          
476 Jose E. Alvarez, "How Not to Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded Trade Regime," 
Widener Law Symposium Journal 7(2001). p.6 
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situation in which its ability to manage international cooperation would be 
compromised and the legitimacy of the Organization in the sociological sense 
would be at stake.477  
 
On the other hand, one of the most successful features of the WTO is the 
obligatory nature of its commitments which have been attained as a result of its 
effective mechanism for the implementation of decisions. The phenomenon of 
overreaching into other areas has been engendered as a consequence of its 
effectiveness and adding non-trade participants would undermine the 
cohesiveness of this process.478 Due to this consequence, other commentators 
believe that if the WTO becomes a forum for non-trade issues, it would 
overburden the regulatory system of the WTO and undermine the effectiveness of 
all WTO conventions.479 Therefore any solution put forward on the issue of the 
contribution of trade policy to the process of wealth creation on a national level in 
terms of strengthening the labour standards should neither encounter the problem 
of legitimacy, nor put at stake the efficacy of the Organization. Just as in 
following the three different approaches presented in the general linkage 
problems, the same approaches have been studied in analyzing the problem of 
linkage between international trade and social standards, especially the labour 
standards. 
 
3.2.2.1.1. Current System Continuation Approach: No Linkage 
The first approach supports the conservative idea of continuing the current system 
without establishing any linkage between international trade and international 
labour standards. While this approach does not deny the importance of social 
standards as a desirable goal, it is based upon the fact that the expansion of trade 
would lead to economic growth which would make more resources available for 
                                                          
477 Legitimacy has two senses: in a normative sense it indicates "who has the right to rule?" but 
in a sociological sense it refers to "widely be believed to have the right to rule". By problem of 
legitimacy we mainly look at the sociological sense. Buchanan and Keohane, "The Legitimacy of 
Global Governance Institutions." p.405 
478 Guzman, "Global Governance and the Wto." p.333 
479 Jagdish Bhagwati, "Third World Intellectuals and Ngo's, Statement against Linkage," available 
at: https://www2.bc.edu/~anderson/twin-sal12.pdf. p.3 
230 
 
states to address their social problems.480 The classic international trade theory 
rejects the consideration of social standards in the trade forum and the first GATT 
case dealing with discrimination based on social standards was Belgium-Family 
Allowances (Allocations Familiales) in which the GATT panel ruled out the 
establishment of any linkage between international trade and social standards.481 
 
However despite the fact that the WTO's current legal regime does not support 
any involvement of non-trade issues in the trade forum, it provides two means of 
promoting international standards; firstly the possibility of negotiating standards 
in return for preferential tariffs below the bound rates and secondly the grant of 
preferential tariffs to the goods manufactured in developing countries through the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). The proponents of the "no-linkage" 
approach consider the GSP programs as one of the few WTO capabilities in 
improving international standards and support the idea of granting trade 
concessions based on the improvement in social standards of the recipient 
countries.   
 
3.2.2.1.2. Expansion Approach: Explicit Linkage 
The expansionist approach toward labour standards presents certain propositions 
both in the legislative as well as judiciary processes of the WTO. These 
propositions which are based on the establishment of an explicit linkage between 
trade and labour standards range from incorporating a separate chapter such as 
TRIPS for social standards and inserting a social clause in GATT, Article XX, to 
broadening the definition of concepts such as "Like Products" in GATT, Article 
III. While developing a separate chapter or adding a particular clause to general 
exceptions in GATT, Article XX, are all possibilities which WTO Members can 
establish by consensus, broadening the definition of available propositions offers 
                                                          
480 McGinnis and Movsesian, "Against Global Governance in the Wto.", p.356 
481 Belgium- Family Allowances (Allocations Familiales), adopted on 7 November 1952, was a 
complaint submitted by Norwegian and Danish delegations regarding the application of Belgian 
law on the levy of a charge on foreign goods purchased by public bodies when these goods 
originated in a country whose system of family allowance did not meet specific requirements. 
Belgium lost the case although it did not invoke GATT, Article XX. See GATT Panel Report, Belgian 
Family Allowances, G/32, adopted 7 November 1952, BISD 1S/59. 
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the possibility of establishing explicit links between international trade and 
international labour standards in the dispute settlement process. However, in 
studying the feasibility of inserting the production methods in the definition of 
“alike” or the feasibility of resorting to GATT, Article XX(a), for legitimizing 
trade sanctions in cases of violation of labour standards, the limitations of 
interpretation of the WTO Agreement should be considered.482 Certain ideas have 
been proposed on the “like products” basis that an argument can be made that 
goods manufactured under conditions in which the international standards such as 
international labour standards have not been respected will not be qualified to be 
seen in the same context as goods which are physically similar but which have 
been manufactured under different conditions of production. The like products 
argument aims at opening the doors for legitimizing the discrimination between 
the same products which have been produced under different production 
circumstances, hence providing room for international standards to play a role in 
the WTO's legal regime.  
 
However on public morals, GATT, Article XX, states that nothing in the WTO 
Agreement shall be construed as preventing the adoption or enforcement of 
measures necessary to protect public morals and the WTO dispute settlement has 
admitted "public morals" as a concept which can vary in time and space, 
depending upon a range of factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical 
and religious values and the members have the right to determine the level of 
protection that they consider appropriate.483 Therefore, unlike the "like products" 
argument, the argument in "public morals" enjoys more support and is a better 
basis at least for the international labour standards and the proponents of the 
"public morals" proposition believe that the 1998 ILO Declaration on 
"Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work" which considers an obligation for 
ILO members to implement four fundamental principles and rights at work even 
                                                          
482 Some arguments could be made based on the similarities between the product of prison 
labour mentioned in GATT, Article XX(e), and the violation of core labour standards which is far 
from a real legal argument as it cannot broaden the definition of words which explicitly implicate 
other meanings. 
483 Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, WT/DS285/R, adopted 20 April 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS285/AB/R, DSR 2005:XII, 5797, paras. 6.559-461. 
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in the case of non-ratification, presents a real model of "public morals". In 
addition, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Article XIV 
provides a wider notion of “Public Order” as a general exception.  
 
However, establishing explicit linkage by advocating an argument on "public 
morals", is in itself an argument based on "General Exceptions" which serves only 
as a basis for a defense and is faced with certain significant limitations.484 
Moreover, the establishment of an explicit link by interpreting public morals in 
this fashion, apart from causing disputes between public morals, does not 
completely conform to the principles of justice. The International Difference 
Principle requires different treatment with different conditions however the 
application of all labour standards fully without considering the circumstances of 
each member would result in excessive sanctions and generate bad-faith claims 
that do not highlight a successful perspective for this approach. 
 
3.2.2.1.3. Current System Improving approach: Implicit Linkage 
The current WTO legal regime supports no linkage between the international 
trade measures and the international standards, mainly the international labour 
standards and therefore in the WTO legal system, any violation of labour 
standards, even if they are the core international labour standards per se, is not 
considered as violation of WTO commitments.485 However, developing an 
implicit linkage provides the possibility of building up a legal status for the 
international labour standards in the multilateral trade forum.  
 
                                                          
484 The precondition to resort to General Exceptions is the satisfaction of the Article XX chapeau 
and in this case for the public morals argument to be capable of being presented as an 
acceptable defense, it should respect the chapeau of Article XX. Moreover, the General 
Exceptions could be utilized only as a defense and not a claim which should fulfill the 
requirements of the "effects Doctrine" which has been developed in Tuna/Dolphin cases and 
requires the effects on trade be substantial, foreseeable and direct. Bagwell, Mavroidis, and 
Staiger, "It’s a Question of Market Access." p.75 
485 Ibid. p.73 
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In fact the implicit linkage approach in international labour standards shifts the 
point of debate onto the WTO dispute settlement body and calls on the judicial 
body of the multilateral forum to take into account the international norms of 
international law as acceptable norms in the WTO dispute settlement. The non-
violation complaints as a judicial tool within the WTO mechanism has provided 
the capability of establishing implicit linkage between labour standards and the 
trade forum. While the ideal pattern of the WTO in a global justice approach 
looks for the establishment of explicit linkage, the current facts and applicable 
limitations do not provide the necessary conditions for the ideal pattern and thus 
any move toward the ideal position should be taken in gradual steps. The non-
violation complaint provides the first possible step in the current WTO regime 
which tailored by the justice-oriented approach provides a significant step toward 
the enforcement of labour standards within the Member States and contributes 
positively to the wealth creation process on the national scale. 
 
3.2.2.2.  Non-Violation Complaint 
As the WTO Agreement is not a complete set of rules without gaps, it is possible 
for WTO Members to take measures that comply with the letter of the Agreement 
but frustrate one of its objectives or undermine trade commitments contained in 
the Agreement. For this reason, the non-violation complaint has been considered 
as a remedy for such measures.486 By recourse to this category of complaints, the 
member states could claim the nullification and impairment of benefits as a result 
of adopting a measure which is not by itself a violation of the WTO Agreement. 
The GATT, Article XXIII states that the application of a measure, whether or not 
it violates the provisions of the WTO Agreement, could be a basis for a claim "if 
any benefit accruing to the member directly or indirectly under this Agreement is 
being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the 
Agreement is being impeded".487 
                                                          
486 A WTO Secretariat Publication, "Handbook on the Wto Dispute Settlement System," 
Cambridge University Press (2004)., p.32 
487 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XXIII: Nullification or Impairment: "If any 
contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this 
Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement 
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In fact the pecuniary externalities in trade relations which constitute the dominant 
paradigm of the WTO Dispute Settlement advocates nullification or impairment 
as necessary requirements of the WTO complaints mechanism which while 
presumed in the violation complaint, is not presumed in non-violation complaints 
and needs to be proved. However the key point is that this nullification or 
impairment of benefits which is required to be proved in non-violation 
complaints, must be contrary to the legitimate or reasonable expectations of the 
complainant at the time of the negotiations.488 In fact in the current regime of 
WTO law, the WTO Agreement requires that the adopted measure must be 
against the reasonable expectations of the complainant and therefore, in a legal 
sense, adopting a measure which lowers a social standard of a Member State 
could be a basis for a non-violation complaint and in contrast, continuing to apply 
an adopted measure would not fit the category of being reasonably unexpected, in 
a legal sense, and therefore it could at least be a basis for a "situation 
complaint".489 While it could be claimed that the international standards 
mentioned in the international conventions which has been ratified by each WTO 
Member constituted the reasonable expected standards from that country, it would 
not be a suitable criteria as it is evident that a big portion of states which have 
signed agreements, containing standards with obligations in them, do not really 
implement the standards once they ratify them.  
 
The situation is complex in labour standards as on one hand the comparative 
advantages of developing countries are in labour-intensive goods and tough 
labour laws in a country with high rate of unemployment do not function well as 
they  would easily be circumvented. On the other hand, economic growth in many 
developing countries has not lead to improvement in life standards and working 
conditions for many workers. In developing countries, job creation has largely 
                                                                                                                                                              
is being impeded as the result of (a)the failure of another contracting party to carry out its 
obligations under this Agreement, or (b)the application by another contracting party of any 
measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or (c)the existence of 
any other situation." 
488 Faunce TA, "A. Non Violation Nullification of Benefit Claims: Opportunities and Dilemmas in a 
Rule-Based Wto Dispute Settlement System." 
489 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XXIII(c). 
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taken place in the informal economy where around 60 per cent of workers are 
employed and most of them have low incomes, almost no job security and no 
social protection.490 Therefore, since reasonable expectation indicates that 
members' engagement in globalization process would improve their social norms 
parallel to their economic growth, adopting the same standards applied at the time 
of establishing the WTO as the expected standards will not be the right approach. 
The approach, presented in Preamble of Agreement Establishing World Trade 
Organization and GATT, Article XXXVI, declares the WTO's commitment to 
improve the quality of life and to promote progressive development.491   
 
As a result of the implementation of the principles of justice, the solutions put 
forward based on promoting progressive development and improving the quality 
of life should adhere to the requirements of the principles of justice. The 
International Difference Principle requires that countries with different conditions 
and in different situations are not treated in a similar manner and on the contrary, 
similar group of countries can be treated in a similar manner and be expected to 
have a similar level of standards. However, if those countries enjoy different 
levels of economic and social development, it would be unjust to expect from 
them the same level of standards. Therefore, the result is that while a high 
standard should not be expected from a low-income country, neither should a low 
standard be expected from a high-income country.  
 
As an adopted tool in improving standards, the concept of "reasonable 
expectations" at the time of negotiations should be scrutinized to determine the 
real reasonable expectations of WTO members in respecting international 
standards and for this reason the principles of justice insert a new element in 
assessing the concept of reasonable expectation. The concept of parallelism, 
developed under the umbrella of global justice, has been presented as a major 
element of a just scheme of applying social standards. Any proposal for 
promoting social standards as a means of wealth distribution on a national level 
                                                          
490 "Globalization and Informal Jobs in Developing Countries," A Joint Study of International 
Labour Office and the Secretariat of World Trade Organization (ILO&WTO) (2009). 
491 Available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/04-wto-e.htm 
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should accommodate the concept of parallelism and fulfill the requirements of 
parallel social and economic developments. Avoiding the unjust imposition of 
international standards, including labour standards, which favors the interests of 
certain powerful lobbies and industries in wealthier and advanced economies, 
requires that the adopted instrument for promoting the international standards and 
mainly the labour standards, be capable of establishing a procedure to implement 
the demand for parallel social development with economic development of the 
concerned member-states.  
 
In the “Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper”, 
the Panel found that in non-violation complaints, the complaining party must 
demonstrate, under Art. XXIII:1(b), that  a measure has been applied by a WTO 
Member which as a result of the application of the measure, nullification or 
impairment of the benefit accruing under the relevant agreement.  However the 
concept of parallelism inserts a new element according to which, not only will the 
application of an unexpected measure provide a basis for non-violation complaint, 
but also the non-improvement of a social standard in parallel to the economic 
development could constitute the concept of implementing an unexpected 
measure.  In other words, the continued implementation of a measure which at the 
time of its initial application was in accordance with the requirements of the 
involved country, subsequent to which it has not been improved and enhanced in 
parallel to the economic development of the said country, could be construed as 
“the application by another contracting party of any measure” thus falling under 
the scope of GATT Art. XXIII:1(b). 
 
The non-violation complaint with its distinct feature of reasonable expectation 
provides the necessary basis for strengthening the social standards and wealth 
distribution in WTO Members within the current limitations. According to 
reasonable expectation, the implementation of a measure which had been adopted 
in accordance with the principles of justice at the time of its adoption could be 
viewed as unjust if that measure has not developed in parallel with the economic 
development of society. In fact reasonable expectation requires that the WTO 
Member States do not just stick to their social standards which were applicable at 
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the time of their accession to WTO but rather calls on them to improve their 
social standards parallel to their economic prosperity and advancement in wealth 
creation on an international scale. In other words, not only is adopting a measure 
which lowers the social standards of the concerned member from the level of the 
time of their accession to WTO, in general against reasonable expectations, but 
also the non-improvement of the social standards parallel to their economic 
development acts against the legitimate expectation of its trading partners. 
Therefore, in a case of the violation of labour standards interfering with 
competitiveness power, if it can be proved that the measure has not developed in 
parallel to economic development, it provides the necessary basis for the non-
violation complaints.  
 
The non-violation complaint is a weak instrument in the sense that even if the 
complaining party wins the case, there would be no obligation for the responding 
party to withdraw the measure and therefore both parties would need to look for a 
satisfactory solution.492  However, the reports of the panels or the Appellate Body 
on this ground recognize the disputed measure as an unjust and illegitimate 
measure which is a step forward in engaging the WTO on the issue of labour 
standards and would force the responding party to seek for a satisfactory 
adjustment in favor of the complaining party. In fact, while an amendment to the 
"Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes" 
(DSU) for improving the implementation process of non-violation complaints 
seems necessary and useful, the principles of justice contribute to the social 
development of WTO Members by starting from an existing potentiality within 
the current mechanism of WTO, which by mere declaration of a measure as an 
unjust and illegitimate measure, facilitates the path for further developments. 
 
3.2.2.2.1. Interpretive Guideline 
Consequently the question would be how to litigate a case brought in WTO DS 
based on a non-violation complaint dealing with violating a labour standard with 
pecuniary impacts and how should the panel and Appellate Body determine that 
                                                          
492 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Article 
26(b) 
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the violation of the specific standard was against reasonable expectation? Despite 
the few cases initiated based on non-violation complaints which have been 
litigated in WTO DS organs, there is no criteria through which the judicial organs 
could distinguish between a standard that is reasonably expected and a standard 
which is not reasonably expected at the time of negotiation. This gap, which could 
weaken the predictability of the dispute settlement process, should be filled by 
referring to and considering the textual interpretation of the WTO Agreement as 
well as the principles of justice. The proposed solution for filling this gap is an 
"Interpretive Guideline" which by scrutinizing the legitimate and reasonable 
expectations, categorizes the international standards especially the international 
labour standards, based on different classes of members. This Guideline could be 
formulated by a group of economic and social experts while considering legal and 
political limitations and the WTO members should be classified into certain 
categories and classes and this classification should be based upon diverse 
economic indicators pertinent to the development process.  
 
The "Interpretive Guideline" could help judicial organs of the WTO to recognize 
what kind of standards should be expected from the respondent members and 
would force states to improve their social standards parallel to the speed of their 
economic growth. Although WTO members are typically concerned about panels 
and the Appellate Body's reference to any other agreements and documents 
outside the WTO agreements, this "Interpretive Guideline" would not be binding 
for the WTO's judicial organs, nor would it be necessary for it to be mentioned 
explicitly in their reports in the current regime of WTO and instead, it would 
operate as an indicative notion of reasonable expectations to enrich the case-by-
case analysis of DS organs.493  Even in child labour cases, a stage by stage and 
step by step approach could be implemented as experience shows that an absolute 
ban on goods produced by children without considering the social environment of 
the affected country would constitute improper action.  
 
                                                          
493 According to Japan-Film panel report, reasonable anticipation must be assessed on a case-by-
case basis. Panel Report, Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 
WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 April 1998, DSR 1998: IV, 1179, Paras. 10.90-349. 
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Using this method would be in the benefit of both developing and developed 
countries. While it frees the developing countries from excessive demand of 
higher standards, it provides a legal tool for developed countries to sanction those 
who have not improved their social norms and standards parallel to their 
economic growth. Furthermore, non-violation complaint supplemented with an 
Interpretive Guideline would not only address the direct effects of the matter but 
also address the indirect effects. In comparison with other WTO tools and 
solutions such as banning importation of goods based on public morals, the 
members could address both the direct effects (e.g. child labour only in export 
industry) and the indirect effects (e.g. child labour in whole industry) of the 
violation of labour standards on competitiveness in a more comprehensive and 
just manner.  
 
The proposed solution is based on a real interpretation and this Guideline does not 
need to be adopted by WTO Members' decision. It does not diminish or add to 
any commitment undertaken as part of the obligation of the members and by well-
scrutinizing a potential tool within the WTO arrangement, it avoids the problem 
of legitimacy. On the other side, by clarifying the real position of WTO members 
and the real expected standards, it prevents potential abuse of the system, whether 
advancing protectionist goals by hiding behind the claims for higher standards or 
violating real human rights by asserting the claims for maintenance of 
comparative advantage. While in a non-violation complaint, the burden of proof 
rests upon the complaining party,494 adopting the Interpretive Guideline by a 
decision of the WTO Members establishes a presumption in favor of complaining 
party to establish the Prima Facie case. While the Appellate Body has agreed with 
the WTO panel approach in approaching the remedy in Article XIII:1 (b) with 
caution as an exception remedy,495 the “Interpretive Guideline” initiative transfers 
the remedy in non-violation complaints from an exception to a rule and in a 
situation which WTO resist against establishing linkage with non-trade issues and 
specially the labour standards, the Interpretive Guideline initiative provides a 
                                                          
494 See Panel Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, WT/DS135/R and Add.1, adopted 5 April 2001, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS135/AB/R, DSR 2001: VIII, 3305. Paras. 8.285-303. 
495 Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001: VII, 3243. Paras. 186-190 
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reform within the system by which any WTO Member could claim against the 
labour standards of other WTO Members which nullify or impair its legitimate 
benefits. 
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Conclusion 
The theory of justice, among the schools of legal theory, has been a major source 
of influence on decisions, regulations and laws. In fact the distributive justice 
approach is a normative value which does not override other normative values 
such as efficiency and liberty, but rather coexists with them while acting as a 
guide and primary principle.496 The cosmopolitan perception of justice, as 
reflected in the global government perspective has been viewed by some 
commentators as the only acceptable moral principle. However the justice 
approach, as expanded upon in this research, still considers individual states as the 
main actors in international relations.497 For a theoretical approach to be 
applicable, the practical realities of the existing situation should be considered as 
a result of which the focus on individual states as the initiators of international 
organizations and international decisions and commitments has resulted in the 
“global governance” approach; a path between the global government and the 
individual states as the only participants of international relations.  
 
3.3. Theory of Justice and the WTO's Structure 
In structure, the global governance approach rejects the white and black concept 
of justice and advocates for the relevancy and applicability of the principles of 
justice by considering a new layer between the individual states and the global 
government. The theory of distributive justice and its extension in international 
relations as the adopted framework of this research perceives the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) as an opportunity for fostering the justice targets and 
principles. The WTO has proved itself to be one of the most powerful and 
successful organizations in international relations. The binding rules and 
                                                          
496 Breyer, "Health Care Rationing and Distributive Justice Author." p.398 
497 Canto-Sperber, "The Normative Foundations of Cosmopolitanism." p.279 
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enforcement mechanisms of the WTO have made it one of the most influential 
international institutions and its wide membership scope together with the 
possibility of attaining membership for the non-members have introduced it as a 
real global forum which is qualified for discussing global problems.  
 
The desirability for the economic integration of national economies and the 
political feasibility of establishing peace by bridging the fate of countries together 
and making nation-states more dependent on each other resulted in the 
establishment of an organization which by advocating the removal of the tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to trade, facilitated the process of international integration 
based on free trade and the comparative advantage approach. The establishment 
of the WTO following the GATT served as a remarkable step for the integration 
process and filled many existing gaps in the international structure by addressing 
trade-related issues and concerns.  
 
The WTO as a multilateral forum with a remarkable record in decision-making 
and dispute settlement represents an important model of cooperation at an 
international level which has provided many opportunities and chances. Even 
though the WTO was established to address international trade issues, the lack of 
a supranational authority having the power to implement decisions and to settle 
disputes arising from the implementation of legal provisions has resulted in non-
trade international issues and problems being brought before the WTO. Even 
though this may be perceived negatively from a pure-trade perspective and seen 
as superfluous to the original intention of the states at the time of establishment of 
GATT or the WTO, it has resulted in the provision of different opportunities 
while at the same time enabling the WTO to showcase its capabilities across a 
much wider scope. In fact the WTO has been placed at the center of discussions 
regarding many non-trade problems such as environmental issues, labour 
standards, equality etc. and this central role has provided the possibility of a semi-
leadership role in global governance.  
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From the global governance perspective, the WTO has the potential for taking on 
a prominent role in international coordination and cooperation thereby becoming 
an integral and significant part of global governance. The global justice approach 
looks at the WTO as a complex set of rules and principles which has significantly 
affected the distribution of wealth across the globe and hence it could and it 
should be utilized to contribute to international cooperation in addressing global 
problems. In other words, the WTO, despite its reluctance, has been placed at the 
crossroads of global governance and this in itself while securing significant 
potential for the WTO through the myriad of open avenues also confers certain 
responsibilities on the WTO. However, in order to profit from the potential 
openings available to the WTO through the effective harnessing of its capabilities, 
a certain element of redesigning and restructuring is required in order to better 
equip the WTO and make it more capable of efficiently and comprehensively 
addressing the problem of inequality.  
 
The theory of justice seeks pure corrective justice to be reflected in the structure 
of the WTO and requires the removal of political considerations. The first 
principle of justice seeks improvement in the transparency of the WTO’s 
decision-making process to reduce the problem of agency and the absence of 
direct democratic input. It calls for the involvement of non-trade ministers in the 
decision-making process to reduce the risk of regulatory capture and limit the 
scope of power of interests groups which act against distribution-centred policies. 
It requires the multi-lateralization of the negotiation process and a move from the 
current principal supplier approach to a more diversified approach in which the 
coalitions of the less-developed countries have a louder voice. 
 
In the execution of the WTO rules, procedural justice rejects the half-
mercantilism, half-free trade approach of the member states toward international 
trade and equal treatment, as a result of originating from the first principle of 
justice it calls upon all WTO Members to approach identical issues on an equal 
basis and also for WTO members to be treated equally in the distribution of 
burdens and benefits. The application of the first principle of justice to the 
execution process of the WTO promotes the idea of removing the asymmetry of 
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economic options and bringing about the enjoyment of the same level of 
opportunities. 
 
While the WTO dispute settlement process seems more compatible with the 
requirements of the first principle of justice than the decision-making and 
execution process of the WTO, certain features and rules of the WTO DS process 
should be improved to deal with the deficiencies of the judicial organ of the 
WTO. The transparency of the mechanism should be increased to reduce the 
shortcomings associated with reduce the shortcomings associated with the agency 
problem. The non-governmental participants should be able to monitor the dispute 
settlement process and also be able to have access to the proceedings, information 
and the national governments’ positions during the dispute settlement process. 
Political considerations should be minimized and the possibility of having access 
to different forums for dispute settlement should be considered through a justice-
oriented approach which provides implementation measures and remedies on an 
equal basis. The adjudication-negotiation issue should be dealt with and certain 
checks and controls should be established to monitor the interpretation of the 
WTO rules and to ensure that the panel and Appellate Body’s interpretations are 
faithful to the text of the WTO Agreement. 
 
However on the other side of a purely corrective nature of the WTO DS process is 
the weakness of the developing and least-developed countries in fact-finding, 
meeting cost payments and investigating and utilizing the possibility of retaliation 
which has contributed to the fact that the dispute settlement process is mostly 
used by the developed countries. The unequal standings of the WTO Members in 
the WTO DS process is not a question of corrective justice, rather it looks for 
substantial inequality among the WTO Members and call for second principle of 
justice. 
 
The study of the WTO’s strategy; i.e. on international trade, from the perspective 
of the first principle of justice, provides certain deviations from this principle 
which has resulted in the developing and least-developed countries suffering the 
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most. The high level of tariffs on certain goods in which the developing countries 
enjoy a comparative advantage, the existing fairness in the WTO regulation and 
the reality of the WTO Members’ schedule of commitments, employing new 
forms of protections and tailored rules of origin in favor of national economic 
sectors, the subsidies especially in agricultural goods and cotton in certain rich 
countries and the existing gaps in provisions provide departures from the equal 
treatment approach and  it is the developed countries who are able to take 
advantage of this non-conformity. According to the theory of justice, these 
problems should be resolved and an equal basis for competition for all the WTO 
Members should be provided. 
 
3.4. Theory of Justice and the International Trade 
Strategy 
The general aim and target of free trade is to alleviate the problem of an 
individuals' welfare and any attempt to promote and develop free trade on a 
higher scale and level requires that groups of people and individuals arrive at the 
understanding and belief that the wealth created as a result of the development 
process would be distributed fairly. However the issue of distribution is not the 
objective when making reference to trade theory. While trade liberalization brings 
growth and increases wealth for the WTO Members, it falls short by not directing 
wealth distribution in order to contribute to global welfare. Therefore not only is 
the distribution of wealth on an international level and between the WTO 
Members not fulfilled, but also the trade forum has relegated policy-making for 
national distribution to the decision making arena of individual states domestic 
policies and therefore based on the current situation, the WTO would be unable to 
play an influential role in the translation of economic growth and wealth creation 
to human welfare and wealth distribution. 
 
When considering the dilemma between the laissez faire approach which rejects 
the interference of the trade forum on any social objective basis and the planning 
approach, the planning approach seeks to bring to the fore the thinking of justice 
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and distribution ofn an international scale.498 For developing countries, free trade 
has been viewed as more likely to exacerbate their dependence on the exportation 
of raw materials rather than enabling them to seek the diversification of their trade 
opportunities.499 Therefore the claims of developing countries’ go further than 
simply having procedural justice and an argument exists for having substantial 
justice with a balanced outcome.500 In other words, it is not only the equality of 
opportunity that matters, but additionally the equality of outcome should also be 
considered. 
 
Many academics, lawyers and practitioners resist against the concept of creating 
links between the trade forum and non-trade issues and will only attend to or 
explore the global non-trade problems up to the extent to which they have been 
provided for or commented upon by the WTO Agreement in an explicit manner. 
However the theoretical study of legal issues and international problems goes 
beyond the positive arguments of practitioners and takes into consideration an 
ethical value for any side of the argument. Therefore the legal theory of 
international law and the WTO, if it is to be applied to analyse a resultant role for 
the WTO as a result of being faced with global problems and international non-
trade issues, should go a step further than a positive and pragmatist approach to 
the WTO and study the existing and potential possibilities. 
 
The evolution in the global economy and the highlighting of the outcome of the 
international trade rounds of negotiations has proved that international trade law 
can no longer ignore he requirements of justice principles. Consequently certain 
institutional arrangements are required in order to make international trade work 
for all members and individuals rather than limited groups and individuals. 
However, certain significant criticisms have been discussed regarding the 
interference of justice concerns in international trade law that could result in 
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domestic protectionist abuses and therefore, these concerns and criticisms should 
be considered in designing the justice-based scheme for international trade.501 
 
3.4.1. Free Trade and Second Principle of Justice 
However the theory of justice looks beyond equal treatment among the WTO 
Members and calls for change in the way of approaching trade negotiations and 
asks that member-states, instead of seeking to maximize the interest of their 
domestic economic sectors, conduct their negotiations in a way which targets the 
objective of development.502 The promotion of international trade within the 
multilateral trade forum requires the development in the belief that international 
trade can contribute to the fair distribution of wealth across boundaries. However, 
the view of the neutral theory of free trade based on the efficiency model of 
international trade is that international trade will not result in just income 
distribution and it is also an important element why the distributional and justice 
aims are not achieved. The efficiency and comparative advantage school as 
followed by the trade forum only cares about trade liberalization and welfare 
maximization. 
 
The second principle of justice requires that all standards and principles of 
international relations be established in a manner which puts the less advantaged 
members in a more favorable position than the advanced members; this refers to 
the standards and principles from investment, trade, loans, intellectual properties 
and international taxation regimes through to environmental standards, use of 
international resources, international social and labour standards etc. The 
relevancy of the second principle of justice depends on the nature of the WTO 
Agreement. While the contractual nature of the WTO refuses the intervention of 
any non-contractual value and concept, the relevancy of the second principle of 
justice in its perception, views the WTO as a unique multilateral treaty and a 
whole package of regulations and dispute settlement process which cannot be 
divided into bilateral treaties.  
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The relevancy of justice requirements to the WTO and international trade also 
depends on the question of trade linkage and the WTO’s reaction to this question 
and the problem of priorities. While as a matter of fact, the broadened scope of 
the WTO has resulted in the overreaching of international trade into other scopes, 
the implementation of the theory of justice on the WTO and trade looks for the 
WTO’s position on the question of trade linkage. The theory of distributive justice 
and its application to trade strategy is a matter of linkage between trade and 
inequality and for the WTO as a coordinator and leading institute in global 
governance, there is no way other than accepting the linkage between the trade 
forum and non-trade issues in a manner which does not put the efficiency of the 
WTO at stake.  
 
The impossibility of the presumption of reducing international economic 
cooperation and the fact that effective trade measures have an impact within 
national borders and on non-trade issues, have ensured that the approach which 
denies any connectivity between trade and non-trade issues and which believes 
that the WTO should only be devoted to the trade agenda, is seen as an unrealistic 
view.503 The connectivity of trade and non-trade issues have therefore made the 
view that the WTO should only care about trade issues non-acceptable and 
initiatives such as the GSP programs, Belgium Standard of Labeling and Eco-
Labels which have been taken by WTO members in a unilateral manner illustrates 
the increasing demand for managing the problem of linkage such that in the event 
that  the WTO does not serve as a pacemaker for managing international 
problems, it would in itself be weakened even in its role of handling the trade 
agenda.504  
 
In other words, when faced with the dilemma of legitimacy or efficiency with 
regard to the linkage issues which originate from the interference of special 
interests and the issue of comparative advantage, the WTO should play a 
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complementary role and admit the trade linkage together with other non-trade 
issues to the extent that it does not put at stake the efficiency of the multilateral 
trade forum. Answering the question of trade linkage seems necessary for 
designing the scheme of justice principles applicable to the WTO and trade. The 
consequence of adopting a trade strategy as the efficient and reliable strategy for 
establishing a sustainable process of development and reducing the inequality gap 
is that the trade strategy should be capable of incorporating other global problems 
which are not necessarily trade issues.  
 
Therefore the question of inequality and justice should be addressed as a linkage 
issue and the WTO should consider the requirements of justice on both 
international and national scales and thereby incorporate a positive role for 
distributive justice in the WTO’s rules and regulations in a manner which 
minimizes the risk of inefficiency for the WTO. Therefore the second principle of 
justice in international trade strategy looks for the implementation of the 
requirements of justice for wealth distribution on both the international and 
national levels. 
 
3.4.2. Wealth Distribution on International Level 
The concept of wealth distribution from the rich countries to the low-income 
countries has been discussed in the linkage between development and trade. The 
launch of the Doha Round presented a new approach towards the trade-based 
policies by creating some distancing away from the pure free trade policy and 
including development as one of the targets of the trade forum. The Doha Round 
was set up to ensure that a considerable part of the demands of the developing and 
least-developed countries were put on the agenda and for this reason it provided 
certain concessions in order to meet the developing countries’ claims due to the 
asymmetry caused as a result of the Uruguay Round. The concessions made were 
considered to represent a gesture of goodwill rather than being a real contribution; 
however the Doha Round opened the door for non-trade concerns and for the first 
time, the deviations from traditional free trade rules were tolerated and approved. 
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3.4.2.1.  Two-Stage Mechanism (outcome-Based) and One-
Stage Mechanism (Rule-Based) 
However the implementation of the second principle of justice goes further than a 
development-based approach and calls for the just distribution of wealth among 
individuals on a global basis. The 2009 Ministerial Conference called for “an 
ambitious, balanced and development-oriented” outcome, providing a better 
theoretical framework for arguing in favor of wealth creation for the lower-
income countries. While the existence of national boundaries has made wealth 
distribution among individuals possible at two levels, at the first level the creation 
of wealth for developing countries has resulted in a debate on the WTO’s role in 
wealth distribution, specifically whether or not an outcome-oriented or a rule-
oriented approach should be adopted.  
 
In the outcome-based approach, to materialize the proposed balanced outcome, it 
has been suggested that the WTO be transformed into a "payment organization". 
The outcome-oriented approach shifts from a reciprocal to a “balanced outcome” 
approach and invents a “payment mechanism” through which the party who gains 
the most should compensate the party who gains less from a decision or 
transaction. In other words, through a two-stage approach, a double-transaction 
scheme is considered which provides a direct transfer payment mechanism to 
transfer the wealth created to the less advantaged parties until the stage at which 
the outcome is seen as a balanced outcome. 
 
However the two-stage mechanism would not be a good solution for the current 
WTO structure and trade strategy and would require significant changes in the 
WTO which therefore makes it less feasible. The rule-based nature of the WTO is 
viewed as a key ingredient for the success of the WTO and any solution for 
implementing the principle of justice should consider the rule-based nature of the 
WTO as the priority framework for the proposed solution. Therefore the balanced 
outcome in this structure requires that the multilateral trade forum moves from the 
Pareto-efficiency policies toward the distributional approach in relation to 
resources and wealth and implement the concept of the second principle of justice 
within the current structure of the WTO rules. The ideal theory of global justice 
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looks for a set of rules and regulations which enables the multilateral trade forum 
to accommodate both efficiency and distributional approaches as the output of the 
entire system. 
 
The second principle of justice rules for unequal treatment for unequal members 
not in a double-transaction mechanism, but rather in the whole WTO framework; 
i.e. the Agreements, legal provisions, decisions, panel and Appellate Body reports 
etc., in order to enable them to accommodate the aims of the distributional 
approach alongside the Pareto efficiency policies. Therefore, global justice 
requires that the current arrangements be changed in order to shift towards a 
model underpinned by fairness and this will require the inclusion of rules and 
principles from which the output will be the fair distribution of wealth. The 
unequal treatment through the current rule-based structure of the WTO considers 
that the regional trade arrangements and special and differential treatment are the 
means of applying the second principle of justice. 
 
3.4.2.2.  Regionalism and Preferential Trade Agreements 
The regional and preferential trade agreements have been studied and been 
viewed as significant and considerable examples of development instruments put 
in place in order to facilitate the process of wealth creation. In fact the principal 
aim of establishing a regional arrangement is to create better trade conditions at a 
level lower than on a global scale in order to ensure that the industries and 
economic sectors of the members of the regional agreements are capable of being 
efficient enough to compete on a global scale. International trade has experienced 
positive RTAs and PTAs both among the developing and also the developed 
countries. These Agreements could provide preferential access to the markets of 
the other parties to the Agreement in order to make the economic sectors of the 
low-income countries ready to compete on a worldwide scale. 
 
However the overall experience of having the RTAs and PTAs in place proves 
that regional integration cannot be viewed as a comprehensive solution for the 
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problem of inequality. The structure of a regional establishment in a general sense 
is not compatible with the generally applicable rules and principles on structure 
within international justice theory. The international justice theory requires a 
comprehensive global governance body to be responsible for addressing the issue 
of inequality in a unified and global manner whereas within the regional 
arrangements each country has their own structure and strategy and the overlaps 
in their structure and strategy normally neutralize each other's efficiency. 
Moreover, in practice due to the small size of the economies of the low-income 
countries, the regional arrangements among the low-income countries (south-
south) have created divergence among this class of countries and instead of 
improving their economic capabilities, they have exacerbated the inequality 
between the least-developed and developing countries.  
 
The initiatives for the integration of the low-income countries with the developed 
countries have not resulted in the expected desirable outcome and the disparities 
in economic and political power of the members of the RTAs and PTAs which are 
of a north-south nature have further contributed to the significant influence of the 
powerful members thus leading to the marginalization of the weaker members. 
Therefore, the preferential and regional trade agreements, whether in a south-
south framework or north-south establishment have fallen short of being a 
comprehensive solution for the issue of inequality and the implementation of the 
second principle of justice and will therefore not work as the strategy for the 
theory of justice. 
 
3.4.2.3.  Asymmetric Trade Liberalization and Special and 
Differential Treatment 
As a key aspect of strategy the asymmetry of trade liberalization in favor of the 
weak and less powerful members of the WTO should be established.505 The newly 
adopted theme in the Doha Round views the utilization of asymmetric rules and 
principles and the resulting balanced outcome as a consequence of the 
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implementation of these provisions and rules. The second principle of justice 
requires an asymmetric mechanism for regulating the advanced and less-
developed countries while guaranteeing a minimum level of balanced outcomes. 
The asymmetric arrangement requires clear, mandatory and comprehensive 
special and differential treatment in order to facilitate the development process of 
the least-developed and developing countries. 
 
The fundamental problem is that the starting point, or the basis that is used for 
determining the commitments of the different members, is completely unequal. 
However this inequality was not established to benefit the more vulnerable ones 
who are socially and economically more fragile. On the contrary, this inequality 
was set up to benefit the stronger countries. Therefore the “power of threats” as 
utilized during the Uruguay Round has also affected the various rounds of 
negotiation conducted after the Uruguay Round.506 The Special and Differential 
Treatment for the marginalized members of the trade forum is a developmental 
solution that was proposed to complement free trade; this solution is seen to be an 
exception to the equal treatment of the WTO Members and seeks to provide 
asymmetry of trade liberalization. 
 
The international difference principle looks for a particular set of rules and 
commitments for the less-advantaged members of society and to this end “Special 
and Differential Treatment” in favor of the least-developed and developing 
countries has been designed in order to provide a more favorable trade regime for 
the weaker members of international trade. The S&Ds are generally provided 
through market protection and market access measures and the capacity building 
and technical assistance provisions have acted as their complementary pillar. The 
S&Ds have worked as a major exception to the dominant feature of reciprocity as 
the rule of the WTO and as a result, a limited reciprocity approach has been 
crafted which accommodates the S&D measures and rules.  
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In fact the rationale of looking for special rules and principles for the weaker 
members of international society with the aim of removing the inequality and 
gaps existing between them and the developed countries conforms to the 
theoretical model which the theory of justice and the global governance approach 
seek to embrace. However in practice, certain deficiencies and problems have 
made the implementation of these measures ineffective. The principle of self-
determination and the discretionary nature of S&Ds for the developed countries 
have made these measures vulnerable to political considerations in granting a 
concession. The self-determination approach has caused the exclusion of the 
goods in which the developing countries have comparative advantage, the 
competitive goods, the free movement of people and also the lack of S&Ds in 
services. Additionally, the conditionality of GSP programs has made these 
programs a means of promoting and imposing international standards desirable to 
the developed countries and these have been drafted in a manner which act 
against other desirable goals, and therefore the lack of legal security has 
prevented the developing countries from counting on favorable measures in order 
to pursue their development policies.  
 
However, the international difference principle looks for a comprehensive and 
binding solution. It rejects the discretionary and exceptional nature of the S&Ds 
and looks for a comprehensive and binding rule parallel to the efficiency and 
equal treatment mechanism of the WTO. Therefore in moving towards a 
distribution-oriented mechanism, the current rule-based approach of the WTO 
should be the point of departure and that is what the S&Ds should be focused on. 
The theory of justice and the implementation of the international difference 
principle at the first stage of wealth distribution on an international level within 
the WTO require that the Special and Differential Treatment moves from a 
discretionary and unilateral program with political considerations to a legal and 
rule-based framework which results in a firm commitment for developed 
countries. In other words, the second principle of justice looks for unequal 
treatment with unequal members for the S&Ds and to fulfill the requirements of 
this approach it should adopt substantive binding criteria for defining the unequal 
members and setting out the unequal treatment in order to produce legally-binding 
commitments for the developed countries and in favor of the least-developed and 
developing countries. 
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3.4.3. Wealth Distribution on National Level: Parallel 
Development 
The second stage of the implementation of the international difference principle 
looks for the distribution of created wealth in the first stage on a national level 
among the individuals who are the citizens of the global society in the ideal global 
justice theory. The WTO as the lead organization in the global governance 
scheme should take into consideration the wealth distribution on a national scale 
as well and it should also make sure that the benefit of international trade 
contributes to the well-being of people on an individual level. 
 
A single-forum dealing with global problems has the advantage of handling all 
issues comprehensively and in a cohesive manner and adopting the WTO as the 
leading organization in global governance increases the possibility of finding a 
multilateral solution for the distribution of wealth through strengthening the 
policies which help the national governments to arrive at the distributional goal on 
a national level. While the intervention of international trade on the second stage 
of wealth distribution on a national level is reflected in international labour 
standards, finding a multilateral response for the non-trade issues and the 
international labour standards within the trade forum becomes the critical question 
of the theory of justice. The international labour standards as a major part of 
social development highlight the importance of the competitiveness and 
comparative advantage in current international trade and the significant position 
of non-trade issues. 
 
Despite the fact that NGOs are the international participants who support 
establishing an explicit link between international trade and international labour 
standards, the connectivity of international labour standards and the issue of 
comparative advantage and the fact that the developed countries are the countries 
who support establishing the link, has led to the belief among the developing 
countries that the motivation for including the labour standards in the trade forum 
is more of a hidden protectionist interest. The principle of justice requires that the 
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proper level of social standards be set with regard to the weakness and power of 
the national economies. The international difference principle provides unequal 
treatment for unequal members and as a result of the contribution of the theory of 
justice to the problem of labour standards, social development should be 
envisaged in parallel to economic. 
 
The WTO cannot on one hand reduce its impact on non-trade issues and on the 
other hand give international law precedence over its own law and hence any 
solution rendered which seeks to take a step forward in the improvement of labour 
standards should consider this dilemma. The dilemma of legitimacy and efficacy 
is the situation which the WTO is facing in considering the non-trade issues and 
any solution put forward to deal with the problem of labour standards should 
neither be faced with the problem of legitimacy, nor put at stake the efficiency of 
the multilateral trade forum. The WTO's experience highlights the fact that in this 
structure, big bargains with such diverse interests and member-states can hardly 
be reached and the WTO's new era is the era of minute but constant steps that will 
take place in the WTO's judicial process. The judicial process, however, has 
limitations and deficiencies of its own and it totally depends on the ability of 
members to identify violations and their willingness to bring complaints against 
other members. Nevertheless, it's the only available solution to avoid the 
dilemma. Propositions made based on the judicial interpretation of existing 
articles and provisions could all be indicative of progress and a step forward. 
 
The international difference principle requires that countries which enjoy different 
levels of economic development should not be expected to attain the same level of 
standards and therefore while a high standard should not be expected from a low-
income country, neither should a low standard be expected from a high-income 
country. Therefore, interpreting legal expressions such as "public morals", "like 
products" and other provisions all indicate the considerable potential of the WTO 
Agreement to address the problem of labour standards however they lack the 
required parallelism and fail to observe social development which is parallel to 
economic development. In contrast, the non-violation complaint in the WTO 
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Agreement is a tool that would not force states to respect international standards 
alone. 
 
The concept of parallelism requires that the continued implementation of a 
measure which at the time of its initial application was in accordance with the 
requirements of the involved country and subsequent to which it has not been 
improved and enhanced in parallel to the economic development of the said 
country be construed as “the application …. of any measure” thus falling under 
the scope of GATT Art. XXIII:1(b). The non-violation complaint is argued based 
on the reasonable expectation of the WTO Members and this basis provides the 
justificatory basis for strengthening social standards according to the second 
principle of justice and the social development which should be parallel to the 
economic development. The reasonable expectation requires that the WTO 
Members should not to stick to their social standards which were applicable at the 
time of their accession to the WTO. The international difference principle call for 
improvement of social standards parallel to the economic prosperity of the WTO 
Members and therefore if it can be proved that the social standards in question 
have not improved parallel to  the economic development, it provides the 
necessary basis for a non-violation complaint. 
 
While the non-violation complaint is a weak instrument in general, the mere 
recognition of a disputed measure as an unjust and illegitimate measure is a step 
forward in creating a leading role for the WTO on this issue. However in the 
WTO dispute settlement, when it comes to panels, a lack of criteria exists based 
on which the WTO DS organs would be able to distinguish between a measure 
which was not reasonably expected at the time of negotiation and a measure 
which is expected. Therefore to fill the gap, an “Interpretive Guideline” has been 
proposed for development which will categorize the international labour standards 
based on different economic levels of the WTO Members. This Guideline could 
help the WTO panels and Appellate Body to determine the real reasonable 
expected measures based on the theory of justice and will provide the legal 
backing to force the WTO Members to improve their social standards. 
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By practically defining the features of reasonable expectation in an "Interpretive 
Guideline", the matter of parallelism would be taken into account and the 
possibility of compliance would be increased. This Guideline would make each 
member's position transparent, leading to some kind of external public pressure 
even in a case of non-dispute and provides a multilateral response to the problem. 
This document would not be binding on the WTO’s judicial body however it 
would work as an indicative definition for reasonable expectation and as it would 
not be a new substantive measure or a new burden or commitment, it would not 
require the consensus-based decision-making process. However a decision 
adopting the Interpretive Guideline could make it more efficient and establish a 
strong presumption in favor of the complainant. The "Interpretive Guideline" 
would provide for the developed countries, the possibility to decide to improve a 
low but legitimate standard of developing or least-developed member, by offering 
them equivalent concessions during the negotiation process and would provide the 
criteria to distinguish between the real and legitimate demands of humanitarian 
concerns (developed countries) and comparative advantages (developing 
countries), from illegitimate goals hiding behind specious claims. 
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